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Abstract 
     William James’ theory of emotion has had a profound impact within philosophy and 
psychology over the last 130 years.  While his counterintuitive James-Lange theory – which 
asserts that an emotion is the feeling of bodily changes – has been widely criticized, it has 
also had its supporters over the years, including recently with advocates from neuroscience, 
psychology and philosophy.  In part one (Chapters 1-4), I argue that critics and advocates 
alike have misinterpreted James on emotion due to a neglect of his overarching framework as 
developed in The Principles of Psychology.  The James-Lange theory remains silent on a 
number of philosophical questions, including the relationship between emotion and 
consciousness, the nature of an emotional feeling, and the relationship between emotion and 
other mental and bodily phenomena, such as instinct, habit, will and attention.  By 
considering James’ views on these matters, I hope to show that his comprehensive theory of 
emotion is far different than traditionally conceived.  As a result, the standard criticisms of 
the theory, such as its inability to account for intentionality, cannot be sustained.   
     In part two (Chapters 5-7), I consider James’ later treatment of emotion as developed in 
The Will to Believe and The Varieties of Religious Experience.  While it is generally thought 
that James employs a cognitive theory of emotion in these later works, I argue that this is not 
the case; that his treatment of emotion is continuous with his earlier theory.  Nevertheless, 
James does expand his conception of emotion in The Varieties of Religious Experience with 
his discussion of two kinds of emotions: feelings of reality and transformational emotions.  I 
attempt to draw out the important implications that these two kinds of emotions have for the 
relationship between emotion and belief.  In the final chapter, I turn my attention to The Will 
to Believe.  I contend that the many misinterpretations of this short essay are rooted in a 
misunderstanding of what James means by ‘our passional nature’.  Drawing upon my 
previous analysis of emotion, I present what I take to be James’ ultimate argument in the 
essay, which is far more passionate than the prevailing right to believe interpretation. 
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Introduction: More than a Century of Misunderstanding 
One would be hard pressed to name a theory of emotion, whether in the history of 
philosophy or psychology that is more famous than William James’.  The theory 
challenges common presuppositions about the ordering of an emotional episode.  Instead 
of an emotion causing the bodily changes, James famously asserts that “the bodily 
changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the 
same changes as they occur IS the emotion” ([1890], 2: 449).  Given this inversion of 
commonsense thinking, James concludes that we run from a threat not because we are 
frightened, but rather we are “frightened because we run” ([1890], 2: 450).  This 
counterintuitive theory has become known as the James-Lange theory of emotion, so 
named because the Danish physiologist Carl Lange came up with a similar view 
independently of James.1  Despite the theory’s fame, it has been widely criticized, both 
by James’ contemporaries (Gurney [1884], Irons [1894], Wundt [1891]), and more recent 
critics (Deigh [2014], Gordon [1987], Solomon [2007]).  It has even been referred to as 
“the Dumb View” of emotion (Jaggar [2008]).  However, the theory has had its 
supporters throughout the years, including recently, with advocates from neuroscience, 
psychology and philosophy (Damasio [1994]; Dewey [1894] [1895]; Laird [2007]; Prinz 
[2004]; Ratcliffe [2005] [2008]; Robinson [2005]).  In fact, it is not an exaggeration to 
say that the theory is currently undergoing something of a revival.   
     As theorists continue to disagree over the general merits of James’ feeling theory, 
most are in agreement as to what its commitments are.  But what precisely is this 
exegetical agreement based on?  Here we find critics and advocates alike focusing 
exclusively on James’ two primary works on emotion: 1) his 1884 article “What is An 
Emotion?” published in Mind, and 2) his chapter on “The Emotions” in The Principles of 
Psychology (hereafter The Principles).  This is simply too narrow a focus.   
                                                
1 While both regard physiological changes as the cause of emotion, Lange emphasizes the role of the 
vasomotor system, which regulates blood flow.  For James, the physiological changes are more extensive, 
including changes in the viscera, facial expressions, and even expressive behavior. 
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     It is surprising that while James is generally classified as holding a feeling theory of 
emotion, there has been no inquiry into what he means by ‘feeling’.  When we begin to 
consider James’ conception of feeling, broadly construed, we are led to consider another 
famous theory he develops in The Principles – his stream of consciousness theory.  Yet 
interpreters have for the most part overlooked the relationship between his conception of 
consciousness and emotion.  Moreover, there has been little attempt to draw out the 
interconnectedness for James between emotion and other mental and bodily phenomena, 
including belief, instinct, habit, attention and will, which are also developed in The 
Principles.  Despite these omissions, a number of critics have suggested that the James-
Lange theory is incompatible with James’ later treatment of emotion developed in works 
such as The Varieties of Religious Experience (Averill [1992]; Oatley & Djikic [2002]; 
Solomon [1995]).  This later work is thought to contain a richer, cognitive view of 
emotion, one that constitutes a fundamental break from his earlier feeling theory.  
However, without understanding what an emotional feeling is for James, and how it 
relates to other mental and bodily phenomena, we are in no position to assert such a 
break.  All of this raises a concern.  The many philosophers who have used James’ theory 
of emotion as a steppingstone to develop their own view may in fact be stepping over a 
straw man. 
     Over the last 130 years, numerous criticisms have been directed toward James’ theory 
of emotion, which continue to seriously undermine its plausibility.  These include the 
following: 
1) The theory reduces emotions to mere epiphenomena.  Since emotions are causally 
inefficacious with respect to action, they have no clear function. 
2) The theory cannot account for the intentionality of emotion.  Since emotions are 
feelings of bodily states, they are neither directed toward nor about the world.  
3) The theory is undermined by its inclusion of subtle emotions.  These emotions, 
which are comprised of aesthetic, intellectual and moral emotions, are clearly 
more than the feeling of bodily changes. 
4) The theory overlooks the fact that our emotions, at least to a certain extent, are 
socially constructed.  
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5) The theory cannot account for unconscious emotions because emotions for James 
are necessarily felt.  Since there are unconscious emotions, the theory must be 
false. 
6) The theory reduces emotions to entirely passive states of consciousness.  If 
emotions are merely feelings of bodily states, then we are in no way responsible 
for our emotions.  
     In the first four chapters, I argue that when we situate James’ conception of emotion 
within his overarching framework as developed in The Principles, the above criticisms 
are either false or overstated.  In so doing, I will show that James’ conception of emotion 
is not exhausted by the James-Lange theory.  This theory, which asserts that the feeling 
of bodily changes is the emotion, remains silent on a number of philosophical questions.  
These include the relationship between emotion and consciousness, the nature of an 
emotional feeling, and the relationship between emotion and other mental and bodily 
phenomena, such as instinct, habit, will and attention.  By considering James’ views on 
these matters, I hope to show that his comprehensive theory of emotion is far different 
than traditionally conceived. 
     This analysis will lay the groundwork for the final three chapters, in which I consider 
James’ treatment of emotion in The Will to Believe and The Varieties of Religious 
Experience.  In Chapter 5, I argue that while there are some developments to James’ view 
in these later works, these changes are best understood as building upon a theory already 
in place at the time of The Principles.  In Chapter 6, I consider the role of emotion in The 
Varieties of Religious Experience, which surprisingly has not received much scholarly 
attention.  I discuss two unique kinds of emotion, ‘feelings of reality’ and 
‘transformational emotions’, both of which add new and important dimensions to his 
earlier view.  In Chapter 7, I turn my attention to The Will to Believe.  I contend that the 
many misinterpretations of this short essay are rooted in a misunderstanding of what 
James means by ‘our passional nature’.  Drawing upon my previous analysis of emotion, 
I present what I take to be James’ ultimate argument in the essay – one that is certainly 
more passionate than the prevailing right to believe interpretation. 
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     My project of inquiring into the role of emotion throughout a portion of James’ career 
(primarily 1890 to 1902) is not without its dangers.  In 1900, James criticized a doctoral 
dissertation that had been conducted on his work.  He objected to the author’s approach, 
which consisted of taking quotes from different texts over different times and for 
different audiences and then assembling them together to form a philosophical system 
that was subsequently shown to be internally flawed.  As James says, "Building up an 
author's meaning out of separate texts leads nowhere, unless you have first grasped his 
centre of vision by an act of imagination” (James [1920], 355).   
     The concern of assembling together quotes from different texts, written at different 
times and for different audiences, is less of a worry for the first part of my analysis 
(Chapters 1-4), as I focus almost exclusively on The Principles.  Despite the previous 
publication of many of its chapters in journals, including the chapter on emotion in Mind, 
James intended The Principles to be a unified work (James [1892], 9-10).2  Nevertheless, 
even within this purportedly unified work, he alternates between philosophical and 
psychological perspectives.  While The Principles was written with the explicit goal of 
developing psychology as a natural science, James struggles with this project, and often 
engages in traditional philosophical questions.3  At other times, he assumes certain 
philosophical positions on pragmatic psychological grounds.  Most notably, he assumes a 
Cartesian dualism on the basis that psychologists must assume that there exist both 
mental and physical facts ([1890], 1: 185).  Even within this single work then, James’ 
purpose is by no means clearly focused.  Sometimes he writes from a philosophical 
perspective, other times from a psychological perspective, and occasionally these 
different perspectives conflict.4  Being attentive to these shifts in perspective is therefore 
                                                
2 This is one of the reasons why I pay more attention to James’ chapter on the emotions in The Principles 
than his earlier 1884 article. 
3 Bruce Wilshire nicely illustrates this struggle in William James and Phenomenology (Wilshire [1968]).  
As of 1892, in the epilogue of The Briefer Course, James seems to have given up on the project of 
developing psychology as a natural science as “the waters of metaphysical criticism leak at every joint” 
([1892], 463). 
4 James’ view on free will provides a clear example of this.  As a psychologist, he assumes determinism, 
but as a philosopher, he holds a libertarian view.  
5 
 
of central importance when considering James’ treatment of emotion within The 
Principles.     
      James’ later works, such as The Will to Believe and The Varieties of Religious 
Experience, also alternate between philosophical and psychological perspectives.  These 
writings were clearly intended for a broader audience than The Principles, which, in 
addition to James’ changing metaphysical views, complicates a study of his work on 
emotion.  Despite all of this, I contend that a “centre of vision” does emerge.  The central 
thread that weaves through James’ work on emotion is his emphasis on experience.  This 
may seem like an uninteresting connection, but given James’ radical empiricism – 
already in place at the time of The Principles in the form of his stream of consciousness 
theory – it is anything but.  Emotions for James are first and foremost experienced; only 
secondarily are they understood.  The philosophical implications of this are considered 
most explicitly in his later work, where he rejects the feeling-less theories of 
epistemology that have dominated the history of western philosophy.  For James, our 
emotional feelings not only lie at the root of our philosophical and religious beliefs, but 
they ought to be the primary epistemic driver in these domains of inquiry.  This is truly a 
Copernican shift.  Out of James’ radical empiricism we get a radical view of emotion, 
one that far exceeds the counterintuitive inversion of the James-Lange theory. 
     This emphasis on the richness of emotional experience may seem difficult to reconcile 
with the physiological focus of the James-Lange theory.  This theory is often perceived in 
a cold, positivistic, antiseptic way, as if he were attempting to squeeze the passion out of 
emotion.  The idea that mere physiological changes could be the direct cause of all the 
meaning and value that emotions bring into our lives has left an unsavoury taste in the 
mouths of numerous critics.  In fact, a number of philosophers have argued that James 
reduces emotion to a mere epiphenomenon, a causally inefficacious byproduct of 
physical reality (Campbell [1997]; Deigh [2014]; Gordon [1987]; Solomon [1976]).  This 
common view is certainly at odds with what I take to be James’ centre of vision with 
respect to emotion.  Rather than a mere byproduct of reality, I hope to show that emotions 
for James play a primary role both in our acquaintance with reality and our knowledge 
about reality.      
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1 Situating Emotion Within Consciousness 
On the surface, James’ theory of emotion seems simple and clear, but when considered 
more closely, complexities begin to appear.  Some interpreters have recognized this 
complexity to varying degrees, and have challenged the dominant non-cognitive 
interpretation as a result.  In the following section, I look at three interpretations of 
James’ theory: 1) the dominant non-cognitive view, which I call the standard view; 2) 
Phoebe Ellsworth’s cognitive view; and 3) Gary Hatfield’s hybrid view.5  I argue that 
each of these interpretations is flawed in particular respects.  In addition, they share a 
common problem, which arises from failing to situate James’ theory of emotion within 
his stream of consciousness theory.  I attempt to clarify matters by articulating an implicit 
distinction that runs throughout The Principles – that between primary feeling and 
secondary feeling.6  Indeed, James uses the term feeling in distinctive and various ways.  
Being attentive to his use of this term is necessary in order to elucidate what exactly an 
emotion is.  
 
1.1 Three Interpretations 
1.1.1 The Standard View 
James’ theory of emotion challenges the commonsense view of a typical emotional 
episode.  The emotion does not cause the physiological response, but rather “the bodily 
changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the 
same changes as they occur IS the emotion” ([1890], 2: 449).  The standard view of 
James' theory takes root from this passage – that emotional consciousness is nothing but 
                                                
5 These three interpretations are the most developed and plausible views of James.  Other interpretations 
have been offered.  For example Gilbert Ryle suggests that James attempts to reduce feelings to their 
physiological changes (Ryle [1949]).  James, however, consistently maintained that his theory is not 
materialistic.  The feeling may be given by the physiological response, but it is not reducible to it. 
6 In The Physical Basis of Emotion, James refers to emotion as a secondary feeling insofar as it is 
“indirectly aroused” rather than “directly aroused by the exciting object or thought” ([1894], 516).  I am 
using the term in a different way. 
 
7 
 
the feeling of bodily changes (Deigh [2014]; de Sousa [1987] [2011]; Goldie [2000]; 
Gurney [1884]; Irons [1894]; Prinz [2004]; Sartre [1939]; Solomon [1973] [2007]).  As a 
result, James is thought to be unable to account for the intentionality of emotion.  Since 
an emotion is the feeling of bodily states, it is neither directed toward nor about anything 
in the world.  By reducing emotion to the feeling of bodily changes, it seems to follow 
that an emotion is a non-cognitive state.  This is an unfortunate result, as we want to say 
that a particular emotional response is appropriate or inappropriate, rational or irrational 
given what it is about.  The fear of a spider, for example, is certainly inappropriate and 
irrational on the face of it.  But according to the standard view of James, we are not afraid 
of the spider; rather, we are afraid because we tremble. 
     Robert Solomon employed this standard view of James to illustrate that feelings are 
inessential to emotion.  Since feelings fail to capture the intentional component of 
emotion, Solomon argues that emotions are essentially judgments (Solomon [1973] 
[2007]).7  Jesse Prinz, meanwhile, agrees that the standard view captures the essence of 
James’ theory.  Unlike Solomon however, Prinz is a general supporter of the theory.  “I 
have endorsed William James (1884) in presuming that emotional consciousness is 
consciousness of changes in bodily states” (Prinz [2004], 206).  Prinz nevertheless agrees 
that James’ theory cannot account for intentionality, and he seeks to amend this alleged 
shortcoming by arguing that emotions are embodied appraisals that represent core 
relational themes.8 
                                                
7 Over the course of his career, Solomon did become more receptive to James’ theory.  In particular, 
Solomon was interested in James’ work on habit (Solomon [2001a]).  Moreover, Solomon expanded his 
conception of judgment in a Jamesian way with his notion of “judgments of the body” (Solomon [2001b]).  
Jenefer Robinson’s “Bob Solomon and William James: A Rapprochement” nicely presents this increasing 
convergence (Robinson [2010]).  
8 Prinz argues that emotions represent core relational themes by registering distinct patterns of bodily 
changes that bear upon an individual’s wellbeing in the world, such as danger and loss (Prinz, [2004], 66-
69).  While the emotion detects the external stimulus through the corresponding bodily changes, Prinz has 
been criticized on the grounds that these bodily changes do not appraise the external stimulus (Deigh 
[2014]). 
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     To review, the standard view of James’ theory maintains that an emotion is nothing 
but the feeling of bodily changes.  There is certainly good textual support for this 
interpretation, but the problem is that it is limited in scope.  Not only is this standard view 
most often limited to James’ two primary works on emotion – his 1884 paper What is an 
Emotion? and his chapter on “The Emotions” in The Principles – but it is reliant on a 
couple of passages.  However, other passages within these works, not to mention James’ 
other writings during this period, call into question the standard view.  As a result of this 
narrow perspective, alternate interpretations have been offered. 
 
1.1.2 Ellsworth’s Cognitive Interpretation 
Phoebe Ellsworth rejects the standard view as too simplistic an account of what is in fact 
a more complex theory.  She argues that, for James, the perception that indirectly causes 
the emotion involves cognitive appraisal.  Ellsworth recognizes that this richer view of 
perception does not in itself overcome the intentionality problem.  After all, the emotion 
may be indirectly caused by a cognitive appraisal, but it is still directly caused by the 
bodily changes.  The emotion would therefore remain a non-cognitive, non-intentional 
feeling.   
     According to Ellsworth, however, the perception not only causes the bodily changes 
but it is a necessary part of the emotion.   
The bodily processes combine with the perception of the object to produce the 
emotion…emotion is a combination of cognitive and physiological responses 
(Ellsworth [1994], 223).   
Ellsworth thereby attributes a cognitive theory to James.  The emotion is irreducibly 
cognitive because the perception, which is a necessary part of the emotion, involves the 
evaluation of an object.  As a result, emotions are necessarily about objects and have the 
property of intentionality.  In making this claim, Ellsworth draws attention to an 
important passage – overlooked by the standard view – where James describes the mental 
and physiological processes involved in an emotional experience.  The transition from the 
9 
 
perception of the object to the subsequent feeling, involves a transformation “from an 
object-simply-apprehended into an object-emotionally-felt” ([1890], 2: 474).  This state 
of consciousness of the “object-emotionally-felt” certainly suggests that an emotion is 
more than the feeling of bodily changes.  Indeed, according to Ellsworth, the perception 
combines with the feeling of bodily changes in consciousness, which gives the emotion.  
The standard view of James' theory is therefore incorrect.  An emotion is not reducible to 
bodily states, but is also about objects in the world. 
     There are some problems with Ellsworth's view, however.  First, even if the 
perception is part of the emotion, not all perceptions involve cognitive appraisal 
(Reisenzein & Stephan [2014], 37).  Some emotions are caused by perceptions that are 
primarily sensations and therefore do not involve any kind of evaluation.  In his 1884 
article, James mentions examples of this kind.  “In advance of all experience of elephants 
no child can but be frightened if he suddenly finds one trumpeting and charging upon 
him” ([1884], 191).  The child does not judge the elephant to be dangerous.  Rather, the 
emotion in this instance is automatically set off by an instinctual response.  It is examples 
such as this that lead Damasio to the view that emotions for James are indirectly caused 
by a perception involving little to no appraisal (Damasio [1994], 130).  
      Second, Ellsworth’s interpretation cannot account for James' commitment to 
objectless emotions.  In the “object-emotionally-felt” passage, James is describing the 
process of a typical emotion episode, one that involves the prior perception of an object.  
But a central feature of James’ theory is its inclusion of objectless emotions.  As he says:   
The best proof that the immediate cause of emotion is a physical effect on the 
nerves is furnished by those pathological cases in which the emotion is 
objectless…The emotion here is nothing but the feeling of a bodily state, and it 
has a purely bodily cause ([1890], 2: 458-9). 
This “best proof” of James’ theory cannot be reconciled with Ellsworth’s view.  If the 
perception is not a necessary part of the emotion, then a cognitive component is not 
essential to emotion.  After all, an objectless emotion involves no perception, let alone a 
cognitive appraisal.  Its essence would seem to be a non-cognitive feeling.   
10 
 
1.1.3 Hatfield’s Hybrid Interpretation 
Gary Hatfield’s interpretation of James’ theory seems better able to account for its 
complexities.  Just as Ellsworth went beyond James’ explicit writings on emotion and 
considered his work on perception to better situate the theory, Hatfield draws particular 
attention to the important role of instinct.  It is perhaps surprising that James’ discussion 
of fear, anger, sympathy, shame, jealousy, love and other emotions in The Principles first 
occur not in the chapter on “The Emotions” but in the preceding chapter on “Instinct”.  
Since emotion and instinct “shade imperceptibly into each other”, Hatfield recognizes 
that what James has to say about instinct is necessary to fully understand his conception 
of emotion ([1890], 2: 442). 
     Emotions begin as innate instinctual responses to certain environmental stimuli.  
When we first experience a particular emotion we have no previous experience of where 
this instinctual response will lead us.  The instinct is blind.  However, unlike many 
traditional writers on the subject, James sees no reason to limit instinct to actions without 
foresight of ends.  Instincts can cease to be blind when, as Hatfield says, “the associative 
processes of experience subsequently add content to such sensations” (Hatfield [2007], 
417).  These associative processes of experience constitute the cognitive appraisal in 
which an object or state of affairs is evaluated.  In short, when cognitive appraisal occurs, 
which is the case for most adult human emotions, the emotion is no longer a blind reflex; 
it has intentional content.  This is reflected in James’ conception of perception, which is a 
combination of “sensational and reproductive brain-processes” ([1890], 2: 78). 
     Hatfield thereby splits the difference between the standard view and Ellsworth’s 
cognitive view.  Not all emotions are cognitive because some perceptions are merely 
instinctive responses involving no cognitive appraisal.  These are instances where our 
blind instinct is simply enacted, such as the fear of a child when encountering a charging 
elephant.  Since an emotion can occur either by a blind instinctual reflex or cognitive 
appraisal, Hatfield attributes to James a theory of emotion that crosses the non-
cognitive/cognitive divide.  Some emotions are non-cognitive; others are cognitive. 
     Hatfield describes the non-cognitive emotions in this way: 
11 
 
James’ theory of our original emotions may rightly be classified as noncognitive, 
and in two senses.  First, although emotional responses are caused by sensory 
perceptions, James describes these perceptions as feelings rather than as 
thoughts…. Second, the emotion itself, as a bare perception of internal 
perturbations, is not an appraisal or a cognitive response to these bodily states or 
their causes, but is another feeling (Hatfield [2007], 420). 
Hatfield then goes on to discuss how emotions can become cognitive: 
However, although emotions originally involve no appraisals, we may come to 
appraise our emotions, we may come to feel fear as a result of detecting a bear 
cognitively through evidence that would not trigger our original bear fear-reflex, 
and we come to view the emotion of fear as a sign that we are in danger.  In 
James’ view, these are subsequent cognitive developments, which allow 
emotional responses to take on cognitive meaning and to be triggered by cognitive 
appraisal (Hatfield [2007], 420). 
While Hatfield seems to presume, like Ellsworth, that an emotion necessarily involves the 
perception of an object, his view could be easily amended to account for James’ 
commitment to objectless emotions.  The non-cognitive grouping would include both 
objectless emotions and those emotions indirectly caused by perceptions involving 
sensations – or feeling to use Hatfield’s term.  The cognitive grouping would include 
perceptions involving cognitive appraisal, and this perception is a constituent part of the 
emotion.  
     In this way, Hatfield’s interpretation can be amended to better explain the various 
components of James’ theory, but it is still deficient in some important respects.  His 
bifurcated interpretation is based on a traditional distinction between feeling and thought.  
While the feeling of an emotion is non-cognitive – “a bare perception of internal 
perturbations” – the thoughts generated by the appraisal are cognitive and thus are about 
the world.  James, however, rejects this sharp distinction between feeling and thought.  
This is made explicit in an important passage where he decides what to call states of 
consciousness throughout The Principles.   
12 
 
In this quandary we can make no definitive choice, but must, according to the 
convenience of the context, use sometimes one, sometimes another of the 
synonyms that have been mentioned.  My own partiality is for either FEELING or 
THOUGHT.  I shall probably often use both words in a wider sense than usual, 
and alternatively startle two classes of readers by their unusual sound; but if the 
connection makes it clear that mental states at large, irrespective of their kind, are 
meant, this will do no harm, and may even do some good ([1890], 1: 186-187). 
The distinction between feeling and thought is ultimately a pragmatic one, to be 
employed “according to the convenience of the context”.  Part of this pragmatic approach 
is to call into question his readers' assumptions.  By using these terms in unconventional 
ways – and at times synonymously as we will later see – James hopes that the wedge that 
has been driven between feeling and thought can be removed.   
     Moreover, as we will also later see, James’ distinction between feeling and thought is 
not meant to distinguish non-cognitive from cognitive states, but rather distinguish 
between different kinds of cognition.  Hatfield’s interpretation – similarly to the standard 
view and Ellsworth – reads into James a cognitive distinction between feeling and 
thought.  But this is not attentive to James’ use of these terms.9  Hatfield attributes to 
James a rather messy view, but the theory was intended to provide a single framework 
encompassing objectless, coarse and subtle emotions.  While it is true that subsequent 
cognitive developments can influence the nature of an emotional experience for James 
(i.e., its phenomenology), this has little bearing on the essence of an emotion.  
 
                                                
9 It is interesting to note that five years prior to The Principles in On The Function of Cognition (1885) 
James uses the term feeling to encompass all states of consciousness.  In this respect he follows such 
thinkers as Alexander Bain and John Stuart Mill.  According to Mill, “A Feeling and a State of 
Consciousness are, in the language of philosophy, equivalent expressions: everything is a feeling of which 
the mind is conscious” (Mill [1868], 54). 
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1.1.4 A Common Problem 
In addition to the particular problems that these three interpretations face, there is a 
problem that they all share.  The question of whether for James an emotion is the feeling 
of bodily changes or the feeling of bodily changes plus the (cognitive) perception of the 
object relies on a common assumption – that individual mental states combine to form a 
complex state of consciousness.  This is a natural assumption to make since many 
philosophers assume a building block model of consciousness.  James, however, rejects 
that a state of consciousness is composed of parts.  According to his stream of 
consciousness theory, as developed in The Principles, a state of consciousness is a simple 
undivided unity.  There are no parts.  Suffice it to say, this complicates the question of 
what an emotion is.    
     The easy solution to this problem is to say that James was inconsistent on this matter.  
At first glance, his definition of emotion appears difficult to reconcile with his stream of 
consciousness theory.  The feeling of bodily changes that is the emotion does seem to 
presuppose a building block model of consciousness, wherein this emotional 
consciousness combines with other mental states such as visual and auditory 
consciousness.  But this complex state composed of parts conflicts with the simple, 
undivided structure of his stream of consciousness theory.  In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will show that James’ two theories are in fact consistent; and further, that his 
conception of what an emotion is, is far different than the three interpretations considered 
here have recognized. 
 
1.2 Primary Feelings 
One of James' fundamental projects in The Principles is his rejection of the two standard 
models of the mind – which he calls the ‘mind-stuff’ and soul theories – in favour of his 
own stream of consciousness model.  According to the mind-stuff theory, “mental states 
are compounds” meaning that a state of consciousness is composed of individual parts or 
building blocks that form a complex state ([1890], 1: 145).  James is particularly 
concerned with refuting the ‘mind-dust’ theory, which is a panpsychist mind-stuff theory, 
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advocated at the time by thinkers such as William Clifford and Herbert Spencer.  Since 
this mind-dust theory is a version of mind-stuff theories more generally, we can thereby 
read his critique of mind-dust as an implicit rejection of the traditional Lockean/Humean 
model of the mind.  After all, whether it is Locke’s ideas or Hume’s impressions and 
ideas, both presuppose that a state of consciousness is a complex state composed of parts.  
Just as the atoms within a physical object are its primary stuff, so too it is assumed that 
the parts of a state of consciousness are its primary stuff. 
     James’ central argument against the mind-stuff theory is that it is logically incoherent. 
“Idea of a + idea of b is not identical with idea of (a + b)” ([1890], 1: 160).  Mind stuff 
theories are unable to explain how the parts of consciousness combine into a unified 
whole.10  The parts alone are insufficient as there needs to be something to organize 
them.  It is at this point that James considers the soul theory, which in order to overcome 
the unification problem, proposes a soul that unifies and orders the parts.  While James 
regards this as a more satisfying account, he is hesitant to endorse it, as he wishes to 
proceed with as little metaphysical baggage as possible.  His solution is to chart a third 
path.  He rejects the presupposition made by both theories that consciousness is made up 
of parts.  Instead, consciousness, as reflected by our immediate experience, is a simple 
undivided state.  “[H]owever complex the object may be, the thought of it is one 
undivided state of consciousness” ([1890], 1: 276).   
     This unity feature of James’ stream of consciousness theory, while original, owes a 
great deal to the work of Franz Brentano.  In 1874, Brentano published Psychology from 
an Empirical Standpoint, in which he argued, contra Locke and Hume, that 
consciousness is not a collection of mental states but a unity (Brentano [1973]).  As 
James notes, Brentano’s work “on the Unity of Consciousness is as good as anything 
with which I am acquainted” ([1890], 1: 240).  However, the nature of this unity does not 
                                                
10 It is interesting to note that James does not distinguish John Stuart Mill from other classical empiricists in 
this respect, including Hume and James Mill.  According to J.S. Mill, a state of consciousness is a unified 
state insofar as its parts fuse into a new mental whole.  In so doing, Mill makes use of a chemical analogy.  
Similarly to how two hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom fuse into a new whole to form water, the parts of 
consciousness fuse into a new whole. Presumably, James thinks that this account is still insufficient insofar 
as it does not explain the nature of this fusion. 
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entail that consciousness is undivided in structure, as Brentano distinguishes parts that he 
calls divisives (Brentano [1973], 161).  A divisive does not have an independent 
existence, but belongs to the “one real entity” which is the unified state of consciousness 
(Brentano [1973], 161).  For Brentano then, there are parts within a unified state of 
consciousness.  While James agrees with Brentano regarding the unity thesis, he 
disagrees with respect to the question of parts.11  
     For James, a state of consciousness is undivided both in its synchronic and diachronic 
structure – that is, at a particular point in time as well as over time.  He calls these states 
the substantive and transitive respectively.  “Let us call the resting-places the substantive 
parts, and the places of flight the transitive parts of the stream of thought” ([1890], 1: 
243).  With respect to substantive states, James offers the example of drinking lemonade.  
While the lemonade itself is composed of particular parts, namely its ingredients, the 
taste of lemonade is not.  It does not combine the sweetness of the sugar with the 
sourness of the lemon.  What we experience when we drink lemonade is rather a simple 
state in which the sweetness and sourness are infused.   
     As for transitive states, he considers the example of a piercing sound of thunder 
coming after a long silence.  This might suggest that consciousness is not always an 
unbroken stream, but instead chopped up into discrete parts.  James responds to this 
objection by supplementing his stream metaphor with that of a bamboo. 
The transition between the thought of one object and thought of another is no 
more a break in the thought than a joint in a bamboo is a break in the wood.  It is a 
part of the consciousness as much as the joint is a part of the bamboo ([1890], 1: 
240). 
A unique feature of James’ stream of consciousness theory is that these transitive states 
between substantive events are also experienced.  As a result, “what we hear when the 
                                                
11 While James technically disagrees with Brentano with respect to the question of parts, from a practical 
point of view his approach seems indistinguishable.  What I will call secondary feelings appears similar to 
what Brentano calls divisives.   
16 
 
thunder crashed is not thunder pure, but thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-
with-it” ([1890], 1: 240).  Since the entire state of consciousness is a simple undivided 
feeling, “The feeling of the thunder is also a feeling of the silence just gone” ([1890], 1: 
241).  As soon as we consider the thunder in and of itself without the preceding silence, 
we have cut out the transitive relation, and have thereby ruptured the primary feeling.12  
     Transitive relations resist introspective analysis.  When we try to capture these flights 
of thought by turning inward we “annihilate them”, as we then find ourselves in a 
substantive state ([1890], 1: 244).  Despite these introspective difficulties, James remains 
confident that transitive relations are prominent features in our stream of consciousness, 
which he likens to the structure of language.  Connective words such as and, if, but, by, 
with, etc. are the linguistic equivalents to these transitive relations of consciousness.  As 
James says, “We ought to say a feeling of and, a feeling of if, a feeling of but, and a 
feeling of by, quite as readily as we say a feeling of blue or a feeling of cold” ([1890], 1: 
245-6).  These feelings of transitive relations – whether conjunctive or disjunctive – that 
connect substantive events will turn out to be important when considering what exactly 
the feeling of an emotion is.   
     In an effort to gain clarity on James’ theory of emotion, it will be useful as we proceed 
to call such undivided states of consciousness that are associated with his stream of 
consciousness theory primary feelings.  When discussing primary feelings in The 
Principles, James uses the terms feeling and thought interchangeably.  At times he uses 
the phrase “stream of thought” or simply thought to refer to them.  But he also uses 
feeling to describe such primary states, as in the following passage, which sums up his 
view quite nicely: 
                                                
12
 If consciousness is an undivided flux for James, we might then wonder how is it that we can individuate 
the transitive from the substantive states.  According to Andrew Bailey, James’ distinction is not intrinsic to 
consciousness but “that we individuate ‘states’ within it, after the fact” (Bailey [1999], 6).  Moreover, this 
distinction for James, according to Bailey, is ultimately based on the pace of the transitive states (Bailey 
[1999], 8). 
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We cannot mix feelings as such, though we may mix the objects we feel, and 
from their mixture get new feelings.  We cannot even have two feelings in our 
mind at once ([1890], 1: 157). 
While James uses the terms feeling and thought interchangeably when discussing his 
stream of consciousness theory, the distinction becomes useful for him when making a 
more fine-grained analysis between different kinds of cognition.  I turn to this next.   
 
1.3 Secondary Feelings 
James makes an important distinction in The Principles between ‘knowledge by 
acquaintance’ and ‘knowledge about’, which according to John Wild “was destined to 
play a very basic role in his thought, as well as in the phenomenology of the future” 
(Wild [1969], 43).  The distinction points to two different kinds of cognition, both of 
which have particular functions.  The function of our acquaintance, which is a pre-
reflective kind of consciousness, is simply the having of an experience.  Meanwhile, the 
function of our knowledge about, which is reflective, is to acquire conceptual 
understanding about the world and our experience in it.  While James does not prioritize 
one mode of knowing over another in The Principles, our knowledge by acquaintance can 
be considered more primary in at least two respects.  First, it is prior temporally insofar as 
we all first engage with the world not by conceptualizing it but by living it.  It is only 
subsequently, as we develop cognitively, that we acquire the conceptual apparatus to 
know and understand features of the world.  Second, it is logically prior insofar as our 
conceptual understanding would have nothing to cognize about without the presence of 
this more basic acquaintance. 
     These two kinds of knowledge generally map onto the terms feeling and thought 
respectively, but not the primary feeling-thought of an undivided state of consciousness.  
Rather these are feelings and thoughts we come to individuate within our stream of 
experience.  As James says: 
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Through feelings we become acquainted with things, but only by our thoughts do 
we know about them.  Feelings are the germ and starting point of cognition, 
thoughts the developed tree ([1890], 1: 222). 
The thoughts associated with knowledge about include conceptions and judgments, while 
the feelings associated with knowledge by acquaintance include sensations, such as the 
feeling of blue or the feeling of thunder; and emotions, such as the feeling of fear (1: 
222).13  Since knowledge by acquaintance includes emotions, and since our acquaintance 
with particular aspects of reality emanates from the primary stream of consciousness, 
emotions can be characterized as secondary feelings. 
     According to James, we may not be able to say anything specific about our 
acquaintance, but we nevertheless know it in an inarticulate way.   
I am acquainted with many people and things, which I know very little about, 
except their presence in the places where I have met them.  I know the color blue 
when I see it, and the flavor of a pear when I taste it; I know an inch when I move 
my finger through it; a second of time, when I feel it pass; an effort of attention 
when I make it; a difference between two things when I notice it; but about the 
inner nature of these facts or what makes them what they are, I can say nothing at 
all ([1890], 1: 221).  
Since emotions also belong to the acquaintance category, the same logic holds true.  I am 
acquainted with fear simply in virtue of feeling it.  Whether or not I also know facts about 
the fear is a separate question.  Of course, the very ability to individuate a feeling out of 
the primary flux of experience involves some discrimination about our experience.  
Hence James’ caveat that we know little about our acquaintances, “except their presence 
in the places where I have met them” ([1890], 1: 221).  In order to be acquainted with the 
feeling of fear then, I simply need to recognize it as an aspect of my experience, to locate 
                                                
13 It is unclear where non-cognitive states such as itches and headaches fit into James’ overall framework.  
He does not include them within the acquaintance category, presumably because they do not involve our 
acquaintance with the world. 
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it in some rough way within the stream of experience.  But I need not know anything 
about the fear, such as its composition, in order to experience it. 
     The difference between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge about is a subtle 
one with respect to emotion.  The actual feeling of the bodily changes as experienced is 
the acquaintance.  Meanwhile, James’ definition of emotion provides knowledge about 
the emotion.  By stating that an emotion is the feeling of bodily changes as they occur, he 
purports to express a fact about emotion.  Thus for James, when we have an emotion, 
what we are acquainted with – whether we know about it or not – is the feeling of bodily 
changes as they occur.  This feeling of bodily changes, which is the emotion, ruptures the 
simple primary feeling in two ways.  First, the transitive relations that connect the 
emotion to prior and posterior substantive experiences within the primary feeling are 
severed.  For example, in most cases of an emotional episode, there is a transitive relation 
within consciousness between the preceding perception of the exciting fact and the 
following feeling of bodily changes.  This perception of the exciting fact and the feeling 
of bodily changes are not discrete experiences.  In the primary stream of consciousness 
they are continuous.  They are conjoined by a transitive relation (e.g., a feeling of and) 
that is immediately experienced but impossible to subject to introspective analysis 
([1890], 1: 243-6).  Once the emotion is dissociated from the transitive relations that bind 
it to other substantive states, we are left with a derivative feeling, one that has been 
abstracted out of the unified whole.   
     In addition, the feeling of bodily changes is isolated from other sensations and 
perceptions within the same undivided substantive state of consciousness.  When we 
experience an emotion at a particular point in time, we are also experiencing many other 
sensations and perceptions along with it.  We are likely experiencing certain shapes, 
sounds, colours, and perhaps even thoughts and judgments.  All of these states first 
present themselves as a unified whole, but when we isolate the emotion out of this 
synchronic unity we are once again rupturing the primary feeling.  As a result, the 
secondary feeling of an emotion has been severed from both its transitive and substantive 
relations.  While the emotion is very much experienced, in order to individuate the 
emotion within the flux of experience, other aspects of consciousness that are constitutive 
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of the primary feeling must be abstracted away.  While modern critics have failed to 
appreciate this nuanced point, John Dewey recognized it.  
As I understand it, he (James) did not conceive himself as dealing with that state 
which we term 'being angry,' but rather with the peculiar 'feel' which any one has 
when he is angry, an element which may be intellectually abstracted, but certainly 
has no existence by itself, of as full-fledged emotion-experience (Dewey [1895], 
16).   
Dewey’s distinction between being angry and feeling angry seems to map onto my 
distinction between primary and secondary feeling.  The secondary feeling of an emotion 
involves an abstraction that has “no existence by itself”. 
     This distinction between primary feelings and secondary feelings fully inverts the 
Lockean/Humean model of the mind.  According to James, Locke’s simple ideas and 
Hume’s impressions are not primary elements at all.  They are abstractions that have been 
filtered out from a more primary experiential state of consciousness.  “The ‘simple 
impression’ of Hume, the ‘simple idea’ of Locke are both abstractions, never realized in 
experience” ([1890], 1: 487).  What is primary for James is the undivided state of 
consciousness as it is immediately experienced, and the secondary feelings and thoughts 
are abstractions.  As James succinctly puts it, “A pure sensation is an abstraction” 
([1890], 2: 3). 
     With this distinction between primary and secondary feelings in hand, we can make 
much better sense of the two passages from James’ chapter on “The Emotions” that we 
looked at previously.  First, it can explain the passage – highlighted by Ellsworth – of a 
typical emotional experience in which there is a transformation “from an object-simply-
apprehended into an object-emotionally-felt” ([1890], 2: 474).  The standard view cannot 
make sense of this “object-emotionally-felt” because the emotion is nothing but the 
feeling of bodily changes; it is not about the actual object.  Ellsworth's cognitive reading 
thereby seems more attractive, but when looked at more closely, her view also faces a 
number of challenges.   
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     In this passage, James is giving a description of the primary feeling.  The “object-
emotionally-felt” is a simple, undivided state of consciousness, which is made clear by 
the unifying hyphens.  It reflects the unity of the substantive state of consciousness at a 
particular instance.  Moreover, the seamless transition from the “object-simply-
apprehended” to the “object-emotionally-felt” highlights the transitive relation in the 
stream of consciousness.  While the emotion is certainly linked to the perception within 
the stream of consciousness via a transitive relation (e.g., a feeling of and), the perception 
is not part of the emotion as Ellsworth and Hatfield maintain.14   
     We can also make better sense of James’ famous definition of emotion.  Once again, 
he says that “the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and 
that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion” ([1890], 2: 449).  
James is here using feeling in its secondary sense, which maps onto our acquaintance 
mode of knowing.  This does not mean that the individual experiencing the emotion 
knows that his or her emotion is the feeling of bodily changes.  S/he simply has the 
emotion.  By using feeling in this secondary sense, both the transitive and substantive 
relations have been abstracted away, leaving the emotion.  This feeling of bodily changes 
“as they occur” is of course very much experienced, but the feeling is not originally a 
separate thing.  It comes infused within a simple state of consciousness, inextricably 
bound up with other sensations, perceptions and cognitions.   
 
1.4 The Metaphysical Status of the Emotions 
This distinction between primary and secondary feelings reveals a radical aspect of 
James’ view of emotion.  For theorists who hold a building block model of 
                                                
14A considerable amount of attention has been focused on the “perception of the exciting fact”.  Some 
theorists have argued that it involves cognitive appraisal (Arnold [1960]; Ellsworth [1994]; Palencik 
[2007]; Reisenzein, Meyer and Schützwohl, [1995]).  Meanwhile, others regard James’ account of 
perception as simply an instinctual response that involves little to no evaluation (Damasio [1994]; Gordon 
[1987]).  This question has no bearing on what an emotion is for James – that is, as a secondary feeling.  It 
does, however, make a difference with respect to the nature of the primary feeling.  
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consciousness, an emotion is a part that is immediately accessible.  That is to say, it is not 
infused within a greater whole.  For James, however, the transitive and substantive 
relations within a primary feeling must be severed before we can access the emotion.  As 
a result, an emotion has a derivative ontological status.  We never experience fear in and 
of itself.  What we experience is fear that is dispersed within a primary feeling.  Trying to 
access the emotion is like trying to access salt within salt water.  It first needs to be 
filtered out.  
     Although this derivative status of emotion follows directly from James’ stream of 
consciousness theory, he never explicitly refers to it.  Nevertheless, it is implicit in much 
of his discussion.  In fact, it is difficult to make sense of some of the unique features of 
his view without considering his overarching theory of consciousness.  First, an emotion 
for James is the feeling of bodily changes.  The feeling is singular.  In this respect, he 
differs from the influential physiological psychologists of the period, such as Herbert 
Spencer and Alexander Bain, for whom an emotion is an aggregate of elementary 
feelings (Dixon [2003], 158).  Wilhelm Wundt has a similar view, as he regards emotions 
as “complexes of feeling elements” (Reisenzein [1992], 143).  But for James, the 
plurality of bodily changes does not give rise to a plurality of feelings.  This feature of 
James’ view is difficult to explain without understanding his conception of 
consciousness.  He is not invoking a building block model whereby aggregates of 
feelings combine.  The emotion is attained not by way of adding up feelings, but by 
subtracting from the primary feeling.  Given this reversal, the emotion is a singular 
feeling not an aggregate. 
     Second, James begins his chapter on “The Emotions” with a rather startling claim.  He 
says, “The trouble with the emotions in psychology is that they are regarded too much as 
absolutely individual things” ([1890], 2: 449).  He will go on to discuss the different 
physiological expressions of the emotions, but this more focused critique follows from 
his larger criticism regarding the nature of consciousness.  Emotions are not individual 
things that combine with other mental states to form a complex state.  It thereby follows 
that the cataloguing and listing of the individual emotions, which has characterized both 
the history of philosophy and psychology, is “to a great extent either fictitious or 
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unimportant, and that its pretences to accuracy are a sham” ([1890], 2: 448).  Finally, 
according to James, “there is no limit to the number of possible different emotions which 
may exist” ([1890], 2: 454).  This component of his view makes perfect sense given the 
background of his stream of consciousness theory.  Since the emotion is derived from a 
unique primary feeling, there are as many emotions as can be subsequently discriminated 
by words.  These unique and distinguishing features of James’ theory of emotion are all 
in accord with his overarching theory of consciousness. 
 
1.5 The Role of Introspection 
The task of developing a theory of emotion requires much more than simply being 
acquainted with the emotions; it requires knowing about them.  Acquiring facts about the 
emotions – such as what constitutes and causes them – involves subjecting emotional 
experience to thought and analysis.  Speaking generally about this process, James says: 
We can ascend to knowledge about it by rallying our wits and proceeding to 
notice and analyze and think.  What we are only acquainted with is only present to 
our minds; we have it, or the idea of it.  But when we know about it, we do more 
than merely have it; we seem, as we think over its relations, to subject it to a sort 
of treatment and to operate upon it with our thought ([1890], 1: 222). 
This progression from acquaintance to ‘knowledge about’ involves introspecting upon 
our experience.  “Introspective Observation is what we have to rely on first and foremost 
and always” ([1890], 1: 185).  It is through introspection that we acquire initial 
knowledge about the emotions.  This may sound surprising given the nature of James’ 
theory, which purports to measure emotion physiologically.  But James’ close attention to 
his own emotional experience formed the basis of his theory.  After the publication of 
The Principles, he remarked that his theory of emotion is based not upon “theoretic 
grounds, but because of the introspective appearances exclusively” (James [1894], 523).   
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     Indeed, James’ main line of argumentation for his theory in his chapter on “The 
Emotions” comes from introspection.  He appeals to his reader to do what he has done – 
to subject their acquaintance with emotion to immediate introspection. 
The next thing to be noticed is this, that every one of the bodily changes, 
whatsoever it be, is FELT, acutely or obscurely, the moment it occurs.  If the 
reader has never paid attention to this matter, he will be both interested and 
astonished to learn how many different local bodily feelings he can detect in 
himself as characteristic of his various emotional moods.  It would be perhaps too 
much to expect him to arrest the tide of any strong gust of passion for the sake of 
any such curious analysis as this; but he can observe more tranquil states… 
([1890], 2: 451). 
It is important to note that James is not advising to have the emotion and then introspect 
on it at a later point in time.  He is urging his reader to introspect on their emotional 
experience immediately.  While James believes that this immediate introspection is more 
amenable to acquire knowledge about the emotion, as opposed to introspection conducted 
after the event, it is nevertheless fallible.   When we immediately turn inward to see what 
is before our mind, we are no longer in the same state as we were a moment prior 
([1890], 1: 190).  Nevertheless, the two states are immediately conjoined within the 
stream of consciousness, and as a result are both part of what James calls ‘the specious 
present’.  The present moment for James is not an immediate now, but includes “probably 
the dozen seconds or less that have just elapsed” as well as a “vaguely vanishing 
backward and forward fringe” ([1890], 1: 613).  Since immediate introspection of one’s 
experience is conjoined in the specious present, this affords greater accuracy to 
immediate introspection.  Non-immediate introspection on the other hand, which falls 
outside of the specious present, is based on memory, and this involves a different process 
entirely (Myers [1986], 67).15   
                                                
15 As Myers says of the specious present, “This concept allowed James to hold that the way a mental state 
felt or registered to preintrospective awareness can be checked against the introspective observation (and 
report) of it as just-past in testing for observational accuracy” (Myers [1986], 67). 
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     Immediately introspecting on our emotional experience is the best way according to 
James to acquire initial knowledge about our emotions.  In so doing, we are best able to 
bring certain relations of our emotional experience to light and be more assured that our 
conceptual understanding is on solid ground.  For example, when we retrospect on an 
embarrassing experience we notice “it is something in the pharynx that compels either a 
swallow, a clearing of the throat, or a slight cough” ([1890], 2: 451).  This activity of the 
pharynx was not previously unconscious.  We always had this knowledge in our 
unarticulated acquaintance mode of cognition.  Through immediate introspection and “by 
rallying our wits and proceeding to notice and analyze and think”, we are able to bring 
these features into explicit awareness ([1890], 2: 222).  Once again, just as mistakes can 
be made with our sensory perceptions so too can they be made with our introspection, 
even when immediately undertaken ([1890], 1: 192).  This is because introspection of any 
kind is unable to capture the transitive relations that connect substantive experiences 
([1890], 1: 243-6).16  Despite these shortcomings, James regards introspective analysis as 
the best (and only) way to ground a theory of emotion. 
     While James’ physiological theory of emotion was informed by his own emotional 
experience, the theory does not attempt to explain the nature of emotional experience. 
Rather, it attempts to explain why an experience is emotional.  Many interpreters of 
James have not recognized this subtle point.  For example, Rainer Reisenzein and Achim 
Stephan are incorrect when they say, “James’s main explanatory aim was to account for 
the peculiar phenomenal character of emotion” (Reisenzein & Stephan, 2014, p. 36).  
This is not the case.  The James-Lange theory of emotion is an attempt to reach a deeper 
level of scientific understanding with respect to the physiological processes and 
mechanisms that underlie the feeling of an emotion.  It is these distinct patterns of 
physiological expression that explain why a primary feeling is emotional, but it does not 
seek to explain the nature of emotional experience.  It is at the level of James’ stream of 
consciousness theory, within which an emotion is embedded, that is to explain the nature 
                                                
16 James says, “Now it is very difficult, introspectively, to see the transitive parts for what they really are.  
If they are but flights to a conclusion, stopping them to look at them before the conclusion is reached is 
really annihilating them” ([1890], 1: 243). 
26 
 
of emotional experience. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the various interpretations of James’ theory of emotion 
fail to capture its complexities.  In particular, they fail to situate his theory of emotion 
within his overarching stream of consciousness theory.  As a result, a critical aspect of 
James’ view has been overlooked.  An emotion is not a thing that combines with other 
mental states.  Rather, an emotion has a derivative ontological status.  It is a secondary 
feeling that has been isolated from within a primary feeling.  An emotion for James is 
more appropriately conceived of as a process or a current within an undivided stream of 
consciousness, rather than an “absolutely individual thing”.    
     By equating the feeling of bodily changes with the emotion, James is attempting to 
acquire knowledge about the physical processes and mechanisms that underlie an 
emotional feeling.  This aspect of James’ theory has been well documented.  However, 
his discussion of the mental side of emotion has been largely overlooked.  In the next 
chapter, I inquire into this question. 
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2 Emotional Feeling 
At the time James introduced his theory, the study of emotion was divided between two 
radically opposed approaches (Dixon [2003]).  On the one hand, a scientific approach to 
the emotions, rooted in the framework of classical British empiricism, was gaining 
prominence.  The physiological psychology of Herbert Spencer and Alexander Bain, who 
both advocated a mind-stuff theory, was especially influential at this time.  Although 
Spencer and Bain were both dual-aspect monists, and regarded the mental and physical 
aspects of emotion as two sides of the same coin, they focused almost exclusively on the 
physical side.  As a result, they were often perceived as having a reductionistic, 
materialistic view of the emotions (Dixon [2003], 181).   
     This perceived reductionist view of emotion was criticized by many of the moral and 
religious thinkers of the period, including psychologists, philosophers and theologians.  
While these thinkers held a variety of views, they can be united insofar as they regard 
emotion as essentially an activity of the mind (Dixon [2003], 181).  The question of 
physiology is thereby either of no importance or a secondary consideration.  James 
McCosh, who wrote a prominent treatise on the emotions in 1880, summarizes this view 
nicely: 
Emotion is not what has often been presented by physiologists, a mere nervous 
reaction from a bodily stimulus, like a kick which the frog gives when it is 
pricked.  It begins with a mental act, and throughout is essentially an operation of 
the mind (McCosh [1880], 4) 
     It is interesting to note that these two competing views of emotion generally map onto 
two competing views of consciousness.  The physiological writers advocate a mind-stuff 
theory, while the moral/religious writers tend to advocate a soul theory.  James, as we 
have seen, rejects both conceptions of consciousness that these competing accounts of 
emotion are based on.  Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the physiological approach to 
emotion had an important influence on him.  Of particular importance was Alexander 
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Bain.17  Although for Bain an emotion – represented by a particular condition of the brain 
– causes the bodily changes, he recognizes that emotional states can be induced by willful 
force.  As Bain says, “we are sometimes able to assume a cheerful tone of mind by 
forcing a hilarious expression” (Bain [1859], 361-2).  According to James, Bain fails to 
recognize the implications of this view ([1890], 2: 463).  The ability to willfully bring 
about an emotional feeling is evidence for James of the inversion thesis – that the bodily 
changes in fact precede the emotion.  Indeed, the inversion thesis, according to James, is 
implicit in Bain’s account. 
     James’ theory is clearly intended to build upon this physiological approach to 
emotion.  In addition, unlike Bain and Spencer, James emphasizes emotional experience.  
In this respect, he is influenced not so much by the moral/religious philosophers on 
emotion as he is with the methodological approach of Brentano.  As we have seen, 
Brentano’s unity of consciousness thesis was an important influence in the development 
of James’ stream of consciousness theory.  This theory has important implications for 
James’ methodology in The Principles, which John Wild has called “a phenomenological 
psychology” (Wild [1969], 3). 
The first task of psychology, as James conceives of it, is to describe these 
phenomena of mental life exactly as they are lived, so far as this possible, and 
then to find out something concerning their relations and the patterns into which 
they fall (Wild [1969], 3). 
Describing the nature and structure of experience, including emotional experience, is 
fundamental to James’ project in The Principles.  Only when this has been sufficiently 
accomplished can he then go about the task of acquiring knowledge about this 
experience, which includes inquiring into the physiological aspect of emotion.  This 
approach is in general accord with Brentano’s, who had earlier conceived of 
psychology’s primary task as describing the features of experience as best as possible.  
                                                
17 In addition to Bain, the Italian physiologist Angelo Mosso, who conducted extensive research on the 
emotions beginning in the 1870s, was also an important influence.  This has recently been recently 
discussed by Otniel Dror (Dror [2014], 13-14).  
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Fittingly, he called this approach ‘descriptive psychology’.  Only by first paying close 
attention to the nature of experience, without any philosophical presumptions, can we 
then proceed with the second task of psychology – that of ‘genetic psychology’.  The 
focus of genetic psychology involves inquiring into the physiological and chemical 
processes underlying this experience (Mulligan & Smith [1985]).  James generally 
adheres to this same methodological approach in The Principles.  
     In this chapter, I will inquire into the mental side of emotion for James, and in so 
doing reveal the structure and nature of an emotional feeling.  Before looking into this 
question, however, I will first consider the relationship between emotion and action.  
James’ theory is well known for putting the action before the feeling, which seems to 
reduce an emotion to an epiphenomenon.  If this is the case, the question of emotional 
experience seems to be a pointless consideration since emotional feelings would have no 
causal efficacy. 
 
2.1 Emotion and Action 
The enduring fame and criticism of James’ theory of emotion is due not only to his 
equating the emotion with the feeling of bodily changes, but the conclusion he draws 
from this with respect to action.  After presenting his definition of emotion, in which the 
bodily changes give rise to the feeling, James concludes that we run from a threat not 
because we are frightened, but rather we are “frightened because we run” ([1890], 1: 
450).  Likewise, “we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike” ([1890], 2: 
450).  We most often think that an emotion plays an important role with respect to 
motivating an action, but given James’ inversion thesis it appears that this is not the case.  
As a result, numerous philosophers have complained that James has stripped emotion of 
any causal role with respect to action (Campbell [1997]; Deigh [2014]; Gordon [1987]).  
As Sue Campbell says: 
The standard criticism of James’s failure to give emotions a significant 
psychological role follows in a straightforward fashion from the second stage 
reduction.  If emotions are not part of a causal sequence resulting in action, but 
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are, in fact, our feeling of the bodily changes that are the sensory processes 
accompanying action, then emotions are mere epiphenomenal accompaniments to 
action and have no useful biological role (Campbell [1997], 27). 
Since for James the emotion does not cause the action, the feeling of the emotion does 
not factor into the causal chain.  If the physiological response is enough to instigate the 
action, then there is no clear role played by the emotions.  They are mere epiphenomena.      
     According to John Deigh, the radical implications of James’ epiphenomenal theory 
have not been sufficiently recognized (Deigh [2014]).  In particular, Deigh argues that the 
recent neo-Jamesian efforts to rehabilitate the theory, which is most developed in the 
work of Prinz, is based on “a basic misunderstanding of James’s view” (Deigh [2014], 5). 
Prinz, as we have seen, broadly agrees with James’ thesis that emotional consciousness is 
the feeling of bodily states, but he attempts to account for intentionality, or what Deigh 
calls an emotion’s “evaluative import”, by arguing that emotions are embodied appraisals 
(Deigh [2014], 4).  According to Deigh, however, the question of evaluative import is 
irrelevant for James because emotions do not motivate actions (Deigh, 2014, p. 5).  Since 
we feel “angry because we strike” and “frightened because we run”, there is simply no 
need for the emotion to represent the external stimulus in some way ([1890], 2, 450).  
Deigh argues that it is our instinctual reflex responses, not emotional feelings, that for 
James provide the motives for action (Deigh, 2014, p. 10).  We do not need to feel fear in 
order to run from a threat.  Rather we instinctually run from the threat, and in so doing 
come to feel fear.  
     This epiphenomenal reading of James’ theory is bolstered by a consideration of what 
kind of bodily changes make up the feeling of an emotion.  In this respect, James’ view 
differs from that of Lange.  The bodily changes that make up an emotion extend beyond 
the visceral responses of the autonomic nervous system, such as increased heart rate.  
They also include facial expressions (e.g., a scowl) and expressive behavior (e.g., crying) 
(Laird & Lacasse [2014], 29).  Since expressive behavior is part of the bodily changes 
that make up the feeling of an emotion, then it seems conclusive that emotion for James 
is an epiphenomenon.   
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     It is not clear that this is James’s more considered view, however.  Within his chapter 
on “The Emotions”, he makes contradictory statements with respect to the relationship 
between emotion and action.  At the outset of the chapter, he writes:   
Instinctive reactions and emotional expressions thus shade imperceptibly into 
each other.  Every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as well.  
Emotions, however, fall short of instincts, in that the emotional reaction usually 
terminates in the subject’s own body, whilst the instinctive reaction is apt to go 
farther and enter into practical relations with the exciting object ([1890], 2: 442). 
While instinctive reactions and emotional expressions are inextricably tied together, 
instincts and emotions can come apart insofar as the latter need not “enter into practical 
relations with the exciting object” ([1890], 2: 442).  In other words, acting out of the 
emotion is not necessary for the emotion to be experienced.  For example, an individual 
may feel anger but resist the temptation to fight because s/he has learned that such a 
response is inappropriate.  As James says, “When the outward deeds are inhibited, these 
latter emotional expressions still remain, and we read the anger in the face, though the 
blow may not be struck” ([1890], 2: 442).  In this case, the strike is not necessary in order 
to feel anger.  This contradicts James’s later statement that we feel “angry because we 
strike” and “frightened because we run” ([1890], 2: 450).  
     It is only in James’ later article, “The Physical Basis of Emotion”, where he clarifies 
his view.  Here he recants his earlier counterintuitive view with respect to action ([1894], 
519). 
I think that all the force of such objections lies in the slapdash brevity of the 
language used, of which I admit that my own text set a bad example when it said 
“we are frightened because we run.”  Yet let the word ‘run’ but stand for what it 
was meant to stand for, namely, for many other movements in us, of which 
invisible visceral ones seem by far the most essential ([1894], 519).  
James’ more considered view is that it is the physiological changes, “of which invisible 
visceral ones seem by far the most essential”, which precedes and constitutes the 
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emotional feeling ([1894], 519).  It seems that the visceral changes are sufficient for an 
emotion.  This is not to say that the behavioral response cannot also contribute.  
However, when the behavioral response does contribute to the feeling of an emotion, it 
must be stressed that the feeling and the action are inextricably woven within an ongoing 
process.  The feeling of bodily changes gives rise to an emotion, the emotion gives rise to 
an action, the action give rise to a modified emotion, which may in turn modify the 
action, and so on.  As John Dewey says of James’ theory, it is only when we run away 
from a bear that we have the feeling of “running-away-from-bear” (Dewey [1895], 22).  
In this way, the behavioral response changes the nature of the feeling, which reflects the 
ongoing interaction between feeling and action.  
     Since the emotional feeling precedes the action, emotions are able to play a 
motivational role with respect to action.  As a result, the question of evaluative import or 
intentionality should be a concern for James.  After all, if we want to act in an 
appropriate, rational way, it seems the emotion must be able to represent the situation in 
some way.  However, almost all critics agree that James’ theory is deficient in this 
respect.  In the next section, I argue against this prevailing view by illustrating the 
intentional component of an emotional feeling. 
 
2.2 More Than a Bodily Feeling 
In 1927, Walter Cannon claimed to have disproved James’ claim that the feeling of 
bodily changes is the emotion (Cannon [1927]).  Cannon’s critique had an enormous 
impact upon emotion theorists at the time, effectively removing James’ account as the 
theory of choice within affective science (Laird & Lacasse [2014]).  According to 
Cannon, the same physiological changes can result not only in different emotions but also 
in non-emotional states.  Since fear and rage have the same physiological response as 
chilliness, fever and hyperglycemia, the emotion cannot simply be the feeling of bodily 
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changes (Cannon [1927], 114).18 A few decades later, in 1962, Schachter and Singer 
were thought to have confirmed that physiological changes alone are insufficient to 
distinguish an emotional feeling (Schachter & Singer [1962]).  In their study, two groups 
of participants were injected with adrenaline.  The first group was given an insulting 
questionnaire to fill out, and they showed signs of anger.  The second group, meanwhile, 
was placed in a jovial setting, and they showed signs of happiness.  The authors 
concluded that the difference in emotional response lies not in physiology since both had 
been injected with adrenaline, but in their interpretation of the particular circumstance 
(Schachter & Singer [1962]).  Thus, just as Cannon had argued, the same physiological 
response can bring about very different mental states.   
     This conclusion is far from convincing.  Schachter and Singer assume that the 
physiological response of the two groups of participants remains the same in the 
changing circumstances (Prinz [2004], 70).  Without evidence documenting this, James 
would surely reject the assumption.  For him, the body acts as a sounding board to the 
continually changing environmental stimuli that we are presented with.  While the 
adrenaline surely played a role in activating an emotional response, the different 
circumstances the participants were placed in also has an impact on their physiology.  
Thus, James would surely expect, along with Prinz, that the group A participants had a 
different physiological response from the group B participants. 
     While these empirical challenges to James’ view have failed to undermine the theory, 
a common philosophical objection does seem to render it implausible.  The view that 
physiological changes produce a feeling that is the emotion seems unable to account for 
our basic intuition that emotions are in some sense about or directed towards the world.  
According to James’ inversion thesis – that the bodily changes precede rather than follow 
the emotion – it would seem that we are afraid because our body trembles rather than our 
                                                
18 Cannon’s critique of James is based on the view that the emotional feeling is constituted solely by 
visceral changes.  As we have seen, the physiological changes are not necessarily limited to the viscera, but 
can also include feedback from facial expressions (e.g. furrowed brow) and expressive behavior (e.g. 
crying).  James Laird and Katherine Lacasse have argued that by failing to recognize the extent of the 
bodily changes, Cannon’s criticism of James ultimately fails (Laird & Lacasse [2014). 
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commonsense intuition that we tremble because we are afraid of some thing.  As 
Solomon, writing later in his career, says: 
The problem with the Jamesian analysis, I now see, is that it has an impoverished 
account of feeling.  Or rather, it reduces all of the richness of emotional 
experience to the singular sensations of the most primitive bodily feelings 
(Solomon [2007], 233). 
If the emotion is a bodily feeling, as the standard view maintains, James is unable to 
account for intentionality.  Many philosophers have used this view as a foil en route to 
developing their own view, from Sartre to Solomon to Goldie. 
     In fact, all three interpretations previously looked at in Chapter 1 assume that the 
bodily changes that give rise to the feeling of an emotion is a bodily feeling; that is, it is a 
feeling that has the body as an object.  This equation of bodily changes with bodily 
feelings often stems from a misreading of James’s definition that an emotion is the 
“feeling of the same (bodily) changes” ([1890] 2: 449).  First, some theorists reinterpret 
this as “feelings of bodily changes”, thereby turning James’s singular emotional feeling 
into a plurality of feelings (Deigh [2014] 10; Stocker [2009], 406).  Once this step is 
made, it seems natural to assert a one-to-one correspondence between certain bodily 
changes and certain bodily feelings.  This is not the case, however.  The many bodily 
changes give rise to a singular feeling.  Other interpreters, meanwhile, regard this feeling 
as the perception of bodily changes (de Sousa [1987]; Hatfield [2007]; Prinz [2004]; 
Solomon [1973]).  If an emotion is a perception of bodily changes, it would be 
inconceivable to suggest that an emotional feeling has anything but the body as an object.   
     James was familiar with this particular reading of his theory and he sought to clarify 
matters.  Soon after the publication of “What is an Emotion?” he responded to a letter 
from Charles Renouvier, who had interpreted his theory in this way.  
 From what you say I fear you may not have caught the precise meaning of my 
 Emotion theory.  I don't mean that the Emotion is the perception of bodily 
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 changes as such, but only that the bodily changes give us a feeling, which is the 
 Emotion (James [1997], 524).19 
If the feeling of an emotion is not the perception of the bodily changes but is given by the 
bodily changes, this opens up the possibility that the feeling is more than a bodily feeling; 
that it is also a feeling that is directed toward the world.  Peter Goldie, however, 
explicitly argues that James does not recognize that emotional feelings point beyond the 
body.  According to Goldie, “James insists that the (emotional) consciousness has to be 
of bodily changes, leaving no room for feeling toward” (Goldie [2000], 54).  This concept 
of ‘feeling toward’ is the lynchpin to Goldie’s view.  It explains how feelings can also be 
directed outward to the world, something that James had allegedly not recognized.20  
     However, James did recognize this.  Matthew Ratcliffe has attempted to show this by 
arguing that James rejects the dichotomy between feeling and thought that so many of his 
critics take for granted (Ratcliffe [2005]).  It might seem that Ratcliffe would thereby 
reject the view that the feeling of the emotion is a bodily feeling.  This is not the case.  He 
agrees with all other interpreters of James in this respect.  However, Ratcliffe argues that 
the category of bodily feelings extends much further than is traditionally conceived.  Not 
only do bodily feelings include feelings that have the body as an object, but also feelings 
that are done by the body (Ratcliffe [2008], 88).  It is these latter kinds of bodily feelings 
that can be considered cognitive states.  As he says of James, “bodily feelings shape the 
manner in which things appear to us and structure our reasoning as a consequence” 
(Ratcliffe [2005], 187).  While I agree with Ratcliffe that James rejects the 
feeling/thought dichotomy, I disagree that he regards emotions as bodily feelings.21   
                                                
19 James goes on to say, “I feel sure that some part of our emotions is covered by this account; whether the 
whole of them is so covered is a question about which I am still doubtful” (James [1997], 525).  Six years 
later, with the publication of The Principles, James does indeed come to the view that this feeling covers 
the whole of emotion. 
20 Goldie is neither the first nor the only philosopher to develop the idea that feelings point outward.  For 
example, Irons [1894], de Sousa [1987], and Charland [1995] have all developed it in some capacity.   
21 Given Ratcliffe’s broad conception of bodily feelings this seems to be a terminological rather than a 
substantive difference.  However, while I generally agree with his interpretation of James, his approach is 
problematic.  Ratcliffe’s argument proceeds by considering James’s later philosophical works, such as The 
Will to Believe and The Varieties of Religious Experience (Ratcliffe [2005]).  By fitting James’s earlier 
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     In the next section, I consider James’ conception of emotional feeling as it is 
developed in The Principles, and argue, in contrast to all other interpreters of James, that 
it is not to be reduced to a bodily feeling. 
 
2.2.1 Emotion and Sense of Reality 
When we situate James’s chapter on “The Emotions” within The Principles as a whole, it 
becomes clear that he does recognize the outward directedness of an emotional feeling.  
If an emotion is not limited to bodily feelings, we might wonder why James is not more 
explicit about this in “The Emotions” chapter.  The reason seems to be that he has 
explicit intentions with this chapter.  He is attempting to motivate the thesis that our 
feeling of bodily changes is the emotion rather than some kind of preceding purely 
mental state.  As a result, he explicitly draws attention to the bodily feelings that arise 
from the bodily changes.  When considering grief it thus makes perfect sense for him to 
highlight the bodily feelings by asking, “what would it be without its tears, its sobs, its 
suffocation of the heart, its pang in the breast-bone?” ([1890], 2: 452).  It would serve 
little purpose to emphasize an outward-directed feeling of emotion because it does not 
direct attention to the bodily changes that are occurring.  By focusing on the bodily 
feelings then, James is able to bring the bodily changes that directly cause emotions to 
light.  
     Nevertheless, allusions are made in “The Emotions” chapter as to what this feeling 
consists in.  In his appeal to readers to introspect on their bodily states during an 
emotional experience, James recognizes that the “strong gust of passion” towards the 
exciting stimulus will be arrested ([1890], 2: 451).  By introspecting upon our emotional 
                                                                                                                                            
 
theory of emotion into this later philosophical framework, Ratcliffe attempts to “piece together a theory” 
(Ratcliffe [2005], 179).  The problem, however, is that we have no assurance that James’s conception of 
emotion and feeling remains consistent throughout his career.  In fact, numerous critics have argued that 
James fundamentally breaks from his theory of emotion in these later works (Averill [1992]; Oatley & 
Djikic [2002]; Solomon [1995]). 
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experience what we bring to light are “many different local bodily feelings” ([1890], 2: 
451).  It might seem that the feeling of an emotion is indeed limited to bodily feelings, 
but James is well aware that the having of an emotional experience and our immediately 
reflecting upon that emotional experience are two very different states of consciousness.  
As soon as we introspect upon an experience we change the nature of that experience. 
The present conscious state, when I say 'I feel tired,' is not the direct state of tire; 
when I say "I feel angry,' it is not the direct state of anger. It is the state of saying-
I-feel-tired, of saying-I-feel-angry, - entirely different matters ([1890], 1: 190). 
When we immediately introspect upon an emotional experience by turning inward toward 
our bodily states, we thereby “arrest the tide of any strong gust of passion” that had been 
directed toward the exciting stimulus ([1890], 2: 451).  We are then only made aware of 
bodily feelings.  But this is not the emotion.  The emotion is the prior state, which 
includes the unintrospectable “strong gust of passion”, which is the outward-directed 
aspect of the emotional feeling.  Indeed, by the time we get to the chapter on “The 
Emotions”, James has already discussed this outward-directed feeling of emotion in “The 
Perception of Reality” chapter.  By considering this chapter closely, I hope to show that 
the bodily changes that give rise to the feeling of an emotion is not simply a bodily 
feeling.  The feeling of an emotion has embedded within it an outward-directed feeling – 
which James calls a ‘belief’ or ‘sense of reality’ – that imbues the world with meaning 
and value.   
     In “The Perception of Reality”, James refers back to his stream of consciousness 
theory, and makes the important point that the stream involves more than the object of 
consciousness such as the “thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and contrasting-with-it” 
([1890], 1: 240).  It also includes one’s psychic attitude toward this object of 
consciousness.  James had discussed this aspect of the stream of consciousness in the 
chapter on the “Stream of Thought” ([1890], 1: 284-289), but it is developed in this later 
chapter.  
What I myself have called (vol. 1, 275) the ‘object’ of thought may be 
comparatively simple, like “Ha! What a pain,” or “It-thunders”; or it may be 
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complex, like “Columbus-discovered-America-in-1492,” or “There-exists-an-all-
wise-Creator-of-the-world.”  In either case, however, the mere thought of the 
object may exist as something quite distinct from the belief in its reality ([1890], 
2: 286). 
For example, the experience of imagining a horse in a field compared to actually seeing a 
horse in a field has a markedly different phenomenology.  While the object of thought 
might be the same, we disbelieve that the former is a particular entity that exists outside 
of our mind and believe the latter to have an independent existence.  The primary feeling 
includes not only the object of consciousness then, but also the psychic attitude towards 
it.   
     This psychic attitude “is the belief itself”, and belief is best characterized as a kind of 
emotion – namely, the emotion of consent or conviction ([1890], 2: 287).  As James says, 
“In its inner nature, belief, or the sense of reality, is a sort of feeling more allied to the 
emotions than to anything else” ([1890], 2: 283).  Later in the chapter, in a subsection 
entitled “The Influence of Emotion and Active Impulse on Belief” we get a better sense 
just how belief is allied to the emotions.  Belief is in fact a constituent element of the 
feeling of an emotion. 
The quality of arousing emotion, of shaking, moving us or inciting us to action, 
has as much to do with our belief in an object’s reality as the quality of giving 
pleasure or pain.  In Chapter XXIV I shall seek to show that our emotions 
probably owe their pungent quality to the bodily sensations which they involve.  
Our tendency to believe in emotionally exciting objects (object of fear, desire, 
etc.) is thus explained without resorting to any fundamentally new principle of 
choice.  Speaking generally, the more a conceived object excites us, the more 
reality it has ([1890], 2: 307). 
The feeling of an emotion has two elements that can be theoretically distinguished.  First, 
there is the “quality of giving pleasure or pain”.  These feelings are not directed toward 
anything in the world, but are exclusively bodily feelings.  They are feelings that have the 
body as an object.  Second, an emotion involves a “belief in an object’s reality”.  By 
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‘object’, James is referring to the entire object of thought, not a particular object within 
the stream of thought.  It might seem that this close identification of emotion with belief 
pushes James toward a cognitive theory of emotion.  After all, cognitive theorists define 
emotion in terms of belief or a similar kind of mental state.  For a cognitivist, our 
emotions are beliefs insofar as they express knowledge about an object or state of affairs.  
Thus my anger when I find that my car has been stolen contains within it the belief that I 
have been wronged in some way.  James, however, is using the term belief in a different 
way.  It is not a thinking about but a feeling for.  Specifically, belief is the feeling of 
conviction in which we become convinced of either a sense of reality (acquaintance with 
the world) or a proposition (knowledge about the world) ([1890], 2: 287).  Since the 
emotions are states that involve our acquaintance rather than our knowledge about the 
world, an emotional feeling includes this conviction of a particular sense of reality.  For 
example, fear involves the conviction of a dangerous reality; joy involves the conviction 
of a benevolent reality; and anger involves the conviction of an unjust reality. 
     When James says that an emotion involves “our belief in an object’s reality” he is not 
discussing an emotion in and of itself.  The object and the emotion are both entwined 
within a primary feeling, while the emotion itself, which has been theoretically extracted 
out of this unified state, is a secondary feeling.  While this secondary feeling does not 
include the object of thought, it is bidirectional in structure, at once directed outward 
toward the world and inward toward the body.  This bidirectional structure of an 
emotional feeling becomes clear when James considers some examples, which highlights 
the close relationship between the preceding bodily changes and the subsequent 
emotional feeling that includes a sense of reality.  “[A] man who has no belief in ghosts 
by daylight will temporarily believe in them when, alone at midnight, he feels his blood 
curdle at a mysterious sound or vision” ([1890], 2: 307; my emphasis).  The object of 
consciousness in this case is the sound or vision, but the sense of reality given toward this 
object of consciousness is the belief.  The feeling of the curdling of the blood is more 
than a bodily feeling.  It is also a feeling at the object of consciousness; namely the belief 
that the sound or vision is dangerous or fearful.  It is this feeling of belief in tandem with 
the bodily feeling of displeasure that constitutes the fear.  Emotions have built into them a 
conviction about the nature of a particular external reality.  It is important to note that, for 
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James, while the emotion itself is directed outward to the world, it is neither about nor 
directed toward a particular object.  It is simply a bidirectional feeling.  It is within the 
undivided primary feeling that the emotion is bound up (most often) with a particular 
object. 
      While belief may be best described as a kind of emotion involving consent, this 
consent need not involve a bodily commotion.  It is possible to believe without emotion 
for James.  These kinds of beliefs are of course not passionately felt, and as a result they 
do not constitute our most deeply held beliefs. 
As bare logical thinkers, without emotional reaction, we give reality to whatever 
objects we think of, for they are really phenomena, or objects of our passing 
thought, if nothing more.  But, as thinkers with emotional reaction, we give what 
seems to us a still higher degree of reality to whatever things we select and 
emphasize and turn to WITH A WILL ([1890], 2: 297). 
We believe in the reality of objects as a matter of course, but our emotional excitement 
towards objects affords them a higher degree of reality.  Indeed, the more intense the 
emotional feeling is, the more passionate the belief.  In this respect, James considers the 
religious belief of Caliph Omar (also Umar), who was a Muslim leader and companion to 
the Islamic prophet Muhammad.  Omar’s religious belief is of a particularly intense 
variety, far more passionate than that which is given to everyday passing perceptions.   
The reason of the belief is undoubtedly the bodily commotion which the exciting 
idea sets up.  ‘Nothing which I can feel like that can be false.’  All our religious 
and supernatural beliefs are of this order ([1890], 2: 308).  
Once again we see that the belief is rooted in the emotional feeling, which is given by the 
bodily changes.  These bodily changes give rise not only to bodily feelings but also an 
outward directed feeling that consents to a particular sense of reality.  It is precisely this 
aspect of the emotional feeling that accounts for the evaluative import of an emotion, as it 
provides meaning and value to an individual’s experience.  As a result, James does not 
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reduce emotional feeling to bodily feeling.  Emotions are bi-directional feelings, 
involving a sense of reality that imbues the world with meaning and value. 
     This relationship between emotion and belief might appear to be circular.  Initially, 
James defines belief in terms of emotion ([1890], 2: 283), only to subsequently define 
emotion in terms of belief ([1890], 2: 307).  However, it must be remembered that when 
defining emotion in terms of belief, James is using the term ‘belief’ broadly.  Since 
emotions are acquaintances they confer the world with a ‘sense of reality’.  This sense of 
reality is a feeling for the object of thought.  It is not a thinking about.  Meanwhile, when 
James defines belief in terms of emotion, it is not the content of the belief that is 
emotional, but the act of moving from a state of doubt to a belief state, which involves a 
feeling of sufficiency.   
     James discusses the bidirectional feeling structure of emotion in a more concentrated 
and explicit way four years after the publication of The Principles in an article entitled 
The Physical Basis of Emotion.  Critics have largely overlooked this important article, but 
those few theorists who do consider it tend to interpret James as retreating from his 
earlier theory (Baldwin [1894]; Irons [1894]; Dixon [2006]).22  According to Dixon, 
“while presented as a plea that he had been misunderstood, (it) amounted in reality to 
little more than an abject surrender” (Dixon [2006], 216).  But having taken a closer look 
at what James has to say about emotion in The Principles, we see that he never intended 
to reduce the feeling of an emotion to bodily feelings.  What he has to say in this later 
article with respect to the nature of the feeling of emotion is fully consistent with his 
earlier position – with the exception of the earlier noted “slapdash brevity”. 
     In The Physical Basis of Emotion, as James had done in “The Perception of Reality” 
chapter, he distinguishes two aspects of an emotion. 
                                                
22 An exception is Gerald Myers, who holds that James’ position in The Physical Basis of Emotion is 
consistent with The Principles (Myers [1986], 220). 
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[I]n addition to this pleasantness or painfulness of the content, which in any case 
seems due to afferent currents, we may also feel a general seizure of excitement, 
which Wundt, Lehmann, and other German writers call an Affect, and which is 
what I have all along meant by an emotion (James [1894], 523). 
An emotion involves two components – the pleasure or displeasure which are purely 
bodily feelings, and the “general seizure of excitement” (i.e., the sense of reality) that 
engages us with a state of affairs that we attribute reality to.  As James says in The 
Principles, “[W]hatever excites and stimulates our interest is real” ([1890], 2: 295).   
     James goes into more detail about this bidirectional feeling when he discusses and 
agrees with David Irons’ notion of a feeling attitude:  
This writer further lays great stress on the vital difference between the receptive 
and the reactive states of the mind, and considers that the theory under discussion 
takes away all ground for the distinction.  His account of the inner contrast is 
excellent.  He gives the name of “feeling-attitude” to the whole class of reactions 
of the self, of which the experiences which we call emotions are one species.  He 
sharply distinguishes feeling-attitude from mere pleasure and pain – a distinction 
in which I fully agree.  The line of direction in feeling-attitude is from the self 
outward, he says, while that of mere pleasure and pain (and of perception and 
ideation) is from the object to the self.  It is impossible to feel pleasure or pain 
towards an object. (James [1894/1994], 521; emphasis and brackets in original). 
James is in full agreement with Irons that the feeling attitude points “from the self 
outward”.  Where James disagrees with Irons is with respect to the structure of this 
feeling attitude of emotion.  For Irons, the feeling attitude is necessarily bound up with 
the evaluation of an object that the feeling is for.  The perception then is part of the 
feeling attitude.  According to James, however, the bodily changes are all that is required 
to provide the outward direction of an emotion.  
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But on what ground have we the right to affirm that visceral and muscular 
sensibility cannot give the direction from the self outwards, if the higher 
senses…give the direction from the object to the self? (James [1894], 521). 
This points to an important difference between James and Irons.  For Irons, the feeling 
attitude of emotion is connected with the perception and the feeling of bodily changes, 
while for James it is connected only with the feeling of the bodily changes.  It is in this 
way that James, unlike Irons, is able to account for objectless emotions.  Since bodily 
changes alone can account for the outward directedness of an emotional feeling, it is 
possible to experience an emotion that is not directed toward a particular object.  Even 
these objectless emotions are intentional states insofar as they are directed toward the 
world in some capacity.  In objectless fear, for example, there is still the sense of a 
dangerous reality.  Even though the fear remains unspecified within the unified stream of 
consciousness, it has meaning and significance for the individual who experiences it.23 
 
2.3 The Subtle Emotions 
Having a better sense of what an emotion is for James, we are in a better position to 
assess his argument that the subtle emotions “form no exception to our account, but 
rather an additional illustration thereof” ([1890], 2: 470).24  James first distinguishes the 
subtle emotions from the coarse emotions in terms of their intensity, as “those whose 
organic reverberation is less obvious and strong” ([1890], 2: 449).  He subsequently 
distinguishes them in terms of type, as the aesthetic, moral and intellectual emotions.  
Adding these two distinguishing features together, it would seem that subtle emotions are 
more sophisticated and refined feelings that are of a lower feeling intensity.  This 
distinction between coarse and subtle emotions is not meant to distinguish what 
contemporary theorists call basic and non-basic emotions.  Non-basic emotions such as 
                                                
23 I will be looking at objectless emotions in more detail in section 3.4. 
24 James was not the first thinker to attempt bringing together simple and cognitively complicated emotions 
under a single framework.  In 1863, Wundt had argued that ‘sensory emotions’ and ‘complex emotions’ 
were both to be explained by the same physiological mechanisms (Wundt [1894]). 
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jealousy and envy, which seem to require some kind of cognitive appraisal, would fall 
into the coarse category for James.  The difference between the more cognitively 
complex coarse emotions and the subtle emotions is that the latter “affect us with a 
pleasure that seems ingrained in the very form of the representation itself” ([1890], 2: 
468).  For example, the beauty of an object, which gives us an emotional reaction, seems 
to be in the object itself.  In order to pick out and recognize this beauty, some kind of 
prior aesthetic education or understanding is required.  Without this prior understanding, 
the object would provoke no response whatsoever.  This kind of aesthetic appreciation 
involves more than sensation and association; it also involves a judgment about a fact, 
namely that the particular object, or a part thereof, is beautiful because of certain features 
that it possesses.  With the coarse emotions, on the other hand, we feel them as a matter 
of course.  We do not feel jealousy having cultivated an appreciation for objects that are 
worthy of jealousy.  In this way, what we are jealous of does not seem ingrained within 
the form of the object. 
     James’ inclusion of the subtle emotions within the framework of his theory was 
considered its weakest link by a couple of his contemporary critics (Gurney [1884]; Irons 
[1894]).  Edmund Gurney admits that there is some truth to James’ bodily changes theory 
with respect to the coarse emotions, but the theory breaks down with the more 
conceptually based subtle emotions.  In presenting his critique, Gurney focuses on the 
emotional response to a piece of music.   
There can be no better illustration of the issue before us than is afforded by one of 
Prof. James’s own examples – that of music.  His view goes far to confound the 
two things which, in my opinion, it is the prime necessity of musical psychology 
to distinguish – the effect, chiefly sensuous, of mere streams or masses of finely-
coloured sound, and the distinctive musical emotion to which the form of a 
sequence of sound, its melodic and harmonic individuality, even realized in 
complete silence, is the vital and essential object.  It is with the former of these 
two very different things that the physical reactions – the stirring of the hair, the 
tingling and the shiver – are far most markedly connected…If I may speak of 
myself, there is plenty of music from which I have received as much emotion in 
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silent representation as when presented by the finest orchestra; but it is with the 
latter condition that I almost exclusively associate the cutaneous tingling and hair-
stirring (Gurney [1884], 425-6). 
Not only is the aesthetic emotion unmediated by bodily changes according to Gurney, but 
the bodily changes are not even necessary for an emotion to be experienced.  Simply 
recounting the piece of music in his mind is enough to bring about the emotion.  It comes 
without any bodily reverberation whatsoever, be it before or after the emotion.  
     When Gurney describes having an aesthetic emotion by recounting a piece of music in 
his mind without a bodily response, what he is really having according to James is a pure 
judgment.  Without some kind of bodily response following such a judgment, which is 
felt in turn, the experience cannot be said to be an emotional one.  As James says: 
In all cases of intellectual or moral rapture we find that, unless there be coupled a 
bodily reverberation of some kind with the mere thought of the object and 
cognition of its quality; unless we actually laugh at the neatness of the 
demonstration or witticism; unless we thrill at the case of justice, or tingle at the 
act of magnanimity; our state of mind can hardly be called emotional at all (2: 
470-1).   
According to James, there is an important difference between a subtle emotion and a pure 
judgment.  The difference between a primary feeling involving a subtle emotion and one 
involving a pure judgment is that the former involves both a judgment and a belief while 
the latter only a judgment.  There is a phenomenological difference between these two 
states.  In the case of a pure judgment, we know something to be true insofar as we have 
knowledge of a fact, but we do not feel it to be true.  By contrast, not only is a subtle 
emotion indirectly caused by our knowledge about an object, but it involves a subsequent 
feeling that gives reality to that object.  As a result, we not only judge the object to be 
beautiful, we actually feel it to be so.  This is how James would ultimately explain 
Gurney’s experience.  It is only when in the presence of the orchestra that he in fact has 
an emotion.  He then not only judges the music to be beautiful, he feels it to be beautiful.  
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When he simply conceives of the music without a bodily response, he only has a 
judgment of its beauty.  
     Similarly to Gurney, David Irons also regards the inclusion of the subtle emotions as 
the weakest part of James’ theory (Irons [1894]).  According to Irons, when we 
conceptualize an object or an aspect thereof to be beautiful, it is patently obvious that the 
emotion immediately follows the perception.  It is not that we are made aware of the 
beauty by the feeling of bodily changes.  We have this emotional appreciation of beauty 
beforehand, and it is this emotion that sets off the bodily changes (Irons [1894], 88).  
Irons then concludes:  “The subtler emotions are the most vulnerable part of the position, 
and, precisely where the proof should be strongest, there is hardly a show of proof at all” 
(Irons [1894], 90).   
     Irons’ objection regarding subtle emotions is certainly more difficult for James to 
respond to.  It seems to expose a deficiency in the “vital point” of his theory.  As James 
says: 
If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness 
of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, 
no ‘mind-stuff’ out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and 
neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains ([1890], 2: 451). 
According to Irons this argument at best proves that the bodily symptoms are necessary 
for an emotion, but it does not prove they are sufficient.  In fact, Irons likens the 
argument to saying that since a “shapeless apple cannot exist, therefore an apple is pure 
shape and nothing else” (Irons [1894], 81).  Shape may be part of what an apple is, but it 
is obviously not the only thing it is.  Similarly, the feeling of bodily changes may be part 
of what an emotion is, but it does not follow that this is all an emotion is.  This is 
especially true for subtle emotions, which are cognitively rich states of consciousness.   
     As it stands, Irons’ argument is a good one.  I have tried to show how James responds 
to this critique with respect to the coarse emotions.  The feeling of bodily changes is not 
limited to a bodily feeling but also includes a sense of reality.  However, James’ attempt 
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to include subtle emotions within his theory presents a new challenge.  How can a feeling 
of bodily changes alone account for the judgment that an object is beautiful?  Surely the 
judgment of the object must be a constitutive part of the emotion.  For James this is not 
the case.  The judgment of the object that indirectly causes the emotion is of course, 
along with the emotion, embedded within the primary feeling.  But the judgment is not 
part of the secondary feeling of an emotion.  In this way, James’ theory of emotion seeks 
to explain the emotionality of subtle emotions.  This emotionality can attach itself to 
judgments and perceptions of varying degrees of appraisal, but this does not entail that 
the essence of an emotion has changed.  This is not to deny that subtle emotions differ 
from coarse emotions within primary feelings.  For example, a primary feeling that 
involves a subtle emotion would be a more active state of consciousness.  Nevertheless, 
the structure of the emotion itself, though of different feeling intensity, is the same.  Both 
coarse and subtle emotions are bidirectional feelings, and it is this feeling element, which 
is brought about by the bodily changes, that accounts for the emotionality of these states.  
Since it is possible to have a judgment without a feeling response, the emotion is not a 
judgment.  Rather, it is the feeling that is indirectly caused by the judgment that is the 
emotion.   
     This account would likely remain unsatisfying to Irons insofar as James only explains 
part of what a subtle emotion is.  For Irons, a subtle emotion involves a feeling plus a 
judgment.  At the level of primary feelings, within which the judgment and the feeling 
are embedded, James would agree.  However, when inquiring into what an emotion is, 
the judgment is simply the indirect cause of the emotion.  It is the feeling of bodily 
changes that not only directly explains the emotion, but also explains why the state of 
consciousness is emotional.  It is the presence of this secondary feeling within a primary 
feeling that distinguishes an emotional state of consciousness from a non-emotional state.   
Ultimately, James and Irons are attempting to explain different things.  James wants to 
explain the emotionality of subtle emotions while Irons wants to explain the constitution 
of subtle emotions.  At the root of this difference seems to be different conceptions of the 
nature of consciousness.  For James, Irons is giving a description not of the emotion but 
the primary feeling within which the emotion is embedded. 
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2.4 The Natural Kind Status of the Emotions 
In Chapter 1, in the context of James’ stream of consciousness theory, I mentioned how 
the emotions are not “absolutely individual things”.  Focusing now on the emotion as a 
secondary feeling, this view has important implications for the natural kind status of the 
emotions.  As James says: 
The trouble with the emotions in psychology is that they are regarded too much as 
absolutely individual things.  Were we to go through the whole list of emotions 
which have been named by men, and study their organic manifestations, we 
should… find that our descriptions had no absolute truth; that they only applied to 
the average man; that every one of us, almost, has some personal idiosyncrasy of 
expression, laughing or sobbing differently from his neighbor, or reddening or 
growing pale where others do not ([1890], 2: 447-8). 
For James, there is a great deal of flux between persons with respect to the bodily 
changes that cause a particular kind of emotion.  Fear, for example, will manifest in 
innumerable ways based on this “personal idiosyncrasy of expression”.  Moreover, these 
variants of fear cannot be clearly demarcated from other emotions.  Horror, for example, 
can blur the line between fear and anger.  As James says, “The internal shadings of 
emotional feeling, moreover, merge endlessly into each other” ([1890], 2: 448).  By using 
the term shading James seems to be drawing a comparison between emotion and colour.  
Green, orange, red and the other colours that we pick out and name do not cut nature at 
its joints.  Rather this picking out is something we do to serve our everyday purposes.  
There are in fact many shades of green, but we do not discriminate between most of them 
because there is usually no need to.  Occasionally, such as when selecting a paint colour 
for a room, it becomes useful to distinguish between more shades.  Similarly, we pick out 
fear, joy, anger and other common emotions because they serve our everyday purposes.  
But what we call fear is in fact a collection of different but closely associated feelings.  In 
some instances, there will be a need to distinguish between some of these feelings.  Then 
variants such as dread, angst, trepidation, terror, anxiety, etc., are named.  In this way, the 
emotions that a novelist will individuate will differ markedly from that of a neuroscientist 
since they are approaching the phenomena from a different perspective.  As James says, 
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“any classification of the emotions is seen to be as true and as 'natural ' as any other, if it 
only serves some purpose” ([1890], 2: 454).25  Given all this flux and variation with the 
emotions it follows that “there is no limit to the number of possible different emotions 
which may exist” ([1890], 2: 454).  The more we can discriminate unique emotional 
feelings by naming them, the more emotions we will have knowledge about.   
     Since emotions are not “absolutely individual things”, they are not natural kinds in the 
traditional sense of the term.  There are no necessary and sufficient conditions we can 
point to for fear for example.  What we call fear in fact refers to a range of feelings, 
which in turn involves a range of physiological expression.  James thereby regards his 
theory of emotion as moving beyond an Aristotelian essentialist framework, based upon 
classification, and aligning with a dynamic, evolutionary model.  According to James, the 
emotions are not “eternal and sacred psychic entities”, but feelings that can be reliably 
grouped together on a causal basis.   
So long as they (the emotions) are set down as so many eternal and sacred psychic 
entities, like the old immutable species in natural history, so long all that can be 
done with them is reverently to catalogue their separate characters, points, and 
effects.  But if we regard them as products of more general causes (as 'species' are 
now regarded as products of heredity and variation), the mere distinguishing and 
cataloguing becomes of subsidiary importance.  Having the goose which lays the 
golden eggs, the description of each egg already laid is a minor matter.  Now the 
general causes of the emotions are indubitably physiological ([1890], 2: 449; first 
bracket is mine). 
James’ distinction between a theory that groups a class of phenomena based on a causal 
basis rather than classification precipitates Richard Boyd’s conception of natural kinds 
                                                
25 In James’ chapter on instinct, he discusses some emotions that are innate.  This might suggest that he 
regards some emotions as basic and thus natural kinds.  However, there are many instincts for James.  
Moreover, once an instinct is experienced, and its ends are known, they can be reshaped in new directions.  
I discuss instinct in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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(Boyd [1989]).  According to Boyd’s more expansive definition, members of a natural 
kind need not share necessary and sufficient conditions as with the traditional Aristotelian 
model.  Instead, a natural kind is constituted by properties that reliably cluster together as 
a result of a common causal mechanism.  In The Physical Basis of Emotion, James 
reaffirms his earlier position, by discussing this reliable clustering of properties in terms 
of a “functional resemblance”. 
[T]he bodily variations are within limits, and that the symptoms of the angers and 
of the fears of different men still preserve enough functional resemblance, to say 
the very least, in the midst of their diversity to lead us to call them by identical 
names.  Surely there is no definite affection of ‘anger’ in an entiative sense 
(James [1894], 520). 
Thus the question of whether or not individual emotions are natural kinds for James 
depends on the conception of natural kind that we are operating with.  On the traditional 
necessary and sufficient condition model, they are not natural kinds.  However, on the 
homeostatic property cluster model, the emotions would qualify as natural kinds insofar 
as they have a common causal mechanism.  
     There is a difference between the natural kind status of the individual emotions and 
the category of emotion (Charland [2002]; Griffiths [1997]).  James’ inclusion of coarse 
and subtle emotions within the parameters of his theory provides good evidence that he 
regards emotion as a natural kind.  Indeed, the criticism James received from his 
contemporaries regarding the inclusion of the subtle emotions within his theory is 
ultimately a critique regarding the natural kind status of emotion.  Although philosophers 
of emotion generally speak of emotion as if it were a homogeneous category, most deny 
that the term picks out a distinct class of phenomena (Griffiths [1997]; Rorty [1978]; 
Solomon [1995]).26  Such philosophers would join the chorus of James’ contemporary 
critics that the subtle emotions are different in kind from the coarse emotions.   
                                                
26 There have been a few exceptions.  Charland argues that emotion is a natural kind using Boyd’s more 
expansive definition of homeostatic property clusters (Charland [2002].  Prinz, meanwhile, argues that 
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     The thesis that the term emotion does not pick out a unified category is most explicitly 
defended by Paul Griffiths (Griffiths [1997]).  According to Griffiths, our concept 
emotion picks out at least two very different classes of mental phenomena, which should 
be separated.  First, there are basic emotions – mapping onto Paul Ekman’s affect 
programs – which are universal across the human species and shared with nonhuman 
animals.  Second, there are higher cognitive emotions, which are informed by culture and 
distinctly human.  While we use the term emotion to refer to both classes of mental 
phenomena, Griffiths argues that this is a mistake.  The term emotion needs to be 
discarded and “replaced by at least two more specific concepts” (Griffiths [1997], 247).  
Griffiths’ critique of our folk psychological concept of emotion entails that James’ subtle 
emotions as well as many of the coarse emotions (e.g., jealousy and shame) are different 
in kind from other coarse emotions (e.g., fear and anger). 
     Griffiths’ argument that emotion is not a natural kind is based on a conception of 
natural kind that is more expansive than the more traditional view.  Rather than requiring 
necessary and sufficient conditions, Griffiths uses Boyd’s more expansive definition of 
homeostatic property clusters (Boyd [1989]).  Despite this more expansive conception of 
natural kind, Griffiths argues that emotion does not satisfy the requirement.  Speaking of 
the higher cognitive emotions, he says: 
Whatever psychological mechanism underlies the irruption of these clusters of 
desires into belief-desire causation, it is not the same mechanism that allows the 
affect programs to rapidly engage various effector systems without reference to 
consciously accessible beliefs and desires (Griffiths [1997], 246). 
According to Griffiths, affect programs are distinct from the higher cognitive emotions 
because they are modular.  They are informationally encapsulated, meaning they cannot 
be influenced by information in other processing systems.  For example, the fear of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
emotion is a natural kind not only in Boyd’s sense but also in the traditional and more restrictive necessary 
and sufficient conditions account (Prinz [2004]). 
52 
 
seeing a predatory animal in a forest produces an automated affective response, 
irrespective of our beliefs and judgments.  The higher cognitive emotions, on the other 
hand, are non-modular.  They are not only influenced by other information (i.e. beliefs 
and desires), but they seem to be in part constituted by beliefs.  For example, feeling 
shame about performing poorly on a test requires the belief that the particular test is both 
important and that one ought to have done well on the test.  If the test were subsequently 
believed to be unimportant, the shame would subside.  These differences, argues 
Griffiths, point to different underlying causal mechanisms.  Thus emotion is not a natural 
kind even in Boyd’s more liberal homeostatic property cluster conception. 
     James would deny this.  Both coarse and subtle emotions are directly caused by the 
same underlying causal mechanism – namely the preceding bodily changes.  Moreover, 
both coarse and subtle emotions figure into our means-end reasoning.  It is not the case 
that our coarse emotions are informationally encapsulated.  While it is true that initially 
our instinctive emotions blindly move us, once this has been experienced and registered 
in memory, we have foresight of its end.  
Every instinctive act, in an animal with memory, must cease to be 'blind' after 
being once repeated, and must be accompanied with foresight of its 'end' just so 
far as that end may have fallen under the animal's cognizance ([1890], 2: 390).  
There is no antagonism for James between an instinctive response and a willful action.  
The instinctive responses of many of our emotions are as much a function of the will as 
more deliberate cases.  It may seem that our fear of a predatory animal is informationally 
encapsulated, but this is only because we have formed associations based on experience 
that are in accordance with the instinctive fear.  While the emotion may be cognitively 
impenetrable at this particular point in time, over time – through effort of attention and 
will – the emotion can be cognitively penetrated.  In this way, our emotions are highly 
plastic for James.  I will be looking at this in more detail in Chapter Four, where I discuss 
the relationship between instinct, emotion and the will.  
     In fact, James regards emotion as a natural kind not only in the homeostatic sense, but 
also in the traditional conception of necessary and sufficient conditions.  There is no 
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essential difference between a coarse emotion of fear and a subtle emotion of aesthetic 
appreciation.  Many theorists would argue that the former is simply a feeling while the 
latter is a feeling plus a belief, pointing to a difference in kind.  James would agree that 
there are important differences at the level of primary feelings, but the emotional 
component of both coarse and subtle emotions are explained by the feeling of bodily 
changes.  This bidirectional feeling is the essence of an emotion.  The difference between 
coarse and subtle emotions is not a difference in their structure, but in their indirect 
causes.  Thus emotion for James is a natural kind in both the homeostatic and traditional 
sense.27   
     With respect to the traditional conception of natural kinds – conceived in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions – emotion, but not the emotions, is a natural kind for 
James.  It follows that the domain of emotion does not come with clearly marked 
divisions in which we can cut nature at its joints.  Instead, it is up to us how we carve this 
domain up.  It would seem that culture would play an important role in this process, but 
James is generally thought to have little to say about the social element of emotion.  This 
is not the case.  In the next section, I consider the importance James attributed to culture 
with respect to shaping emotional feelings. 
 
2.5 The Influence of Culture 
The emotional diversity between individuals for James runs deeper than simply different 
objects inciting different emotions.  If this were the only difference we would have no 
basis to say that the actual emotion is different.  If dogs incite fear in person A but not 
person B, while mice incite fear in person B but not person A, the feeling of fear in both 
cases may very well still be the same.  But for James the actual physiological expression 
between individuals is different, resulting in different shades of the same named 
emotional feeling.   
                                                
27 In this respect, James’ view is similar to that of Prinz (Prinz [2004], 102).  
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     Despite this great diversity in emotional expression, Lisa Feldman Barrett notes that 
“basic-emotion theorists often claim James as their intellectual predecessor” (Barrett 
[2006], 42).  Indeed, some proponents of basic emotions – such as Ortony and Turner – 
build upon James’ idea that there is a distinct physiological pattern for each emotion by 
arguing that some of these emotions are transcultural, universally expressed across the 
human species (Ortony & Turner [1990]).  Feldman rightly points out that this 
association between James and the basic emotion research program is misinformed.  
Since there is a variety of bodily expressions within the same emotion category, there is 
not one thing that anger, fear or any other emotion is (Barrett [2006], 42).  Phoebe 
Ellsworth has also highlighted James’ rejection of anything like basic emotions.  
He rejected the categorical view of emotion.  Instead he saw emotions like the 
color spectrum or like the weather – a vast domain with infinite gradations from 
one region to another with no clear boundaries (Ellsworth [2014], 21). 
Where basic emotion theorists emphasize the similarity of emotional expression, James 
consistently emphasizes its diversity.   
     Nevertheless, Rainer Reisenzein and Achim Stephan have recently argued that James 
is best understood as a basic emotions theorist (Reisenzein & Stephan [2014]).  They 
draw attention to James’ evolutionary approach to emotions, and the important influence 
that Darwin had on his view.  Following Darwin, James closely aligns emotions with 
instincts, which are innate reflex actions.28  All of this is true, but it is not enough to 
assert that James is a basic emotions theorist.  In this respect, Carroll Izard has 
distinguished five necessary and sufficient conditions for the thesis that there are basic 
emotions.  This includes the requirement that “a basic emotion has a unique feeling 
component that can be conceptualized as a phase of the associated neurobiological 
process” (Izard [2007], 262).  In other words, “a discrete emotion feeling is innate and its 
distinctive quality is invariant over the life span” (Izard [2007], 263).  James clearly 
                                                
28 I will discuss the important role of instinct and the influence of Darwin in more detail in Chapter 4 in the 
context of habit.   
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rejects this.  Fear and other emotions may be an instinctual response that is innate, but it 
is not a discrete feeling.  As we have previously seen, an emotion such as fear or anger 
refers to a range of feelings, which involves a range of physiological expression.  There is 
not a unique feeling that is fear or anger.  
     James’ association with basic emotion theorists, while misinformed, certainly seems 
more applicable than aligning him with theorists on the opposite end of the emotion 
spectrum – social construction theorists.  After all, James’ point of emphasis throughout 
his principal works of emotion is on physiology with little mention of the social element 
of emotion.  However, in a popular essay entitled The Gospel of Relaxation, published 
nine years after The Principles, James takes quite a different perspective on emotion.  
Rather than taking a largely theoretical and scientific approach, as in his chapter on “The 
Emotions”, his purpose is more practical.  Indeed, James discusses some of the practical 
implications of the James-Lange theory.   
The general over-contraction may be small when estimated in foot-pounds, but its 
importance is immense on account of its effects on the over-contracted person’s 
spiritual life.  This follows as a necessary consequence from the theory of our 
emotions to which I made reference at the beginning of this article.  For by the 
sensations that so incessantly pour in from the over-tense excited body the over-
tense and excited habit of mind is kept up; and the sultry, threatening, exhausting, 
thunderous inner atmosphere never quite clears away (James [1916], 210-211). 
It follows from the James-Lange theory that a tense and over-excited body entails an 
emotional disposition that is characterized by anxiety, nervousness and over-excitability. 
Importantly though, these emotional expressions are not simply biological and 
physiological phenomena.  Indeed, for James they also have a social and cultural 
dimension.  With respect to the over-tension discussed above, James regards this as a 
manifestation of an American custom. 
The American over-tension and jerkiness and breathlessness and intensity and 
agony of expression are primarily social, and only secondarily physiological, 
phenomena.  They are bad habits, nothing more or less, bred of custom and 
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example, born of the imitation of bad models and the cultivation of false personal 
ideals (James [1916], 212-213). 
James’ emphasis on the cultural and social element of emotional expression over their 
physiology might seem to suggest that he is best characterized as a social construction 
theorist with respect to emotion.  This would be strange given that social construction 
theorists most often hold a traditionally cognitive theory of emotion.  The emotion is 
socially constructed insofar as the concept that is intrinsic to an emotion is socially 
constructed.  Such an approach need not deny the physiological and evolutionary basis of 
emotion – particularly if a hybrid cognitive-feeling theory is advocated – but it 
nevertheless emphasizes the cultural influence that necessarily shapes this biological 
foundation. 
     James, as we have seen does not have a traditionally cognitive theory of emotion.  He 
argues for a feeling theory of emotion, and yet he puts an emphasis on the social 
dimension.  This approach nicely shows the false dichotomy between the biological and 
social elements of emotion, which has been played out by basic emotion and social 
construction theorists.  It is not that the concepts of our emotions add a cultural 
dimension to the underlying physiological aspect.29  Rather culture affects our very 
physiology in such a way that the physical basis of emotion cannot be entirely explained 
from a purely psychological or biological perspective.30  The physiological expression of 
emotion is at once a biological and cultural phenomenon, and the perspective we take is 
dependent upon our particular purpose of inquiry.  Ellsworth characterizes James’ view 
nicely when she says:  
Emotional experience then, is not so much a process of construction as a process 
of selection, each culture drawing boundaries around certain regions of the 
infinite complexity and leaving others undiscriminated (Ellsworth [2014], 24).   
                                                
29 Peter Goldie calls this “the avocado pear misconception of the emotions” (Goldie [2000], 99).   
30 This is a position also held by Prinz, who calls attention in a rather Jamesian way to “habits of the body” 
which can be culturally influenced (Prinz [2004], 142).   
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     As an example of this cultural influence on the physiological expression of emotion, 
James contrasts the over-excited and over-emotional American demeanour with that of 
the European.  He notes that the “American character is weakened by all this over-
tension” in which breathlessness and a sense of hurry predominate, resulting in a state of 
mind that is anxious and muddled rather than calm and harmonious.   
[I]f you breathe eighteen or nineteen instead of sixteen times a minute, and never 
quite breathe out at that, - what mental mood can you be in but one of inner 
panting and expectancy... (James [1916], 211). 
Far from being determined by these cultural influences, individuals can become aware of 
them and ultimately change them.  For these emotional expressions are after all habits, 
and habits can be changed by way of attention and will.31  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this section, I have inquired into the structure of an emotional feeling for James.  
Emotions are not the non-cognitive perturbances that most interpreters presume them to 
be.  Embedded within the feeling of an emotion, which is given by the bodily changes, is 
a belief that attributes a sense of reality to the world.  It is from this outward-directed 
aspect of an emotional feeling – which imbues the world with value and meaning – that 
James can account for the intentionality of emotion.  This feeling structure can also help 
to explain the inclusion of subtle and objectless emotions within the parameters of his 
theory.  James is ultimately concerned with explaining the emotionality of a state of 
consciousness.  Whether the emotion is coarse, subtle or objectless, this emotionality is 
due to the particular feeling of bodily changes.   
  
                                                
31 I will be looking at the nature of these emotional habits and how they can be changed in more detail in 
Chapter 4. 
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3 The Impossibility of Unconscious Emotions 
If an emotion is necessarily felt, as James’ theory maintains, then it is impossible to have 
an emotion that we are not conscious of.  An unconscious emotion becomes a 
contradiction in terms.  Numerous critics, within philosophy and psychology, have 
objected to this implication of James’ theory (Berridge & Winkielman [2003]; Deigh 
[2001]; Jaggar [2008]; Prinz [2004]).  
     There are at least two ways in which philosophers have understood the notion of an 
unconscious emotion, which follows from their particular theoretical view.  For cognitive 
and hybrid theorists, who regard a judgment or belief as necessary for an emotion, an 
unconscious emotion can come about in one of two ways (Suppes & Warren [1975]).  
First, one can be unconscious of what an emotion is about.  For example, an individual 
may direct anger toward his friend, when really that anger is about something else 
entirely, such as his parents or spouse.  Since the individual is unconscious of what the 
anger is about, it would follow under such a theory that we have an unconscious emotion.  
The anger may be felt, but since the emotion is essentially a judgment and not a feeling, 
the emotion itself is unconscious.32  Freud, who advocates a hybrid theory of emotion, 
discusses unconscious emotions of this sort. 
To begin with it may happen that an affect or an emotion is perceived but 
misconstrued.  By the repression of its proper presentation it is forced to become 
connected with another idea, and is now interpreted by consciousness as the 
expression of this other idea.  If we restore the true connection, we call the 
original affect ‘unconscious’ although the affect was never unconscious but its 
ideational presentation had undergone repression (Freud [1915/1953-1974], 177-
78). 
Freud is clear that what is unconscious is not the feeling (i.e., the affect), but the idea 
associated with the feeling.  For hybrid theorists, unlike for cognitive theorists, an 
                                                
32
 Hatzimoysis argues against this thesis.  He calls into question whether the thought initially repressed 
remains the same (Hatzimoysis [2007], 293-4). 
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emotion is necessarily felt.  In this respect, there is agreement with James.  However, the 
feeling, while necessary, is not sufficient for an emotion, as the judgment is also required.  
If we consider the previous example of an individual directing anger toward his friend, 
when really the anger is about something else, we also have an unconscious emotion on 
the hybrid view.  The feeling is experienced, while the thought of what the feeling is 
about remains unconscious.  
     Second, an emotion can become unconscious when it is denied to have been 
experienced.  For example, an individual may in fact have directed anger towards his 
friend, but denies ever having done so.  In such a case the emotional judgment is 
experienced, but its denial renders it unconscious.  Either way, whether the emotion is 
misconstrued or denied, it is unconscious. 
      Alison Jaggar, who can best be described as a hybrid theorist, has argued against the 
Jamesian view from this perspective.  Following Elizabeth Spelman, Jaggar refers to the 
feeling theory as “the Dumb View” (Jaggar [2008]).  She does not mention James by 
name, but since his theory is the archetype of feeling theories, it is safe to assume that by 
“the Dumb View” she has in mind the Jamesian view.  According to Jaggar:  
Another problem with the Dumb View is that identifying emotions with feelings 
would make it impossible to postulate that a person might not be aware of her 
emotional state, because feelings by definition are a matter of conscious 
awareness (Jaggar [2008], 155).     
For Jaggar, a viable theory of the emotions must account for instances in which we have 
an emotion but do not understand what the emotion is about.  Just because we experience 
a feeling, does not mean we have experienced the emotion.  While Jaggar may be hesitant 
to endorse a full-blown cognitivist view, this requirement of knowing what the emotion is 
about certainly pushes her view in that direction.  In this way, we can consider the 
conception of unconscious emotion from cognitive and hybrid theorists as more or less 
the same. 
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     The second way in which unconscious emotions can be construed is under a somatic 
theory of emotion.  Somatic theories are distinct from feeling theories insofar as the 
requisite bodily changes are sufficient for an emotion.  These bodily changes need not be 
registered in consciousness and thereby felt.  Somatic theorists recognize that the feeling 
of these bodily changes may often be present within consciousness, but this feeling is not 
a necessary condition for an emotion.  So long as those bodily changes produce affective 
behavior, irrespective of being felt, we have the emotion.  Jesse Prinz holds a somatic 
theory of emotion (Prinz [2004]).  Prinz, of course, would reject the conception of 
unconscious emotions as employed by cognitive and hybrid theorists.  For him, not only 
is an emotion not a judgment, it need not even be felt.  It is thereby possible to have an 
emotion without a feeling or a thought registered in consciousness.  This is clearly a more 
extreme conception of an unconscious emotion.  
     This difference between the cognitive/hybrid view of unconscious emotion and the 
somatic view lies in different ways that we talk about the unconscious.  John Searle has 
conceptualized this nicely by distinguishing between the ‘dynamic unconscious’ and the 
‘deep unconscious’ (Searle [2004]).33  The dynamic unconscious refers to unconscious 
states that can in principle be made conscious through effort of attention.  This is the 
view of the unconscious that the cognitive/hybrid theorists have in mind.  It is no surprise 
that Freud operated through this theoretical perspective as psychoanalysis attempts to 
bring unconscious thoughts, drives and motivations to conscious awareness.  The deep 
unconscious, on the other hand, refers to the unconscious mental processes postulated by 
cognitive science.  These mental processes cannot in principle be made conscious.  In 
other words, its contents cannot be recovered.  It is this deep unconscious that Prinz has 
in mind when he argues that unconscious emotions exist.      
     In this section, I hope to show that James’ inability to account for unconscious 
emotions in both the deep and dynamic sense should not be regarded as a deficit of his 
view.  Arguments for the deep and dynamic unconscious – though not distinguished in 
                                                
33 The deep unconscious refers to what is often called the cognitive unconscious within cognitive science. 
 
61 
 
these terms – were present at the time of The Principles, and I will show how James 
responds to them.  Before doing so, I will provide a brief historical overview of the 
concept of the unconscious at the time of The Principles.    
 
3.1 The Unconscious in the Late Nineteenth Century 
During the period that James researched and wrote The Principles, from 1878 to 1890, 
the concept of the unconscious was at the forefront of philosophical and psychological 
discussions (Ellenberger [1970], 311).  The philosophical precursor to this wave of 
interest was Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation.  Although published 
in 1819, it was initially ignored, and was not until the latter half of the nineteenth century 
that the work garnered widespread attention.  Schopenhauer’s ‘will’ provides not only a 
psychological explanation of human behaviour, but also a metaphysical account of the 
nature of reality.  What ultimately exists is the will – a blind, irrational force that is more 
aptly called the unconscious (Ellenberger [1970]).  Following Schopenhauer, Eduard von 
Hartmann in his Philosophy of the Unconscious also develops a metaphysical worldview 
that hinges on the notion of the unconscious (von Hartmann [1893]).   
[T]he principle of the Unconscious is imperceptibly extended beyond the physical 
and psychical domains to achieve the solution of problems which, to adopt the 
common language, would be said to belong to the province of metaphysics.  
These consequences flow so simply and naturally from the application of our 
principle to physical and psychological inquiries, that the transition to another 
department would not be remarked at all, if the subject-matter of those questions 
were not otherwise familiar to us (von Hartmann [1893], 3). 
In particular, von Hartmann uses the concept of the unconscious to argue against 
metaphysical materialism in favour of an idealistic theory that synthesizes the work of 
Hegel and Schopenhauer. 
     While von Hartmann’s work helped to popularize the unconscious within philosophy 
in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, the concept also became central to 
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psychology, including Pierre Janet’s work on dissociation.  In Janet’s research on hysteria 
he found that within some individuals there is a splitting of consciousness.  For example, 
Janet discusses a woman who went on a fugue, and who appears to have lost all memory 
of the time she was away.  When Janet put a pencil in her hand, she wrote out in detail 
exactly what she had been doing during this period.  Despite writing this detailed 
account, the woman maintains that she remembers nothing of the trip (Janet [1907], 62).  
In such disturbances of the personality, there is a splitting of consciousness into two 
distinct personalities.  In order to describe these dissociated ideas of which the subject is 
unaware, Janet uses the term subconscious.  While the unconscious and subconscious are 
often taken to be synonymous terms, Janet’s term has no metaphysical implications.  As 
he says: 
The word “subconscious” is the name given to the particular form which disease 
of the personality takes in hysteria…This word is not a philosophical explanation; 
it is a simple clinical observation of a common character which these phenomena 
present (Janet [1907], 65). 
Meanwhile for others, such as G.F. Stout, the subconscious refers to that of which we are 
dimly conscious (Prince [1907], 363).  During the period in which James was researching 
and writing The Principles, there was clearly no precise definition for the terms 
unconscious and subconscious.  As Bernard Hart notes, different authors during this 
period “speak of the subconscious not only from different points of view, but speak of 
totally different things” (Hart [1910], 363). 
     It is within this period of excitement and confusion with respect to the unconscious 
that James conducted his research and writing of The Principles.  James is generally 
regarded as being hostile to the notion of the unconscious during this time.  To a certain 
extent this is true, but we have to be clear what notion of the unconscious he is arguing 
against.  For James, a mental state is necessarily conscious for a particular subject of 
experience.  This “for a particular subject of experience” is important.  James discusses at 
considerable length Janet’s empirical research on dissociation, in which there is a 
splitting of consciousness within an individual.  Following Janet, James is content to 
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discuss the notion of unconscious mental states in a qualified psychological sense to 
explain these circumstances.  While Personality A remains unconscious of Personality B 
and vice versa, consciousness is always attached to a particular personality.  That is, the 
experience is always conscious for a particular subject of experience.  In short, there is no 
such thing as an unconscious mental state that is not experienced.34   
     The question of whether or not unconscious mental states exist depends on what our 
theory of consciousness is.  On a building block model, conscious and unconscious states 
and processes can combine to form a complex state.  This is first expressed by Leibniz’s 
notion of ‘petites perceptions’, which are perceptions that we are not aware of.  As these 
petites perceptions accumulate their combined force breaks into conscious awareness.  In 
this way, the perceptions of which we are conscious are represented by perceptions of 
which we are not conscious.  But according to James’ stream of consciousness theory, a 
state of consciousness is simple and undivided.  There are no parts.  The unified state of 
consciousness is thereby necessarily conscious with no unconscious parts underlying it.   
     In James’ “Mind-Stuff Theory” chapter, he devotes an entire subsection to this 
question entitled “Do unconscious mental states exist?”  After going through ten 
purported arguments for their existence, James responds to each, concluding that 
unconscious mental states do not exist.  Although James does not explicitly make the 
distinction between the deep and dynamic unconscious, he does provide arguments 
explicitly targeting these different conceptions.  His responses all take either one of two 
forms.  First, many posits of unconscious mental states such as Leibniz’s ‘petites 
perceptions’, are not mental states at all according to James.  Rather, they are physical 
processes ([1890], 1: 164).  These notions of the unconscious map onto what Searle 
distinguishes as the deep unconscious.  Second, other posits of the unconscious refer to 
                                                
34 According to Gerald Myers, James allows unconscious states to exist in two ways.  First, by the splitting 
of consciousness in which multiple streams occur.  Second, “we can be unconscious of experiences when 
we fail to attend to them” (Myers [1986], 59).  This is incorrect.  For James, when we fail to attend to 
certain features of our experience, we are either acquainted with them but do not know about them or else 
they do not get registered in consciousness at all.  Either way, they are not unconscious. 
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states whereby we subsequently discover something about ourselves which was 
previously unconscious.  James rejects this postulation of the unconscious as a confusion, 
and introduces his distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge about 
as better able to explain these facts.  In the next two sections, I will present James’ 
arguments in further detail.  First, I will consider James’ argument against the dynamic 
unconscious, which cognitive and hybrid theorists of emotion invoke.  I will then 
consider the deep unconscious, which somatic theorists of emotion use to argue for 
unconscious emotions. 
 
3.2    The Argument from Cognitive/Hybrid Theorists 
Cognitive and hybrid theorists of emotion argue that some kind of judgment, belief or 
thought is necessary for an emotion.  Interestingly, as we have seen, James also argues 
that belief is intrinsic to emotion.  However, his conception of belief is very different than 
the one employed by cognitive and hybrid theorists.  Beliefs do not provide knowledge 
about our emotions as cognitive and hybrid theorists stipulate, but rather attribute a sense 
of reality to the world.  On this basis, he would reject the notion of unconscious 
emotions. 
     James does not deny the kind of cases that Freud, Jaggar and other cognitive and 
hybrid theorists of emotion highlight.  In the following passage, he considers the 
argument that a cognitive or hybrid theorist of emotion might offer in support of 
unconscious emotions. 
There is a great class of experiences in our mental life which may be described as 
discoveries that a subjective condition which we have been having is really 
something different from what we had supposed…[For example], we deliberately 
analyze our motives, and find that at bottom they contain jealousies and cupidities 
which we little suspected to be there.  Our feelings towards people are perfect 
wells of motivation, unconscious of itself, which introspection brings to light 
([1890], 1: 170).   
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James here provides a standard example of a purported unconscious emotion in the 
dynamic sense.  Through introspection, a jealousy that was previously unconscious is 
brought into conscious awareness.  While this may seem to accurately reflect our 
experience, James finds such arguments to be based on a conceptual confusion.  
These reasonings are one tissue of confusion.  Two states of mind which refer to 
the same external reality, or two states of mind the later one of which refers to the 
earlier, are described as the same state of mind, or ‘idea,’ published as it were in 
two editions; and then whatever qualities of the second edition are found openly 
lacking in the first are explained as having really been there, only in an 
‘unconscious’ way.  It would be difficult to believe that intelligent men could be 
guilty of so patent a fallacy, were not the history of psychology there to give the 
proof… But once make the distinction between simply having an idea at the 
moment of its presence and subsequently knowing all sorts of things about 
it…and one has no difficulty in escaping from the labyrinth ([1890], 1: 172). 
The mistake such theorists make is that they treat the subsequent knowing state and the 
original unconscious state as the same mental state.  Central to James’ response is that 
these are in fact two different states of mind – the first is a simple having of the 
experience, while the second is a knowing about this experience.  The latter is a different 
kind of experience altogether.  James will later articulate this as a distinction between the 
two kinds of knowing that we have already looked at: knowledge by acquaintance and 
knowledge about.   
     As we have seen, when we acquire knowledge about our emotions, such as what our 
jealousy is in fact about, we are acquiring knowledge about a fact.  But this knowledge 
about the emotion is not part of what the emotion is.  While the emotional experience 
may provide the foundation for such conceptual knowledge, the emotion itself is simply 
the having of the experience, namely the feeling of bodily changes.  In order to acquire 
knowledge about this emotional experience, it requires “rallying our wits” by attending 
closely to our experience ([1890], 1: 222).  These two states of mind are clearly related, 
insofar as one is about the other, but they are nevertheless two distinct states.   
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…the difference between those that are mere ‘acquaintance,’ and those that are 
‘knowledges-about’ is reducible almost entirely to the absence or presence of 
psychic fringes or overtones.  Knowledge about a thing is knowledge of its 
relations.  Acquaintance with it is limitation to the bare impression which it 
makes.  Of most of its relations we are only aware in the penumbral nascent way 
of a ‘fringe’ of unarticulated affinities about it ([1890], 1: 259). 
According to James, when we subsequently realize that a particular emotion was in fact 
about something else, we are not bringing to light something that was previously 
unconscious.  What we are bringing to light are the fringe elements within a previous 
state of consciousness.  These fringes were originally experienced in an acquaintance 
mode, and through introspection we are able to bring these relations of the prior 
experience out of the background and into the foreground of consciousness.  In so doing, 
we can acquire knowledge about them.  For James, these facts that we come to know 
about were originally experienced in a substantive state as opposed to a transitive state – 
as we have seen, the latter cannot be introspected upon.  When we acquire knowledge 
about our emotions then, we are bringing to light relations within previously experienced 
substantive states of consciousness.  
     Cognitive and hybrid theorists who posit unconscious emotions are thus confused on 
two fronts according to James.  First, the unconscious thought or judgment that is 
purportedly intrinsic to emotion is not unconscious at all.  It was experienced within an 
acquaintance mode of cognition.  Second, such judgments are not even part of what an 
emotion is.  There is a difference between having an emotion and knowing about the 
emotion.  The latter is a thought about the emotion, but it is not part of what an emotion 
is. 
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3.3    The Somatic Theory Argument 
Recently within psychology, and to a lesser extent philosophy, the possibility of 
unconscious emotions in a more extreme sense has been given serious scholarly attention.  
A growing number of theorists now assert that an emotion need not be registered in 
consciousness at all, be it a feeling or a thought (Berridge & Winkielman [2003]; 
Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger [2008]; Prinz [2004]).  On such an account, an 
unconscious emotion is defined in the following way: 
For an emotion to be unconscious, people must not be able to report their 
emotional reaction at the moment it is caused.  Yet there must be clear evidence 
of the emotional reaction either in their behavior, or physiological response, or 
subsequent subjective impressions of an affect-laden event (Berridge & 
Winkielman [2003], 187). 
The possibility of unconscious emotions in this deep sense has been opened up by 
developments within cognitive science, in which unconscious mental processes have 
been shown to play important roles in perception, memory and thinking.  This gives us 
good reason to believe that unconscious processes are also at work in emotion (Kihlstrom 
et al [2000], 31-36).  However, the somatic theory requires much more than this.  It 
requires that these unconscious processes are all that are required for an emotion. 
     Robert Zajonc’s work on subliminal priming provides good evidence that these deep 
unconscious processes are in fact at work in emotion.  In his famous 1980 study, 
participants were subliminally exposed to a specific octagon (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc 
[1980]).  They were subsequently shown pairs of octagons – one of which they had 
previously been subliminally exposed to.  Participants tended to prefer the octagon they 
had been subliminally exposed to over the one they had no previous exposure to.  Such 
experiments nicely show that we do not need to know about something in order to have 
an affective response toward that thing.  While Zajonc’s work has highlighted the 
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unconscious causes of emotion/affect, the emotion/affect itself is very much experienced.  
Indeed, for Zajonc – like James – emotions are necessarily conscious (Zajonc, [2000]).35   
     More recent work within psychology, which has built upon Zajonc’s findings, goes 
further.  Not only is the cause of the emotion unconscious, but the emotion itself is 
unconscious.  Within philosophy, Jesse Prinz engages with this psychological literature in 
support of the view that emotions need not be registered in consciousness at all.  It may 
seem surprising that Prinz takes this stance given that he spends much of Gut Reactions 
subscribing to a broadly Jamesian view.  “I have endorsed William James (1884) in 
presuming that emotional consciousness is consciousness of changes in bodily states” 
(Prinz [2004], 206).  The temptation is to read Prinz as advocating a feeling theory, but 
he is not.  The above passage comes soon after Prinz’s sustained argument that an 
emotion can be completely unconscious (Prinz [2004], 201-205).  As a result, Prinz 
rejects the feeling theory.  “I join the majority in denying that emotions are mere 
feelings” (Prinz [2004], 198).  There is a tinge of irony to this statement.  While true, 
Prinz is really in the minority, as he is denying that emotions need not be conscious at all.  
     If Prinz endorses James’ theory on the one hand, but rejects the feeling theory on the 
other, what then is his view?  Simply put, emotions for Prinz are states that carry 
information about core relational themes (Prinz [2004], 198).  Sometimes we are 
conscious of this information and sometimes we are not, but in all cases we have the 
emotion.  When the emotion is conscious, the consciousness is of bodily states.  Thus 
Prinz broadly adheres to James’ theory with respect to conscious emotions, but he 
deviates from it by including unconscious emotions as well.  When arguing for his 
broadly Jamesian account that emotional consciousness is consciousness of bodily states, 
Prinz targets cognitive theories of emotion.  But when arguing for the possibility of 
                                                
35 Berridge and Winkielman go further, and suggest that for James the cause of emotion is also 
unconscious.  “William James’ (1894) (sic) theory defined subjective feeling as the essence of emotion.  
Yet he posited that conscious emotional feeling depended on an unconscious prior cause, namely the bodily 
reaction to the emotional stimulus” (Berridge & Winkielman [2003], 205).  This view is incorrect.  The 
cause of the emotion for James is not unconscious at all.  The preceding physiological changes are just that 
- physiological. 
69 
 
unconscious emotions, Prinz becomes critical of James’ view that a feeling is necessary 
for emotion.  
     In motivating his argument for deep unconscious emotions, Prinz first considers an 
anecdotal example of a fearful flyer.  As the plane takes off, the individual is in a 
conscious state of fear.  He then becomes engaged in an amusing conversation with the 
person beside him, during which time he is no longer conscious of his fear.  It is only 
after this conversation that the fear returns to consciousness.  Prinz suggests that there are 
two options available to explain this.  Either the fear completely subsided during the 
conversation or it endured unconsciously.  Prinz thinks the latter is the better explanation.  
We may retrospectively become aware that we were showing physical signs of fear such 
as clutching onto the armrest, even though we did not feel the fear at the time.   
     While Prinz uses this example to motivate his thesis that emotions can be unconscious 
in a deep sense, it seems to be a case of an unconscious emotion in a dynamic sense.  
Indeed, James would likely explain this example as he would other cases of purported 
unconscious emotions in the dynamic sense.  The fear was in fact experienced but only 
subsequently does the individual come to know about it.  Alternatively, if as Prinz 
suggests the fear was not experienced, then James would say that there is no emotion; 
that it did indeed subside.  As James says: 
When absorbed in intellectual attention we may become so inattentive to outer 
things as to be ‘absent-minded,’ ‘abstracted,’ or ‘distraits.’  All revery or 
concentrated meditation is apt to throw us into this state… The absorption may be 
so deep as not only to banish ordinary sensations, but even the severest pain 
([1890], 1: 418-9). 
The question then comes down to the degree of attention for James.  If the attention of 
Prinz’s flyer is focused exclusively on the conversation at hand, then it is likely that the 
fear is completely banished from his consciousness.  If the attention is of a lesser degree, 
however, then the fear would likely be experienced in the fringes of consciousness, which 
the individual could subsequently come to know about.   
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     Prinz’s argument then becomes more focused.  He considers a number of experiments 
that purport to reveal unconscious emotions in a truly deep sense.  In one experiment he 
cites, cocaine addicts were each affixed to two intravenous lines, one containing various 
amounts of cocaine, the other saline (Fischman & Foltin [1992]).  At very low doses of 
cocaine, subjects reported no difference between the two lines, but they nevertheless 
pressed the button for cocaine more often.  This, as well as the other studies that Prinz 
cites, seems to show that the experience of emotion and emotionally driven behavior can 
come apart.  Prinz concludes that these subjects are having unconscious emotions (Prinz 
[2004], 203).  Berridge and Winkielman have been at the forefront of this psychological 
research, and likewise agree that the evidence supports the existence of deep unconscious 
emotions (Berridge & Winkielman [2003]; Berridge & Winkielman & Wilbarger, 
[2008]).  
     Importantly, the subjects involved in these studies were explicitly attending to their 
conscious state, and reported no change.  This indicates that these are indeed cases 
involving deep rather than dynamic unconscious states.  It is for this reason that Prinz is 
willing to grant Ned Block’s distinction between phenomenal and access 
consciousness.36  Prinz concedes that this distinction might make sense in cases like the 
fearful flyer where other perceptions occupy his attention.  Perhaps the flyer experienced 
the fear phenomenally but could not access it.  But with respect to the experimental 
findings under question, the distinction is of little use since the participants were directly 
attending to the issue at hand.  As a result: 
There is no reason why participants in these experiments should be unable to 
report on their phenomenal experiences… So even if we grant that phenomenal 
and access consciousness both exist and can come apart, there is no reason to 
think they come apart in these experiments. (Prinz [2004], 204).        
                                                
36
 James’ distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge about bears a similarity to 
Block’s distinction (Block [2007], 159-213).  
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According to Prinz, if we are explicitly attending to our experience, then we are able to 
fully report on that experience.  Since the participants in these studies were directly 
attending to their experience and since they did not report experiencing an emotion, it 
follows that an emotion was not consciously experienced.  The participants, however, 
behaved in an affective, emotional manner.  Therefore, these empirical studies reveal 
genuine instances of unconscious emotions.   
     It seems that there are three ways that James’ view could account for this empirical 
research.  These different responses depend on whether or not the affective state does 
indeed break the threshold of consciousness.  As James says: 
Let the line a - b represent the threshold of consciousness: then everything drawn 
below that line will symbolize a physical process, everything above it will mean a 
fact of mind ([1890], 1: 155).  
If the threshold of consciousness is not broken in the studies under question, as Prinz 
assumes, James would explain the affective behaviour not by an unconscious emotion but 
by a purely physical state.  Since the changes in the amount of cocaine do not register in 
consciousness, the resultant behaviour is caused by a neurobiological process.  It is not 
caused by an unconscious mental process but has a purely physical cause.  In so doing, 
James denies the very notion of a deep unconscious.37 
     Second, it is possible that the threshold of consciousness in these studies is broken, 
and the emotion is experienced.  If so, James would simply reject Prinz’s assumption that 
experienced states that are directly attended to can be introspected upon and necessarily 
brought to explicit awareness.  According to James, the threshold of consciousness could 
be broken and yet participants could still be unable to report on it.  This inability to report 
                                                
37 John Searle, who also rejects a building block model of consciousness, has made this kind of argument 
against the postulation of a deep unconscious.  He says: “There is no such thing as a deep unconscious 
mental state.  There are nonconscious neurobiological processes capable of producing states in the 
conscious form; but to the extent that the mental state is not even the kind of thing that could become the 
content of a conscious state, it is not a genuine mental state” (Searle [2004], 171).  
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could be due to deficits in attention, in which case we are dealing with a case of the 
dynamic unconscious.  Indeed, attention for James is a skill that admits of degrees 
([1890], 1: 423).  It could simply be that the participants in the studies, and perhaps most 
human beings, have deficient skills of attention. 
     Third, the threshold of consciousness could be broken, but it might be the case that the 
so-called unconscious emotions are in fact transitive states of consciousness.  As we 
previously saw, transitive states of consciousness resist introspective analysis.  They are 
flights, always in movement and thus impossible to capture introspectively ([1890], 1: 
244).  Emotions, however, are not transitive states of consciousness since they attribute 
reality to a particular substantive state.  But transitive states, which are feelings, do seem 
to have an affective nature, as they can have a significant impact on what James calls the 
substantive conclusions.   
For the important thing about a train of thought is its conclusion.  That is the 
meaning, or, as we say, the topic of the thought…The parts of the stream that 
precede these substantive conclusions are but the means of the latter’s attainment. 
([1890], 1: 260). 
It is important to note that the same conclusion need not be reached; that different 
transitive relations that connect substantive events can change the entire meaning of a 
stream of thought ([1890], 1: 260).  The analogy here is language, as prepositions and 
conjunctions similarly change the meaning of a sentence.  Under this reading, these 
purported unconscious emotions are neither unconscious nor emotions.  What we have 
instead are individuals experiencing an affective state but who are unable to report on it.  
While the participants in the cocaine study most often make the conclusion to choose the 
intravenous line with cocaine, this is based on an affective state that cannot be 
introspected upon – and this affective state in question is not an emotion.   
     Under the first and third potential Jamesian responses, Prinz’s core relational themes 
would capture affective behavior that extends much further than the category of emotion.  
As an analogy, consider colour.  Our experience of colour is a conscious experience, but 
we are constituted to perceive a certain range of colours within the wavelength.  X-rays 
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and radio waves, for example, fall outside the range that we can perceive.  But we do not 
call X-rays and radio waves colours because they are not experienced.  Prinz’s notion of a 
core relational theme seems to be the corollary to wavelength, not colour.  It may pick out 
a genuine class of phenomena, but it is broader than emotion. 
     James would certainly be troubled by the implication that emotions need not be 
conscious, for it raises the question why any emotions are conscious in the first place.  
For James, consciousness is a fighter for ends, and the consciousness of emotion is no 
different ([1890], 1: 141).  From a philosophical perspective, emotions for James provide 
our lives with meaning, value and interest.  Without emotion, our lives become empty, 
barren and quite literally meaningless.  The notion then of an unconscious emotion, on a 
Jamesian account, surely stretches the concept of emotion too far.  For Prinz as well, 
conscious emotions provide the foundation for value, including our moral judgments.  
This function of conscious emotions seems to relevantly distinguish it from its genus of 
affective behaviour, which is more generally concerned with responding to 
environmental stimuli.  Prinz’s core relational themes thus seem to pick out the genus to 
which emotions belong, but this is very different than the emotions themselves.  Given 
these considerations, there are good reasons to maintain with James that emotions are 
necessarily felt. 
 
3.4    Objectless Emotions and the Unconscious 
James’ rejection of unconscious mental states might seem difficult to reconcile with the 
“best proof” of his theory, namely its inclusion of objectless emotions.  Although the 
feeling of bodily changes is most often caused by the perception of an exciting fact, 
whether in the world or in one’s mind, it need not be.  This feature distinguished James 
from his contemporaries, and indeed distinguishes him from most modern theorists.38  
                                                
38 For many contemporary philosophers an objectless emotion is a mood.  In fact, this is how emotion and 
mood are distinguished.  Emotions are about objects; moods are not. 
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     At first glance, if an emotion is objectless it seems that it must be unconscious.  But 
having looked at James’ critique of the unconscious in more detail, it is clear that this is 
not the case.  Objectless emotions can occur in ways that does not invoke the 
unconscious.  First, it seems that physiology alone can produce emotional effects, which 
the consumption of alcohol and other drugs can attest to.  Even with an undivided stream 
of consciousness, within which the emotion is embedded, it is possible that there is no 
object to which the emotion is directed.  Second, objectless emotions could include those 
instances in which an individual experiences an emotion but the object that it is about 
remains in the fringes of his or her consciousness.  The emotion is thus objectless but not 
unconscious.  Through effort of attention, these fringes can be brought to light, in which 
case the emotion is no longer objectless. 
     James’ inclusion of objectless emotions within the framework of his theory is thereby 
not in tension with his position on the unconscious.  Objectless emotions can potentially 
take a variety of forms, all of which need not posit the existence of unconscious mental 
states, be it of a dynamic or deep variety. 
 
3.5    Conclusion 
The critique that James’ theory of emotion is deficient because it does not account for the 
possibility of unconscious emotions turns out to be rather empty.  When we delve deeper 
into his theory of both emotion and consciousness, James can account for all the 
purported instances of unconscious emotions in the dynamic sense.  Moreover, there is 
good reason to be wary of unconscious emotions in the deep sense, as it seems to stretch 
the concept of emotion too far.   
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4 Emotion, Habit and the Self 
James’ two famous works on emotion – his 1884 article in Mind as well as his chapter on 
“The Emotions” in The Principles – have a very clear purpose.  By arguing for the thesis 
that the feeling of bodily changes is the emotion, James hopes to provide a theory that 
can reach a deeper level of scientific understanding.  Instead of simply categorizing the 
different emotions under different names, his goal is to bring to light the more 
fundamental physiological processes that underpin emotional feelings.  James’ discussion 
is thereby limited to emotions as they occur at a particular point in time – that is, 
occurrent emotions.  As a result, the James-Lange theory is not a comprehensive theory 
of emotion, at least not for James.39   Questions regarding emotion over time fall outside 
of its scope.  For example, do these occurrent emotions arise from an emotional 
disposition?  If so, to what extent are we responsible for our emotional dispositions?  It is 
certainly possible that defenders of the James-Lange theory could differ with respect to 
these diachronic aspects of emotion.  Nevertheless, critics tend to treat the James-Lange 
theory as a comprehensive view.  In so doing, James becomes an easy target for criticism.  
     A common criticism that arises from treating the James-Lange theory as 
comprehensive in scope is that James reduces an emotion to an entirely passive state of 
consciousness (Sartre [2002]; Solomon [1976]).  According to Robert Solomon, since an 
emotion for James is immediately caused by a physiological response, the emotion 
simply happens to an individual.  Even if, as I have argued, emotional feelings are 
directed towards the world, thereby imbuing the world with value and meaning, these 
feelings are still directly caused by a physiological response.  Emotions may be directed 
toward the world in some capacity, but we have as much control over them as we do with 
sneezing, coughing or having an itch.  This leaves “no opportunity for reflection”, which 
in turn offers no opportunity to change our emotions (Solomon [2007], 139).  Reflecting 
on our emotions with the intention of changing them would be as productive as reflecting 
on our sneezes.  Since these physiological disturbances will happen irrespective of what 
                                                
39 The James-Lange theory also remains silent on the nature of consciousness and the nature of the feeling 
that the bodily changes give rise to.  I have considered these questions in chapters one and two. 
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we do, emotions are ultimately resistant to our rational reflections.  They are entirely 
passive, involuntary states that we suffer. 
     Having already discussed how emotion fits into James’ conception of consciousness it 
should be clear that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as an active or passive 
emotion.  Since an emotion is not a primary state of consciousness, what admits of 
activity or passivity is the primary feeling within which emotions are embedded.  To a 
certain extent, James’ distinction between subtle and coarse emotions reveals this 
difference.  While subtle and coarse emotions are both bidirectional feelings brought 
about by physiological changes, the primary feelings within which they are embedded 
vary in their activity.  A subtle emotion is indirectly caused by a judgment and is thus 
embedded within a more active state of consciousness than a coarse emotion, which is 
indirectly caused by a perception that is more sensation-based.  Since the judgment that 
indirectly causes a subtle emotion is cultivated over time, there is a diachronic component 
built into these emotions.  In fact, this is also the case for many coarse emotions – though 
to a lesser degree – which are indirectly caused by perceptions that involve associations 
that have been put in place by individuals over time ([1890], 2: 3).   
     This diachronic aspect of emotion is more than simply implicit in James.  It is 
explicitly discussed throughout The Principles.  In the following, I will illustrate how 
James’ work on the self, instinct, habit, and attention, all of which are infused with 
emotion, inform his comprehensive theory of emotion.  In so doing, I hope to show that 
the passivity critique cannot be sustained. 
 
4.1 Self-Feeling 
As we have seen, James’ two principal works on emotion have had a profound influence 
within philosophy.  Critics of the theory often use these seminal texts as a foil from 
which to develop their alternative account.  This is perhaps best exemplified in the work 
of Robert Solomon.  
77 
 
In Sartre's essay of 1938 and in my 1976 book, our shared target was William 
James.  Sartre's and my emphasis on action and choice was in direct opposition to 
the “passivity” of James's account, especially its emphasis on visceral disturbance 
and bodily sensations (Solomon [2001], 198). 
According to Solomon, wherever the gusty winds of a Jamesian emotion may blow we 
are swept along for the ride.  We are slaves to these visceral disturbances.  By contrast, 
Solomon developed an active theory of emotion.  Early on in his career he defended the 
thesis, following Sartre, that emotions are choices that we make (Sartre [2002]; Solomon 
[1973]).  Solomon would later retract this view, but he consistently maintained that 
emotions do not simply happen to us; that, for the most part, they are active states of 
consciousness (Solomon [2001] [2007]).   
     Rather than being led astray by the irrational winds of our emotions as James’ theory 
purportedly asserts, the emotions for Solomon are the anchor from which we navigate the 
world.  This anchor lies in his concept of self-esteem:   
We are fundamentally concerned with our own Self-esteem, our regard for our 
Selves, our sense of Self-worth, the various ways in which we have invested our 
Selves in our world.  It is the goal of Self-esteem that motivates our actions, our 
inquiries, and – most importantly – our passions.  Self-esteem is the ultimate goal 
of every passion (Solomon [1976], 97). 
Our emotions are thereby intimately tied to our conception of self.  This helps to sustain 
Solomon’s thesis that emotions are judgments.  He concedes that emotions are not like 
other judgments insofar as they are not necessarily reflective and they can even surprise 
us.  But emotions are judgments nevertheless, not only because they possess the property 
of intentionality, but also because they are strategies for wellbeing that issue from our 
sense of self.  “Our emotions, to put the matter bluntly, are nothing other than our 
attempts to establish and defend our self-esteem” (Solomon [1976], 100).  As a result, 
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emotions are something that we actively do, as they ultimately derive from our sense of 
who we are and what we want.40   
     While Solomon develops this notion of self-esteem in an effort to overcome an alleged 
inadequacy of James’ theory, James by no means neglects the relationship between 
emotion and the self.  In “The Consciousness of Self” chapter, he discusses a particularly 
important and distinct kind of emotion that he calls ‘self-feeling’.  Self-feelings lie on a 
continuum, ranging between two oppositional classes of emotion that are primary to our 
nature – self-satisfaction and self-dissatisfaction.  On the side of self-satisfaction lies 
feelings such as “pride, conceit, vanity, self-esteem”; while feelings such as “modesty, 
humility, confusion, diffidence, shame, mortification” lie on the self-dissatisfaction side 
of the spectrum ([1890], 1, 306).   
     There is a difference between self-feelings of pride and shame, for example, and 
feelings of pride and shame about particular objects or events.  We can feel pride about 
doing well in a sporting event, but the self-feeling of pride refers to how one is faring in 
the world as a whole.  As James says, “[T]he normal provocative of self-feeling is one's 
actual success or failure” ([1890], 1: 306).  It is this global feature of self-feeling that 
makes it an emotion of “a unique sort” ([1890], 1: 307).  Indeed, self-feelings, ranging 
from depression and despair on the one hand to arrogance and vainglory on the other, 
reveal how we are doing.  They may constitute a unique kind of emotion, but they are 
still very much emotions in the James-Lange sense.  
Each has its own peculiar physiognomical expression. In self-satisfaction the 
extensor muscles are innervated, the eye is strong and glorious, the gait rolling 
and elastic, the nostril dilated, and a peculiar smile plays upon the lips ([1890], 1: 
307). 
                                                
40 Maximizing self-esteem may be the function of emotion, but Solomon recognizes not all emotions are 
successful in this capacity.  Emotions can subvert wellbeing.  It is here where questions regarding 
rationality come into play for Solomon.  Rational emotions are those that actually contribute to self-esteem, 
irrational emotions do not.  It is the purpose of reflection to make this determination. 
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Like other emotions then, self-feelings also have their particular physiological 
expression, and “each as worthy to be classed as a primitive emotional species as are, for 
example, rage or pain” ([1890], 1: 307). 
     With respect to the question of activity, it is important to note – particularly in light of 
Solomon’s critique – that for James “our self-feeling is in our power” ([1890], 1: 311).  
These emotions do not merely happen to us.  
So our self-feeling in this world depends entirely on what we back ourselves to be 
and do.  It is determined by the ratio of our actualities to our supposed 
potentialities; a fraction of which our pretensions are the denominator and the 
numerator our success: thus, Self-esteem = Success / Pretensions.  Such a fraction 
may be increased as well by diminishing the denominator as by increasing the 
numerator ([1890], 1: 310-11).   
We can increase our self-feeling in one of two ways: either by acquiring what it is that we 
desire or by relinquishing these desires and thereby changing “what we back ourselves to 
be and do” ([1890], 1: 310).  While we are not in complete control with respect to 
attaining our desires, due to the vicissitudes of life, we are in complete control of what 
James calls our pretensions.  It is in this way that our self-feeling “depends entirely” on 
how we regard ourselves.  One sure way to become depressed, for example, is to work 
toward impossible goals.  No matter how much success will be attained along the way, 
such an individual will necessarily fail, and self-esteem will fall as a result.   
     According to James, we have the power to change this self-inflicted feeling by simply 
relinquishing our desire for certain ends.   
To give up pretensions is as blessed a relief as to get them gratified…How 
pleasant is the day when we give up striving to be young, - or slender!  Thank 
God! we say, those illusions are gone.  Everything added to the Self is a burden as 
well as a pride.  A certain man who lost every penny during our civil war went 
and actually rolled in the dust, saying he had not felt so free and happy since he 
was born ([1890], 1: 311). 
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It is the possibility to overcome these pretensions that puts self-feeling directly in our 
power.  There are two ways that this overcoming can occur, one by exclusion of the self 
and the other by inclusion.  James discusses Stoic philosophy as a good example of the 
exclusionary kind.  Rather than attempting to acquire a good that might not be attained, 
one may renounce the good altogether so as not to incur any pain.  Thus, instead of 
becoming attached to people and things that will inevitably be lost and cause pain, better 
to simply detach oneself.  While James sees a certain heroism in the Stoic attitude within 
its historical context, he is ultimately critical of this approach as it inspires a “narrow and 
unsympathetic character” ([1890], 1: 312). “Sympathetic people, on the contrary” reduce 
pretensions by taking a more inclusive and expansive approach ([1890], 1: 313).  By 
regarding themselves as part of a greater whole, as intrinsically connected to others, the 
pretensions of the self tend to dissipate, thereby increasing self-esteem.   
     Solomon’s critique of James, which reduces all emotions to passive states beyond our 
control, clearly cannot be sustained with respect to self-feelings.  But it could still be the 
case that the rest of our emotions – which lack the unique global feature of self-feeling – 
are passive in nature.  To see that this is not the case we need to first consider his theory 
of the self. 
 
4.2 The Self 
In his discussion of the self, James follows his radical empiricist approach, and rejects the 
postulation of a non-empirical self such as a Kantian transcendental ego.41  He also 
rejects Hume’s empirical analysis of the self, as it “proceeds to pour out the child with 
the bath, and to fly to as great an extreme as the substantialist philosophers” ([1890], 1: 
                                                
41 While James rejects such a non-empirical conception of the self on psychological grounds, he remains 
open to it philosophically.  “I find the notion of some sort of an anima mundi thinking in all of us to be a 
more promising hypothesis, in spite of all its difficulties, than that of a lot of absolutely individual souls. 
Meanwhile, as psychologists, we need not be metaphysical at all. The phenomena are enough, the passing 
Thought itself is the only verifiable thinker, and its empirical connection with the brain-process is the 
ultimate known law” ([1890], 1: 346). 
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352).  For James, the self is made up of two interconnected components: 1) the subjective 
passing thought of the stream of consciousness, which he calls ‘the I’; and 2) the 
objective collection of habits and dispositions, which he calls ‘the me’.  
We may sum up by saying that personality implies the incessant presence of two 
elements, an objective person, known by a passing subjective Thought and 
recognized as continuing in time.  Hereafter let us see the words ME and I for the 
empirical person and the judging Thought ([1890], 1: 371). 
While the self is composed of ‘the I’ and ‘the me’, James further divides ‘the me’ into 
three parts – the material self, the social self and the spiritual self.  The material self is for 
the most part related to the bodily concern of self-preservation; the social self, 
meanwhile, is concerned with the recognition one gets from others; and the spiritual self, 
which is really composed of aspects from the material and social self, is what we take to 
be the most intimate part of the self, including our moral sensibility and conscience. 
     The emotions figure prominently with respect to these three parts of ‘the me’.  In fact, 
‘the me’ is constituted by emotions and instincts.  The material self is made up of 
emotions such as fear and anger as well as instincts including hunting, acquisitiveness 
and home-constructing ([1890], 1: 307-8).  This may seem like a strange grouping, but 
these emotions and instincts are all united by the function of self-preservation.  The social 
self, meanwhile, is constituted by emotions that are other-related, such as jealousy, envy, 
shame and instincts such as ambition and power.  Finally, the spiritual self includes 
“every impulse towards psychic progress, whether intellectual, moral, or spiritual in the 
narrow sense of the term” ([1890], 1: 309).  James does not draw the connection to the 
subtle emotions, probably because he has yet to introduce this concept, but it seems that 
the cultivation of these more refined emotions fall into this part of the self.  While ‘the 
me’ that ‘the I’ reflects on is largely made up of emotions and instincts, it is not the 
occurrent emotions that James is concerned with in “The Emotions” chapter.  The 
emotions of ‘the me’ are dispositional in nature.  They are habitual emotions. 
The central part of the me is the feeling of the body and of the adjustments in the 
head; and in the feeling of the body should be included that of the general 
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emotional tones and tendencies, for at bottom these are but the habits in which 
organic activities and sensibilities run ([1890], 1: 371). 
There is an intrinsic relationship that holds between self-feeling and these “emotional 
tones and tendencies” that in part make up the self.  By changing our self-feeling, which 
is in our control, we end up restructuring many of our emotional habits.  For example, if I 
give up the desire for attaining a certain stature in my career, I will no longer be jealous 
of those who have such a stature; I will no longer respond with anger when my career 
path is thwarted; and I will no longer experience fear about not attaining this career goal, 
etc.  In short, by changing aspects of one’s global self-feeling many of the emotional 
habits that constitutes the individual will in turn change.  If self-feeling is in our power, 
then it seems many of our emotional habits are, by extension, in our power as well.  
     James’ discussion of the self and self-feeling clearly shows that not all of our 
emotions are beyond our control; that they are not merely passive disturbances that direct 
us off course.  Solomon’s criticism of James is certainly overstated in this respect, but it 
is not completely without merit.  Some emotions for James do indeed simply happen to 
us.  In order to appreciate the range of emotions with respect to the active-passive 
question, we must consider in greater detail the relationship between emotion, instinct 
and habit.  
 
4.3 Blind and Habitual Emotions 
It is surprising that there has been no serious inquiry to date connecting James’ extensive 
writing on habit to his theory of emotion.42  Habit is a fundamental concept in James’ 
philosophy and psychology, impacting all areas of our lives.  Not only are many of our 
emotions habitual, but so are our thought patterns, daily tasks, and skills.  In fact, even 
our physical bodies operate by habit.43  While habits govern a large portion of our lives, 
                                                
42 Solomon has noted James’ discussion of habit but does not connect it to his theory of emotion. 
43 As James notes, an arm or nose once broken is more susceptible to being broken again. 
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they arise in different ways.  “The habits to which there is an innate tendency are called 
instincts; some of those due to education would by most persons be called acts of reason” 
([1890], 1: 104).  Our emotional habits arise out of instincts.  Indeed, instinct and 
emotion “shade imperceptibly” into each other, and it is no accident that the two chapters 
are positioned successively in The Principles, with the chapter on instinct preceding that 
on the emotions ([1890], 2: 442).  Our emotions may flourish in any number of directions 
depending on our particular experiences, but that we are endowed with the capacity to 
experience emotions in the first place is due to their being rooted in our innate arsenal of 
instincts.   
     The importance of instinct in James’ work reflects the importance of Darwin on his 
thinking.  The theory of natural selection provided a way out of the seemingly 
interminable debate between the classical empiricists and rationalists.  We are neither 
blank slates nor are we endowed with innate ideas that enable us to arrive at necessary 
truths about the big questions of philosophy.  Instead, we are creatures who come 
equipped into the world with a bundle of instincts – including emotions – that were 
successful for our ancestors in solving practical problems.  For Darwin, instinct 
encompasses a range of reflex actions, from sneezing and hiccupping to anger and fear 
(Darwin [1872/2007]).  James expanded the category even further to include instincts 
such as cleanliness, play, hoarding, acquisitiveness and curiosity.  Our practical, 
emotional and intellectual lives are ultimately rooted for James in instinct.   
     This emphasis on instinct distinguishes James from the classical empiricists, who did 
not entirely discount instinct but regarded it as a much smaller category (Myers [1986]).  
Moreover, what is primary for the classical empiricists are the associations first accrued 
from experience.  It is only subsequent to experience that our instincts are enacted.  
According to James, the classical empiricists explain all of our actions as the “results of 
the individual’s education, due altogether to the gradual association of certain perceptions 
with certain haphazard movements and certain resultant pleasures” ([1890], 2: 406).  For 
example, a child bitten by a dog will subsequently come to associate dogs with danger.  
Only then is the fear instinct enacted.   
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     For James, however, the relationship between instinct and experience is reversed.  Our 
very first actions occur independently of experience, and are entirely based on our innate 
instinctive reactions to environmental stimuli.  These first actions are not based on 
association since there is no prior experience from which to base an association on.  In 
order to activate an association, instinct must first blindly move us.  James does not 
discount the importance of association, but it is an insufficient explanation to account for 
our first actions in which there are no associations to draw upon.   
When a particular movement, having once occurred in a random, reflex, or 
involuntary way, has left an image of itself in the memory, then the movement 
can be desired again, proposed as an end, and deliberately willed.  But it is 
impossible to see how it could be willed before ([1890], 2: 487). 
Initially then, we are carried by our emotional instincts and are completely blind as to 
their ends and purposes.  These blind emotions do indeed happen to us.  In this limited 
respect, Solomon’s critique of James is correct.  But it is precisely because of this 
passivity that knowledge is accrued; namely the knowledge of the ends to which the 
emotion and its associated instinctual action leads.  These passive responses are anything 
but mere visceral disturbances.  They ultimately increase our understanding of our selves 
and our world. 
     Experience and education can certainly sharpen and refine instincts, but when this 
occurs the instinct is no longer blind.   
Every instinctive act, in an animal with memory, must cease to be 'blind' after 
being once repeated, and must be accompanied with foresight of its 'end' just so 
far as that end may have fallen under the animal's cognizance ([1890], 2: 390).  
Emotional responses based on memory, and thus association, are not as passive as blind 
emotions since the individual knows the end to which the act will lead.  This is not to say 
that such emotions are active, as the associations may have accrued passively.  
Nevertheless, on the active-passive spectrum, primary feelings involving emotions based 
on memory versus blind emotions are clearly more active states.  
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     In addition to Darwin, Douglas Spalding influenced James’ view of instinct, and by 
extension, emotion.  Spalding conducted experiments on newly hatched chicks by 
blinding them for their first three days.  Upon restoring their sight, Spalding observed that 
the chicks could peck at an approaching fly with great success on the first attempt 
(Spalding [1873]).  This confirmed to James that organisms come into the world already 
equipped with instincts.  It is also from Spalding that James came to the view that 
“Nature implants contrary impulses to act on many classes of things” ([1890], 2: 392).44  
As James notes: 
Animals, for example, awaken in a child the opposite impulses of fearing and 
fondling.  But if a child, in his first attempts to pat a dog, gets snapped at or bitten, 
so that the impulse of fear is strongly aroused, it may be that for years to come no 
dog will excite in him the impulse to fondle again ([1890], 2: 395). 
These contrary instincts clearly serve a useful evolutionary purpose, as individuals are 
able to remain responsive and adapt to novel environmental stimuli.  While instinct 
precedes experience, our experience often awakens one instinct and the opposing instinct 
fades.  Over time a habit can become entrenched.  According to James, “most instincts 
are implanted for the sake of giving rise to habits”, which he calls “the law of inhibition 
of instincts to habits” ([1890], 2: 395).  We can thereby distinguish blind emotions from 
habitual emotions for James.  Once an emotional response ceases to be blind and 
eventually becomes ingrained as a habit, a host of associations will have been made 
based on the individual’s experience with a particular object or situation.  For example, 
the individual who fears dogs may associate with them such things as biting and sharp 
teeth, and knows the ends to which the feeling of fear will lead – namely safety and 
security.  To this extent, it is a more active emotional response than a blind emotion. 
     While habitual emotions may not be under our direct control as our self-feelings are, 
they certainly are not the passive visceral disturbances that Solomon makes them out to 
                                                
44 “Mr. Spalding’s wonderful article on instinct shall supply us with the facts.  These little creatures show 
opposite instincts of attachment and fear, either of which may be aroused by the same object, man” ([1890], 
2: 396). 
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be.  A habitual emotion, caused by a perception involving a host of associations, clearly 
involves a primary feeling of consciousness that is more active than one involving a blind 
emotion.  While something in our environment may simply happen to us, it does not 
follow that the resulting state of consciousness simply happens to us.  States of 
consciousness involving emotion thereby differ widely in their degree of activity, from 
extremely passive on one end (blind emotions) to extremely active on the other (self-
feelings).  
 
4.4 Attention and Breaking Emotional Habits 
The emphasis James places on attention in The Principles marks another area where his 
empiricism deviates from the classical tradition.  The concept of attention is essentially 
neglected by the British empiricists (Myers [1986], 182).  For empiricist thinkers such as 
Herbert Spencer, whose ideas were prominent at the time, human experience and 
perception is an entirely passive process that is subject to the whims and forces of 
external events.  James rejects that we are “absolutely passive clay upon which 
‘experience’ rains down” ([1890], 1: 403).  Instead, experience involves an active 
component.  Since we cannot fully take in all that is presented to our senses, it is up to us 
to decide what to select and attend to.  Attention does not itself create ideas, but involves 
the effort of concentrating upon an idea that is already of interest ([1890], 1: 450).45  This 
relationship between attention and interest generally maps onto the two components of 
the self previously considered – ‘the I’ and ‘the me’ respectively.  ‘The I’ is in part 
constituted by attention, while what is of interest stems from the emotional and 
instinctual habits of ‘the me’.  Indeed, our emotional tendencies and proclivities play a 
significant role in selecting those aspects of our experience for attention to focus on.   
     Occasionally ‘the I’ and ‘the me’ come into conflict, and it is in such moments that the 
dynamic nature of the self comes to the fore ([1890], 1: 310).  With respect to the 
                                                
45 Attention is closely related to the will.  The will is a broader concept than attention, including not only 
the concentrating of consciousness, but also a fiat, consent or decision of some kind ([1890], 2: 561).   
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emotions, this can occur when we experience a habitual emotion, which is part of ‘the 
me’, which the passing thought of ‘the I’ rejects.  Although these habitual emotions are 
often deeply entrenched, effort of attention can serve to unhinge these habits.  
Effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will.  Every reader must 
know by his own experience that this is so, for every reader must have felt some 
fiery passion’s grasp.  What constitutes the difficulty for a man laboring under an 
unwise passion of acting as if the passion were unwise?… The difficulty is 
mental; it is that of getting the idea of the wise action to stay before our mind at 
all.  When any strong emotional state whatever is upon us the tendency is for no 
images but such as are congruous with it to come up ([1890], 2: 563). 
Our emotional experiences tend to be dominated by a particular feeling, making it 
difficult, if not impossible at times, to act in a way contrary to it.  The more dominant the 
feeling within a state of consciousness the more likely a habitual perception-feeling-
action link has been formed.  Thus the more likely the action is to follow since there is no 
resistance within consciousness.  But occasionally we are presented with an idea within 
consciousness that runs contrary to the dominant feeling and its associated action.  By 
attending and focusing upon this contrary idea, it is possible to break this habitual link.  
James is not explicit here how the idea of the wise action can come before our mind in 
the first place.  Earlier, however, he discusses how reason and instinct are never in 
conflict.  Thus, when we experience an emotion that we do not want, it is not the case 
that we have an irrational feeling that has come into conflict with a rational idea, as the 
history of philosophy has been wont to characterize it.  For James, “there is no material 
antagonism between reason and instinct” since “the only thing that can neutralize an 
impulse is an impulse the other way” ([1890], 2: 393).  Reason simply attaches to a 
particular instinct.46 
                                                
46 James would thereby take a distinctive approach to the phenomenon of recalcitrant emotions, which has 
become an important topic in contemporary philosophy of emotion.  These are instances where our emotion 
persists despite our judgment that the emotion is irrational.  Thus recalcitrant emotions are seen as 
irrational.  But for James, the conflict is not between reason and emotion, but between two opposing 
emotional impulses. Recalcitrant emotions are not irrational at all.  What admits of rationality or 
irrationality is the way in which we attend to the situation. 
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     It seems that we are back to James’ view regarding the opposition of instincts that he 
adopted from Spalding.  In these important experiences, in which attention breaks an 
emotional habit, two emotional impulses are experienced simultaneously – the faint 
emotional feeling and the more dominant habitual feeling.  It is by means of our attention 
that we are able to bring the faint feeling into the foreground of consciousness.  This 
becomes clear as James proceeds in his discussion of how “the strong-willed man” 
responds to such a circumstance.  
The strong-willed man, however, is the man who hears the still small voice 
unflinchingly, and who, when the death-bringing consideration comes, looks at its 
face, consents to its presence, clings to it, affirms it, and holds it fast, in spite of 
the host of exciting mental images which rise in revolt against and would expel it 
from the mind.  Sustained in this way by a resolute effort of attention, the difficult 
object erelong begins to call up its own congeners and associates and ends by 
changing the disposition of the man’s consciousness altogether.  And with his 
consciousness, his action changes, for the new object, once stably in possession of 
the field of his thoughts, infallibly produces its own motor effects ([1890], 2: 563-
4; my emphasis). 
The strong-willed man is able to seize upon this faint emotional impulse (i.e. the small 
voice) in spite of the fiery passion, and through effort of attention bring it into the 
forefront of his mind.  Once the idea is assented to, the action follows – an action that is 
contrary to that which the dominant feeling was linked to.  These kinds of experiences 
point to how our emotional habits can be broken and restructured, thereby “changing the 
disposition of the man’s consciousness altogether”.  For a new link has been formed 
between a feeling, though faint, and an action.  A habit is obviously not formed in one 
instance, but experiences such as this can lay the foundation for the development of a 
new emotional habit.  By directly choosing the appropriate action, which is under the 
direct influence of the will, we can indirectly choose its associated emotional feeling.  
Thus, in the future, when presented with a similar situation, it is possible that the 
instinctual response will arouse this new emotional feeling.  Once this occurs, the new 
emotional habit will be fully entrenched. 
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     James calls attention to these important experiences within his chapter on “The 
Emotions”.  While he focuses on occurrent emotions, he points to the role of attention 
and will to “conquer undesirable emotional tendencies” ([1890], 2: 463). 
There is no more valuable precept in moral education than this, as all who have 
experience know: if we wish to conquer undesirable emotional tendencies in 
ourselves, we must assiduously, and in the first instance cold-bloodedly, go 
through the outward movements of those contrary dispositions which we prefer to 
cultivate ([1890], 2: 463). 
Acting deliberately and cold-bloodedly in these instances nevertheless requires seizing 
upon the faint instinctual impulse that we have already looked at.  The ability to even 
think of smiling while in a state of depression is no easy task, but by attending to this 
faint emotional impulse and rather cold-bloodedly acting upon it, we can potentially 
cultivate the kind of emotional tendencies and habits that we want.  We may not be in 
control of our emotions as they occur synchronically, but we can deliberately put in place 
our emotional dispositions through these kinds of efforts.  Our emotional habits thus 
come in different grades of activity.  Those that are put in place by our effort of attention 
and acts of will are clearly more active than those that become entrenched by the 
associations we accrue from experience.  We quite literally choose these habitual 
emotions in decisive moments of effort of attention and will.47 
     Since the body is a sounding board for James, action and feeling are intimately linked.  
As feelings lead to actions so do actions lead to feelings.  There is continual feedback 
between the two.  As we willfully act on the basis of a faint emotional impulse we may 
very well produce the very feelings that we are trying to engender. 
                                                
47 We are then left with the further question of whether or not this choice is free.  As a psychologist, James 
steers clear of the free will question as it is a metaphysical rather than a psychological question.  He does 
note that as a philosopher he endorses free will for “ethical rather than psychological” reasons ([1890], 2: 
573).  This free will “could only be to hold some one ideal object, or part of an object, a little longer or a 
little more intensely before the mind” ([1890], 2: 576-7).  Free will for James thus lies in attention.  James’ 
philosophical discussion of free will can be found in The Dilemma of Determinism (1884). 
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The reward of persistency will infallibly come, in the fading out of the sullenness 
or depression, and the advent of real cheerfulness and kindliness in their stead. 
Smooth the brow, brighten the eye, contract the dorsal rather than the ventral 
aspect of the frame, and speak in a major key, pass the genial compliment, and 
your heart must be frigid indeed if it do not gradually thaw! ([1890], 2: 463). 
The very act of smiling, even if it is forced, can often give rise to a positive feeling.  
Though actions and feelings are intimately linked, it is the action that is more directly 
under our control.  As a result, it is through actions that we can indirectly choose feelings.  
In The Gospel of Relaxation, James highlights some of the practical implications of the 
James-Lange theory of emotion.  Of central importance is our ability to regulate our 
emotions. 
Action seems to follow feeling, but really action and feeling go together; and by 
regulating the action, which is under the more direct control of the will, we can 
indirectly regulate the feeling, which is not (James [1916], 201). 
Remarkably, this essay has gone completely unnoticed by critics of James’ theory of 
emotion.  But it clearly articulates what was earlier discussed in The Principles nine years 
prior – that we have considerable control over our emotions.  First, we can attempt to 
willfully bring about an emotional feeling through action.  James recognizes that willfully 
bringing about emotional states pales in comparison to a legitimately induced emotion.  
The physiological changes of an emotion are complex, and they cannot be fully replicated 
by sheer effort.  Second, even if such an effort of will fails to bring about the desired 
emotion at that particular moment, the individual may be making inroads in developing 
the kind of emotional disposition that s/he wants.  Over time, through such effort of 
attention, an individual may find themselves with radically changed emotional habits.  It 
is in this way that ‘the I’ can restructure ‘the me’. 
     It is clear that for James we have the ability and are thus responsible for putting in 
place the emotional dispositions that we want.  Nevertheless, James’ point of emphasis, 
unlike Solomon, is not so much on responsibility for our emotions but developing good 
emotional habits.  Whether these habits are put in place by our choosing or not is of 
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secondary importance.  In James’ Talk to Teachers, which draws out some of the 
practical implications of The Principles, he says: 
It is very important that teachers should realize the importance of habit, and 
psychology helps us greatly at this point.  We speak, it is true, of good habits and 
of bad habits; but, when people use the word ‘habit,’ in the majority of instances 
it is a bad habit which they have in mind…  But the fact is that our virtues are 
habits as much as our vices.  All our life, so far as it has definite form, is but a 
mass of habits, - practical, emotional, and intellectual, - systematically organized 
for our weal or woe, and bearing us irresistibly toward our destiny, whatever the 
latter may be (James [1916], 64). 
Teachers, parents and other caregivers can help to awaken certain basic instincts and help 
nurture good emotional habits.  While this may result in emotional habits that are more 
passive than active, what ultimately matters is that the emotions have positive 
consequences for our lives.  The activity or passivity of these emotions is subordinate to 
this more primary ethical question.  Of course, our upbringings are invariably imperfect, 
and bad habits, including bad emotional habits, are likely to develop.  It is here where our 
finite resources of attention are to be focused. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this section, I have attempted to show that states of consciousness involving emotions 
vary widely in their activity for James.  Some emotions, such as self-feelings, are directly 
under our control, while others, such as blind emotions, are entirely passive.  Moreover, 
there are differences in degree with respect to habitual emotions.  Those that have 
developed out of a blind emotion are more passive than those that have been put in place 
by attention and will.  Ultimately, what matters for James is that we develop good 
emotional habits. 
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5 Developments in James’ Conception of Emotion 
It has been argued that James’ later philosophical works, particularly The Varieties of 
Religious Experience (hereafter Varieties), represents a fundamental break from his 
earlier treatment of emotion (Averill [1992]; Oatley & Djikic [2002]; Solomon [1995]).  
According to James Averill, James has two distinct theories of emotion: first, a feeling 
theory, as developed in “What is an Emotion?” and The Principles; and second, a 
cognitive theory, as developed in Varieties (Averill [1992], 221).  For Robert Solomon, 
the discontinuity in James’ work on emotion is even greater.   
I would argue that James has at least three different and sometimes radically 
opposed theories of emotion. In his 1884 essay, "What Is an Emotion?" he argues 
both for a physiological and for a behavioral conception of emotions.... James also 
proposes a very different view of emotions in his religious writings, notably in 
The Varieties of Religious Experience, such that emotions clearly emerge as a 
species of spiritual phenomena and hardly physical or physiological at all 
(Solomon [1995], 201). 
At first glance it might seem that a fundamental break between The Principles and 
Varieties does occur.  James’ discussion in this later work focuses entirely on the 
cognitive aspects of emotion, which is difficult to reconcile with the standard view of his 
earlier feeling theory.  Furthermore, although emotion features prominently throughout 
Varieties, the James-Lange theory is not referred to once.  For Averill and Solomon, it is 
an omission that surely signals James’ abandonment of the theory.  
     This reading of a fundamental break, I contend, is mistaken.  While James does not 
reference his earlier James-Lange theory of emotion within Varieties, he does reference it 
in support of other later works.  In 1899, shortly before he began working on Varieties, 
he published The Gospel of Relaxation.  In this article, as we have seen, he discusses 
some of the practical implications of the James-Lange theory of emotion, to which he 
remains a staunch advocate.  Moreover, in 1905, after the publication of Varieties, James 
refers back to his James-Lange theory of emotion in support of his metaphysical theory of 
‘pure experience’ ([1905], 1208).  
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     More importantly, as I have attempted to show throughout my analysis of The 
Principles, James’ conception of emotion is not exhausted by the James-Lange theory.  
This theory focuses on the bodily changes that cause and underlie an emotional feeling, 
and thereby takes a scientific third-person perspective on the phenomena.  But the James-
Lange theory remains silent on a number of features of emotion, most notably emotional 
experience.  As we have seen, James inquires into these experiential aspects of emotion 
in his chapter on “The Perception of Reality”.  Here he discusses how emotional feelings 
involve ‘a sense of reality’ or belief, which imbue experience with meaning and value.  
This experiential aspect of emotion is continued in Varieties in the context of religious 
experience.  
     Given these considerations, it might then seem that James’ account of emotion 
undergoes no changes during the intervening twelve years between The Principles and 
Varieties.  Matthew Ratcliffe has taken this view (Ratcliffe [2005], [2008]).  While 
Ratcliffe’s understanding of James’ theory is generally astute, he employs a problematic 
methodology.  He takes aspects of James’ later treatment of emotion, particularly from 
Varieties, as well as aspects from his earlier view “in order to piece together a theory” 
(Ratcliffe [2008], 221).  This approach rests on the assumption that James’ theory 
remains unchanged throughout his career.  
     During the period between The Principles and Varieties three notable changes occur 
in James’ conception of emotion.  The first two changes concern his conception of 
consciousness.  First, he comes to accept that mental states do indeed combine.  As a 
result, James is no longer committed to the view that a state of consciousness must be an 
undivided unity.  He now accepts that a state of consciousness can have parts.  Second, 
he explicitly rejects the dualistic interactionism that he had endorsed for pragmatic 
psychological reasons within The Principles, in favour of a monistic metaphysical theory.  
These changes affect his view of emotion indirectly, and can be considered more minor 
changes in this regard.  The third change, concerning James’ discussion of feelings of 
reality in Varieties, is of greater consequence, and I consider their nature and function in 
close detail in Chapter 6.  Here I simply note that these emotions are an addition to 
James’ earlier account, and do not undermine it.  Indeed, there is neither a fundamental 
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break nor seamless continuity in James’ theory of emotion from The Principles to 
Varieties.  The three changes that I consider below are best understood as refining and 
building upon a theory already in place.     
 
5.1 Three Changes from The Principles to Varieties 
5.1.1 The Compounding of Mental States 
The central tenet of James’ stream of consciousness theory, which is developed in The 
Principles, is that mental states do not combine to form a complex mental state.  Instead, 
these concrete states of mind, which I have called primary feelings, are a single, 
undivided unity.  They are not composed of parts.  However, five years after the 
publication of The Principles, James amends this position.  In The Knowing of Things 
Together he comes to the view that some mental states do indeed contain parts.   
I see, moreover, better now than then that my proposal to designate mental states 
merely by their cognitive function leads to a somewhat strained way of talking of 
dreams and reveries, and to quite an unnatural way of talking of some emotional 
states. I am willing, consequently, henceforward that mental contents should be 
called complex, just as their objects are, and this even in psychology.  Not 
because their parts are separable, as the parts of objects are; not because they have 
an eternal or quasi-eternal individual existence, like the parts of objects; for the 
various 'contents' of which they are parts are integers, existentially, and their parts 
only live as long as they live. Still, in them, we can call parts, parts ([1895]), 124). 
James mentions that certain emotions lead him to the conclusion that some mental states 
do in fact combine.  He is not explicit, here or elsewhere, about what kind of emotions he 
has in mind (Myers [1986]).  However, what brought James to this amended view is his 
recognition that we know some states of consciousness in the same way, whether taken 
individually or in conjunction with other states.  Given this, it seems that he is most likely 
referring to the subtle emotions in the above passage.   
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     As I attempted to show in Chapter 2, there is a difference between a pure judgment 
and a subtle emotion for James – the latter includes an emotional feeling in addition to 
the judgment.  In both states of consciousness, however, it seems that we know the 
judgment in the same way, whether taken singly as a pure judgment or in conjunction 
with an emotional feeling.  Consider again Edmund Gurney’s imagining of a musical 
piece in his mind versus the actual experience of being at the symphony.  In both cases, 
the judgment that the music is beautiful is the same.  The primary feeling involving a 
subtle emotion would then consist of the judgment of beauty plus the emotional feeling.  
Primary feelings involving coarse emotions, on the other hand, do not seem to have this 
kind of structure.  I may know what a snake is and I may know what fear is taken as 
individual states of consciousness, but my fear-of-a-snake is something entirely new.  My 
knowledge of the snake and the fear do not combine to form a complex mental state, 
rather they mix into an indivisible unity.  If this is correct, the difference is the nature of 
the perception that indirectly causes the emotion.  In the case of a subtle emotion, it is 
more conceptual and less sensational.  This reading is supported by a passage in James’ 
chapter on “The Emotions” in The Principles.  At one point, when discussing subtle 
emotions, James describes how the pleasure from the emotional feeling is “added” to the 
judgment ([1890], 2: 468).  This “added” seems to conflict with his stream of 
consciousness theory, as it is suggestive of mental combination.  If I am correct that 
James is referring to subtle emotions, the structure of these emotions would remain the 
same insofar as they are bi-directional feelings.  What changes is the structure of the 
primary feeling, which is no longer a simple undivided unity, but complex and composed 
of parts.  The judgment does not mix with the emotional feeling, but is rather added to it. 
     Regardless of what emotions James has in mind, his acceptance of mental 
combination does not appear to have a significant impact on his conception of emotion.  
It is important to note that he is not renouncing his previous position in The Principles 
regarding the primacy given to a unified state of consciousness.48  He is clear that these 
                                                
48 In A Pluralistic Universe, James holds that his theory of consciousness as developed in The Principles in 
which states are a simple undivided unity is still “the best description of an enormous number of our higher 
fields of consciousness” ([1909], 715). 
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parts within a state of consciousness cannot be separated like those of a physical object, 
and he remains critical of the empiricist model of the mind, which equates the whole with 
the sum of the parts.  A unified state of consciousness continues to have a more primary 
existence.  The relation between what I have called a secondary feeling and a primary 
feeling thereby remains largely intact.  
     At the time of Varieties then, James is committed to the seemingly contradictory view 
that some mental states are composed of parts and are at the same time a unity.  How 
exactly this is to be reconciled, he is unsure of at this time.  In fact, this problem of the 
relation between parts and wholes was arguably the most troubling philosophical problem 
James encountered throughout his career ([1907], 542).  If a whole is composed of parts, 
then how is it that we get the whole?  It was not until 1909, in A Pluralistic Universe, that 
James resolves the problem for himself.  He ends up renouncing the intellectualistic logic 
in which the problem is framed, by arguing that our immediate experiences 
simultaneously function both as parts and wholes.49  
     It might seem that this acceptance of mental combination in some states of 
consciousness is being referred to in James’ description of religious emotions in 
Varieties: 
As concrete states of mind, made up of a feeling plus a specific sort of object, 
religious emotions of course are psychic entities distinguishable from other 
concrete emotions; but there is no ground for assuming a simple abstract 
‘religious emotion’ to exist as a distinct elementary mental affection by itself, 
present in every religious experience without exception ([1902], 33). 
                                                
49 James says: “Sensational experiences are their ‘own others,’ then, both internally and externally. 
Inwardly they are one with their parts, and outwardly they pass continuously into their next neighbors, so 
that events separated by years of time in a man’s life hang together unbrokenly by the intermediary events.  
Their names, to be sure, cut them into separate conceptual entities, but no cuts existed in the continuum in 
which they originally came” ([1909], 760). 
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Emotional responses to religious symbols, art, iconography, etc., would certainly be 
considered subtle emotions for James.  If I am correct that subtle emotions involve 
mental combination, then it follows that in these instances the emotions involve the 
combination of parts – that is, a judgment plus a feeling.  However, James is not 
concerned with subtle emotions in Varieties.  The religious emotions he is concerned 
with, as will become clear in Chapter 6 with my discussion of feelings of reality and 
transformational emotions originate from our immediate acquaintance with reality, not 
our knowledge about reality.  The plus in the above passage should not be read literally.  
James is referring to the contents of a unified state of mind (i.e., a concrete state), and it is 
difficult to do so without using the language of parts.  His ultimate point is that there is 
no such thing as a religious emotion in itself “but only a common storehouse of emotions 
upon which religious objects may draw” ([1902], 33).  The emotion in itself is the love, 
awe, wonder, fear, anger, joy, etc., which he notes has a bodily manifestation.  This goes 
to show that by ‘religious emotion’ James does not mean some spiritual entity, but an 
emotion like any other emotion. 
     To summarize, James’ acceptance of mental combination in some cases of emotion – 
likely that of subtle emotions – changes the structure of these emotions from a simple to a 
complex state.  Nevertheless, the primary feelings within which these emotions are 
embedded, which James here calls ‘concrete states of mind’, continue to have a more 
primary existence than the secondary feelings and thoughts that compose them. 
 
5.1.2 From Dualism to Neutral Monism 
Another development that occurs between The Principles and Varieties concerns James’ 
overarching metaphysical worldview.  In The Principles, he pragmatically endorses a 
dualistic philosophy on the grounds that psychology must assume both mental and 
physical facts; and that the ultimate nature and relation of these mental and physical facts 
is a question for metaphysics.  As Bruce Wilshire has shown, James struggles with this 
dualistic assumption throughout his treatise, and thereby struggles to keep psychology 
distinct from metaphysics (Wilshire [1968]).  Indeed, in James’ 1904 article Does 
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Consciousness Exist, where he first introduces his metaphysical theory of pure 
experience, he says, “for twenty years past I have mistrusted ‘consciousness’ as an 
entity” ([1904], 1141).  During the writing of The Principles then, James had doubts not 
only about dualism but the metaphysical status of consciousness.  It was not until 1895, 
in The Knowing of Things Together, that James first gave voice to these doubts. 
What, then, do we mean by 'things'?  To this question I can only make the answer 
of the idealistic philosophy.  For the philosophy that began with Berkeley, and has 
led up in our tongue to Shadworth Hodgson, things have no other nature than 
thoughts have, and we know of no things that are not given to somebody's 
experience.  When I see the thing white paper before my eyes, the nature of the 
thing and the nature of my sensations are one ([1895], 106-7). 
We see here the seeds of his later neutral monism, wherein thoughts and things are both 
derivative of and reducible to a more primary stuff.  This important change to James’ 
philosophy is operating in the background as he writes The Will to Believe and Varieties, 
which were written after The Knowing of Things Together, although before his more 
developed ‘pure experience’ theory. 
     According to James’ theory of ‘pure experience’, experience is neutral with respect to 
the distinctions that we impose on it, including the distinctions between subject-object 
and mind-matter.  In 1905, James published The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of 
Pure Experience where he responds to the objection from his critics that the emotions are 
exclusively inner, subjective, mental events, thereby posing a counterexample to his 
theory.  In response, James argues that there is in fact an ambiguity with respect to the 
emotions that is in perfect accord with this theory of pure experience.  
With the affectional experiences which we are considering, the relatively ‘pure’ 
condition lasts.  In practical life no urgent need has yet arisen for deciding 
whether to retain them as rigorously mental or as rigorously physical facts.  So 
they remain equivocal ([1905], 1210).   
James’ point is that it is only secondarily that we class an emotion as either happening to 
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us as a physical object or happening in us as a mental subject.  This ambiguity is 
consistent, as he notes, with his earlier James-Lange theory of emotion, which gives 
emphasis to the physical side ([1905], 1208).  Moreover, it is fully consistent with his 
treatment of emotion in parts of The Principles and Varieties, which gives emphasis to 
the mental side.  Whether we emphasize emotion as a physical fact or as a mental fact, 
these are two ways of classifying the same pure experience.  James is no longer 
committed to the view that the bodily changes and the feeling of an emotion are two 
distinct kinds of stuff.  Rather, they are both derivative of and reducible to a more 
primary stuff – pure experience.  I will not be considering the role of emotion within 
James’ theory of pure experience, as this is developed after Varieties and is beyond the 
scope of my project.  I mention it here because these changes in James’ metaphysical 
worldview are being developed concurrently to his writing of The Will to Believe and 
Varieties.   
 
5.1.3 Feelings of Reality 
The most significant change in James’ conception of emotion from The Principles to 
Varieties concerns the addition of an affective category he calls ‘feelings of reality’.  This 
is where Ratcliffe’s view that James’ theory of emotion remains the same throughout his 
career is difficult to maintain, as the notion of feelings of reality is not developed within 
The Principles.  As we have seen, James does discuss the sense of reality, which 
constitutes the outward-directed feeling of an emotion.  However, by feelings of reality 
he is pointing to something different.  It is only in Varieties that these unique emotions 
are explicitly discussed, although they are present in a less explicit way in The Gospel of 
Relaxation and The Will to Believe.  I will look at feelings of reality in close detail in the 
next chapter.  Here I simply note that these emotions do not undermine James’ previous 
theory, but add to it, thereby broadening the category of emotion. 
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5.2 Terminological Changes 
In addition to the more substantive changes noted above there are some terminological 
changes that occur from The Principles to Varieties.  Most notably, there is a change in 
James’ metaphor of choice to describe consciousness.  Instead of the stream of 
consciousness, it is now described as a field.  These terms are used more or less 
synonymously.50   
     This terminological change seems to come about as a result of James’ increased 
emphasis on the subconscious in Varieties.  Although he has the theoretical tools to 
account for the subconscious realm in The Principles, two main reasons explain its 
growing emphasis in his work.  First, during the period between 1890 and 1902 a great 
deal of research had been conducted on the subconscious.  As James notes:  
In the wonderful explorations of Binet, Janet, Breuer, Freud, Mason, Prince, and 
others, of the subliminal consciousness of patients with hysteria, we have revealed 
to us whole systems of underground life ([1902], 217).   
Moreover, the work of Frederic Myers on The Subliminal Consciousness, published in 
1892 was particularly influential for James ([1902], 457).  This growing empirical 
research convinced him that “The subconscious self is nowadays a well-accredited 
psychological entity” ([1902], 457).  The second reason for this emphasis on the 
subconscious concerns the nature of James’ inquiry in Varieties.  In much of this work, 
he is trying to provide a theoretical framework that can explain the various first-person 
accounts of religious experience, particularly experiences of conversion.  This task is 
difficult in itself, but without invoking the subconscious realm such an attempt would 
pose even more challenges.   
     It is this growing emphasis on the subconscious in his work that seems to motivate the 
change to a field of consciousness.  According to James, this metaphor is better able to 
                                                
50 Writing later in his career, in A Pluralistic Universe, James refers to his theory of consciousness in The 
Principles not as a stream but as a field ([1909], 720). 
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capture the important role of the subconscious realm, which is associated with what he 
calls the margin.   
The important fact which this ‘field’ formula commemorates is the 
indetermination of the margin.  Inattentively realized as is the matter which the 
margin contains, it is nevertheless there, and helps both to guide our behavior and 
determine the next movement of our attention.  It lies around us like a ‘magnetic 
field,’ inside of which our centre of energy turns like a compass-needle, as the 
present phase of consciousness alters into its successor ([1902], 214). 
A state of consciousness for James is now conceived of like a field of energy, where it is 
most intense at its centre (i.e., its focus) and which gradually dissipates as the field 
extends into the margins, wherein the subconscious lies.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to show that James does not break from his theory of 
emotion during the period between The Principles and Varieties.  While there are 
certainly some amendments to his view, these changes are best understood as refining his 
theory developed in The Principles.  In the following two chapters, I will look more 
closely at James’ developing account of emotion within Varieties and The Will to Believe.  
In Chapter 6, I consider the nature and function of two kinds of emotions that are 
discussed throughout Varieties – feelings of reality and transformational emotions.  In 
Chapter 7, I consider James’ argument in The Will to Believe by looking closely at his 
notion of the passional nature. 
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6 Feelings of Reality and Transformational Emotions 
According to traditional rationalist and empiricist theories of epistemology, feelings have 
no role to play in our knowledge about the world.  Many rationalist philosophers, through 
the guidance of reason, claim to have untangled all of the problems of philosophy and 
thereby arrived at necessary truths about the world.  This includes the question of God’s 
existence, which they purport to demonstrate – such as with the ontological argument – 
by pure reason.  Emotion and feeling are excluded from the rationalist’s method, at best 
regarded as irrelevant, and at worst, a corrosive influence that stains the entire process.  
James rejects rationalism since it is not attentive to the facts of experience.  Whereas the 
world is messy and complicated, rationalist theories are clean and simple.  The grand 
philosophical systems conceived of by rationalists are for James abstractions that have 
essentially lost touch with reality.  With respect to the existence of God, rationalists may 
be convinced by their philosophical arguments, but this conviction according to James is 
not ultimately an intellectual matter based on logic and reason.  Rather, it is based on 
feeling ([1902], 387).   
     Meanwhile for traditional empiricists, beliefs are proportioned to the amount of 
available evidence in the world.  Since there is no evidence in the world for God, an 
empiricist has no grounds for belief.  What one feels to be the case is entirely irrelevant, 
as these feelings are merely subjective phenomena that are not about the world.  James 
rejects traditional empiricism on the grounds that it does not take experience far enough.  
By excluding the relations that connect experiential events and our feelings of those 
events, traditional empiricists end up excluding facts of experience from their 
philosophical inquiry.  This is especially pertinent in the realm of religion, for according 
to James, “feeling is the deeper source of religion” ([1902], 387).  James’ radical 
empiricism, already present in his stream of consciousness theory, thereby carves out a 
distinct methodological approach, one that is empirical but which makes room for 
religious belief. 
     James’ rejection of the cold, feeling-less epistemology that both traditional rationalists 
and empiricists subscribe to comes as a result of his rejection of the traditional knower-
103 
 
known relation, most explicitly discussed in Pragmatism, but already present in The 
Principles.  We are not simply passive knowers who come to know a world that is “out 
there”, be it through reason or the senses.  Rather, we are inextricably bound up with the 
world, and are as much contributors to knowledge as we are receivers.  This contribution 
derives from an ineliminable feeling foundation that colours our entire experience.  Of all 
James’ works, it is Varieties that inquires into the nature of this feeling element most 
explicitly.  
     Much has been written on Varieties across numerous disciplines, and the prominence 
of emotion within the work, including its seeming tension with his earlier theory, has 
been well documented (Averill [1992]; Carrette [2005]; Myers [1986]; Solomon [1995]).  
However, there has not been a sustained, close analysis of James’ treatment of emotion 
within Varieties.  In the following chapter, I hope to elucidate two distinct but 
interconnected kinds of emotion that are central to the work.  I first consider the role that 
feelings of reality play in shaping our respective experience of the world.  I then turn my 
attention to transformational experiences, which involve not only feelings of reality but 
also transformational emotions.  I show how a transformational emotion can completely 
reorient an individual’s perspective on the world, and thereby put in place new feelings of 
reality from which new beliefs about the world emerge.  Before embarking on this task, I 
will first briefly describe James’ methodological approach in Varieties. 
 
 
6.1 James’ Methodology in Varieties 
James engages with two central questions in Varieties, which divides the work in two 
parts.  First, he inquires into the nature of the various religious feelings and experiences 
individuals have had.  Second, he considers what general conclusions can be drawn from 
this preceding inquiry, if any, about the nature of reality ([1902], 13).  The large majority 
of the work is focused upon the first question, which is fitting given that James’ subtitle 
to Varieties is “a study in human nature”.  It is in this respect that emotion figures 
prominently.  In fact, upon re-reading this first section of his manuscript James says, “I 
am almost appalled at the amount of emotionality which I find in it”  ([1902], 435). 
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     Since Varieties is primarily a study in human nature, James does not approach the 
topic of religion from the perspective of a theologian, but – given his expertise – from 
that of a psychologist ([1902], 12).  However, his approach is not the physiological 
psychology that he employed in much of The Principles, including the chapter on “The 
Emotions”.  Rather, it is the descriptive psychology utilized in chapters such as “The 
Stream of Thought” and “The Perception of Reality”, which pays close attention to the 
nature of experience itself.  This becomes evident in the opening chapter of Varieties, 
entitled “Religion and Neurology”, where James is concerned with refuting ‘medical 
materialism’.  According to this view, religious experiences are symptomatic of 
pathological physiological states, and can be entirely disregarded as a result.  James 
concedes that the physiological conditions underlying some religious experiences are 
pathological, but he argues that this has no bearing upon the philosophical significance of 
the experience.   
When we think certain states of mind superior to others, is it ever because of what 
we know concerning their organic antecedents?  No! it is always for two entirely 
different reasons.  It is either because we take an immediate delight in them; or 
else it is because we believe them to bring us good consequential fruits for life 
([1902], 22). 
It is not surprising then that the James-Lange theory of emotion, which is concerned with 
the “organic antecedents” of emotion, is not referred to in Varieties.  No matter what 
bodily changes may cause and accompany an experience, emotional or otherwise, they 
are irrelevant to the question of meaning and significance.  This does not mean that James 
has abandoned his earlier theory.  The physiological changes that cause and underlie an 
emotion continue to be an important aspect of emotion, but given the nature of his 
inquiry, they are simply not pertinent.   
     Having argued against medical materialism, James then proceeds with his project of 
considering the nature of religious experience itself.  Here he describes his general 
methodology: 
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If the inquiry be psychological, not religious institutions, but rather religious 
feelings and religious impulses must be its subject, and I must confine myself to 
those more developed subjective phenomena recorded in literature produced by 
articulate and fully self-conscious men, in works of piety and autobiography 
([1902], 12). 
James’ inquiry, concerned with understanding the nature of religious experience, is 
ultimately phenomenological in approach.  Not only is he interested in detailing the 
structural components of these experiences, but also the meaning and significance that 
they confer for those who experience them.51  Central to this are two distinct kinds of 
emotions: feelings of reality and transformational emotions, which the remainder of this 
chapter is focused on. 
 
6.2 Feelings of Reality 
The nature of religious belief is not a central concern for James in The Principles, 
although he does touch upon it in his chapter on “The Perception of Reality”.  He notes 
that it is the intensity of emotional feelings toward religious objects that explains the 
individual’s belief.  
The reason of the belief is undoubtedly the bodily commotion which the exciting 
idea sets up.  ‘Nothing which I can feel like that can be false.’  All our religious 
and supernatural beliefs are of this order ([1890], 2: 308).  
A similar view is presented in Varieties: 
                                                
51
 According to James Edie: “William James was the first to attempt a phenomenology of religious 
experience in an experiential sense, and I would point out that he has had almost no successor in this 
endeavor up to the present time” (Edie [1987], 52). 
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The truth is that in the metaphysical and religious sphere, articulate reasons are 
cogent for us only when our inarticulate feelings of reality have already been 
impressed in favor of the same conclusion ([1902], 74). 
In both cases, our explicit religious beliefs take root from an underlying feeling 
foundation.52   The nature of this feeling foundation undergoes an important shift in the 
period between The Principles and Varieties.  James’ earlier treatment of emotion had 
focused exclusively on emotions felt at particular points in time.  He also considered how 
many of our emotional reactions are structured by habitual patterns of response.  All of 
this remains consistent in Varieties.  What is new to James’ account are feelings of 
reality.  
     Feelings of reality are discussed throughout Varieties, but are given their most explicit 
theoretical attention in the chapter aptly entitled “The Reality of the Unseen”.  These 
feelings are not directed toward sensible objects within the world, but nor are they 
abstract ideas.53  As James says: 
It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of 
objective presence, a perception of what we may call ‘something there,’ more 
deep and more general than any of the special and particular ‘senses’ by which the 
current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed ([1902], 
59). 
James is not here describing mystical states of consciousness, which Varieties is well 
known for, but everyday states of consciousness in which a sense of reality is 
continuously but dimly felt.  These feelings are “more deep and more general” than other 
elements within consciousness: they are “more deep” insofar as they lie not in the 
foreground of consciousness but in the background; and they are “more general” insofar 
                                                
52
 A similar view is present in James’ earlier essay “The Sentiment of Rationality” (1879). 
53
 As James says, feelings of reality are “more like a sensation than an intellectual operation properly so-
called”.  He says they are “quasi-sensible realities directly apprehended” ([1902], 64).   
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as they are not particular feelings, but rather give shape and structure to the contents of a 
conscious state.  As his discussion progresses it becomes clear that feelings of reality 
provide an individual with a foundational orientation to the world, a kind of lens through 
which things and events are experienced.  While the different feelings of reality that 
characterize these ways of being often result in different religious beliefs, James is not 
interested in the various philosophical arguments that have been put forth to defend these 
positions.  Nor is he interested in the theological dogma associated with the respective 
religions.  He considers these philosophical and theological aspects of religion 
“secondary products, like translations of a text into another tongue” ([1902], 387).54  For 
James, “feeling is the deeper source of religion”, and the deepest of these feelings are 
feelings of reality ([1902], 387). 
     Feelings of reality may be inarticulate, but they can be given verbal expression to 
some extent by what James calls “our total reaction upon life”.  This process involves 
bringing one’s feelings of reality before one’s attention, which he describes in the 
following passage:  
To get at them you must go behind the foreground of existence and reach down to 
that curious sense of the whole residual cosmos as an everlasting presence, 
intimate or alien, terrible or amusing, lovable or odious, which in some degree 
every one possesses. This sense of the world’s presence, appealing as it does to 
our peculiar individual temperament, makes us either strenuous or careless, 
devout or blasphemous, gloomy or exultant, about life at large; and our reaction, 
involuntary and inarticulate and often half unconscious as it is, is the completest 
of all our answers to the question, “What is the character of this universe in which 
we dwell?” ([1902], 39). 
These different feeling orientations toward the world - whether it is felt as “intimate or 
alien, terrible or amusing, lovable or odious” – lie at the foundation of the various 
                                                
54
 This is elucidated by a letter James wrote to Frances Morse regarding Varieties: “The problem I have set 
myself is a hard one: first, to defend…‘experience’ against ‘philosophy’ as being the real backbone of the 
world’s religious life…” (Perry [1948], 257).  
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religious (including irreligious) ways of being in the world.  If the universe is felt as 
having no divine significance beyond what is given to our senses, then an individual’s 
feelings of reality can be described, at least in part, as a feeling of disconnectedness or 
alienation.  This is not to say that such individuals will necessarily find no meaning and 
significance in life, but rather the self is not felt to be an intrinsic part of the universe as a 
whole.  If, on the other hand, the universe is felt as having a divine significance with a 
transcendent order to which the individual is a part, then this self-world relation can be 
characterized by a feeling of intimacy. 
     Feelings of reality are certainly the most primordial and basic affective category for 
James, but they are not to be understood as moods.  The term mood is used sparsely 
throughout his works, and is not given a clear definition.  Nevertheless, mood does figure 
prominently at times, particularly in James’ distinction between the ‘strenuous mood’ and 
the ‘easy-going mood’ in The Moral Philosopher and Moral Life, which is also referred 
to in other works ([1912], 211).55  In fact, this distinction is implicit in the passage above 
where James mentions the “strenuous or careless” temperament.  Although he does not 
explicitly discuss the relationship between feelings of reality and mood, the above 
passage does provide some hints.  As he says, when these feelings of reality appeal to an 
individual’s particular temperament, this “makes us either strenuous or careless, devout 
or blasphemous, gloomy or exultant” ([1902], 39).  Whereas in this passage James speaks 
of a strenuous temperament, in other works, including Varieties, The Principles, and The 
Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, he speaks of the strenuous mood.  In this respect 
then, James seems to be using the terms mood and temperament interchangeably.  As a 
result, it is not entirely clear whether these moods are to be regarded as affective states, 
dispositions of character, or both.56   
                                                
55 This important distinction, which is made most explicitly in James’ moral philosophy, has been discussed 
by Hunter Brown to better elucidate James’ argument in “The Will to Believe” (Brown [2000]). 
 
56 Later in this section, I will discuss what James describes as ‘the habitual centre of personal energy’.  This 
term seems to capture what he means by mood and temperament. 
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     In Varieties, James is primarily concerned with different religious ways of being in the 
world, and he focuses most explicitly upon three types: ‘healthy-mindedness’, 
‘saintliness’, and ‘the sick soul’.  The healthy-minded and saintliness types both feel that 
a “more” exists behind the veneer of our sense experience, and thereby share a feeling of 
intimacy with the universe at large.  James describes the healthy-minded type as having a 
feeling of being in “union with the divine” ([1902], 78), while the saintliness type has a 
“A feeling of being in a wider life than that of this world’s selfish little interests” ([1902], 
249).  Where their feelings of reality differ is with respect to the nature of this intimacy.  
For the healthy-minded type, the self is an intrinsic part of a loveable and beautiful 
universe.  These individuals look “on all things and sees that they are good” ([1902], 85-
6).  As a result, they have “an inability to feel evil” or to experience any prolonged 
suffering ([1902], 82).  It is these loving and intimate feelings of reality that underlie their 
optimistic and enthusiastic temperament. 
     Meanwhile, for the saintliness type this feeling of intimacy is tempered by a feeling of 
repulsion towards evil in the world.  Whereas the healthy-minded type does not regard 
evil as an intrinsic component of reality and thereby does not focus upon it, the 
saintliness type seeks to confront and overcome evil in order to get into better relations 
with the divine.  In so doing, the saintliness type is most often impelled to follow certain 
religious and moral ideals, which may involve forms of asceticism that can even “turn 
into self-immolation” ([1902]: 249).  This feeling of intimacy coupled with a feeling of 
repulsion, which make up the feelings of reality of the saintliness type, seems to map 
onto what James calls the strenuous mood.  
     As we have seen, the healthy-minded and saintliness types both feel a divine presence 
behind the world that is presented to our senses.  In this way, their feelings of reality 
differ markedly from what James calls the sick soul.  The same facts that are presented to 
the exultant temperament of the healthy-minded type are given a much different 
interpretation by the sick soul type.  Whereas the former has an inability to feel evil, the 
latter has an inability to feel goodness.  For the sick soul type, there is no unseen reality 
behind things and events within the world.  Seemingly good things that occur are fleeting.  
Since nothing good is everlasting, the world to the sick soul is at once pointless and 
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wicked – it “looks remote, strange, sinister, uncanny” ([1902], 142).  These dark and 
dreary feelings hang over all of experience like a cloud, resulting in a kind of existential 
depression.   
     The sick soul type shares similar feelings of reality with those carefree individuals that 
James characterizes as having an easy-going mood.  These types of individuals are not 
discussed in Varieties, but are referred to in The Moral Philosopher and Moral Life 
([1912], 211).  Similarly to the sick soul type, the carefree type feels no transcendent 
order behind the world that is presented to our senses.  What is seen is all there is.  In this 
way, both share a self-world relation characterized by a feeling of alienation insofar as 
the self is not part of a greater divine order.  However, whereas the sick soul type feels 
this alienation to be terrible, the carefree type feels it in a more positive (or at least 
neutral) way.  It is this difference that explains why the sick soul type is beset by 
existential dread.   
     The following chart summarizes the four religious ways of being for James. 
Religious Type Feelings of Reality Response to Evil Mood/Temperament 
Healthy-minded Intimate and loveable Turning away Exultant 
Saintliness Intimate and odious Confronting Strenuous 
Sick Soul Alien and terrible Dread Gloomy 
Carefree Alien and amusing/neutral Shrinking from (out of self-
interest) 
Easy-going 
     In the following passage, James describes how the different feelings of reality of the 
healthy-minded and sick soul types lead to fundamentally different experiences of the 
world. 
Let our common experiences be enveloped in an eternal moral order; let our 
suffering have an immortal significance; let Heaven smile upon the earth, and 
deities pay their visits; let faith and hope be the atmosphere which man breathes 
in; - and his days pass by with zest; they stir with prospects, they thrill with 
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remoter values.  Place around them on the contrary the curdling cold and gloom 
and absence of the permanent meaning which for pure naturalism and the popular 
science evolutionism of our time are all that is visible ultimately, and thrill stops 
short, or turns rather to an anxious trembling ([1902], 133). 
Feelings of reality are not directed toward a particular thing, but envelop our common 
experiences.  They are like an experiential lens through which all of reality is perceived.  
Needless to say, the healthy-minded type sees the world through a rosy lens, while a dark 
lens pervades the experience of the sick soul type.  Since feelings of reality envelop our 
day-to-day experiences, the ideas and activities of the individual oriented to the world by 
feelings of zestful enthusiasm will be entirely different to the individual whose 
experience is pervaded by gloomy pessimism.  Around their divergent foundational 
feelings of reality are built entirely different systems of ideas.   
     James calls this complex of feelings, ideas, and activities ‘the habitual centre of 
personal energy’.  This habitual centre seems to bear a relation to what James earlier also 
calls temperament or mood.  Since James focuses more attention detailing the nature of 
this habitual centre, I will focus more on it.  He says: 
Let us hereafter, in speaking of the hot place in a man’s consciousness, the group 
of ideas to which he devotes himself, and from which he works, call it the 
habitual centre of his personal energy.  It makes a great difference to a man 
whether one set of his ideas, or another, be the centre of his energy; and it makes 
a great difference, as regards any set of ideas which he may possess, whether they 
become central or remain peripheral in him ([1902], 183). 
Feelings of reality provide the underlying support to the habitual centre, much like the 
foundation of a building, and it is their presence that makes a group of associated ideas 
hot.  As we will see when looking at transformational experiences, when the feelings of 
reality no longer support the habitual ideas and activities, the edifice will subsequently 
crumble.  
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     Since feelings of reality function as a kind of magnetic force around which a system of 
ideas and activities rotate, our explicit philosophical and religious beliefs take direct root 
from this feeling foundation.  Healthy-minded types are inclined toward what James calls 
a pluralistic religion, in which there is not one absolute fact, but rather a collection of 
principles ([1902], 125).  In this way, what is good can be conceived of as the ultimate 
principle and “evil would not be essential” ([1902], 125).  The sick soul type meanwhile 
is often atheistic ([1902], 132-3), while the saintliness type, who has “a feeling of being 
in a wider life than that of this world’s selfish little interests” is compatible with both 
monotheism and pantheism ([1902], 249).  These modes of being also inform 
philosophical beliefs.  For example, James likens Spinoza’s philosophy as healthy-
minded in temper ([1902], 121); and he associates positivistic and naturalistic approaches 
to philosophy with the sick soul orientation ([1902], 132).57 
     While an individual’s religious and philosophical beliefs are rooted in their particular 
feelings of reality, there is not a necessary one-to-one mapping between the feeling and 
the belief.  Certain feelings of reality do not necessarily cause specific religious and 
philosophical beliefs.  For example, James speaks of healthy-minded Christians.  His 
central thesis is that whatever our religious and philosophical beliefs may be, it is our 
feelings of reality that “have prepared the premises” for them ([1902], 73). 
I spoke of the convincingness of these feelings of reality, and I must dwell a 
moment longer on that point.  They are as convincing to those who have them as 
any direct sensible experiences can be, and they are, as a rule, much more 
convincing than results established by mere logic ever are ([1902], 72).   
It is for this reason that philosophical argumentation often has little success in changing 
people’s beliefs, as cold logical analysis does not touch upon the deeper feelings of 
reality.  Even if one’s argument is shown to be logically flawed, we often stick to our 
                                                
57
 James goes into more detail concerning the feeling basis of philosophical beliefs in Pragmatism 
(published after Varieties), where he distinguishes the tough-hearted from the tender-hearted philosopher. 
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original conclusion.  As James says, “something in you absolutely knows that that result 
must be truer than any logic-chopping rationalistic talk, however clever, that may 
contradict it” ([1902], 73).58  In order for an individual’s religious and philosophical 
beliefs to change, the feelings of reality must first change.  Rather than by either 
philosophical reflection or argumentation, our beliefs are more likely to change by one of 
two ways.  The first is by a powerful and sudden affective experience that reorients an 
individual’s perspective – and thus feelings of realty – to the world.  The second is by a 
gradual process involving conscious effort, supported all the while by one’s feelings of 
reality.  I consider the first way later in this chapter by a discussion of transformational 
emotions; and the second way in the next chapter by elucidating James’ famous will to 
believe thesis. 
     First, there remains an important question to consider: What exactly are these feelings 
of reality for James?  Are they emotions or do they form a distinct kind of affective 
category?  There are good reasons to think that James does not regard these feelings as 
emotions.  Unlike emotions, which lie in the foreground of consciousness, feelings of 
reality are “more deep and more general”.  They lie in the background regions of 
consciousness.  In so doing, they provide a foundational orientation through which all of 
our specific engagements within the world are experienced.  In addition, feelings of 
reality are not short-term feeling states as emotions are for James in The Principles, but 
can persist for protracted periods of time.   
     On the other hand, there are also good reasons to think that they are emotions.  First, a 
central pillar of his earlier James-Lange theory is its inclusion of objectless emotions, 
which are not indirectly caused by anything within the world, but are nevertheless 
directed toward the world.  Similarly, feelings of reality are not indirectly caused by 
                                                
58
 In Varieties, James is content to present this as a psychological thesis, and does not question whether it 
is a good or bad thing.  In Pragmatism, however, he goes into more detail concerning the relationship 
between feeling and philosophical beliefs.  He argues that such feelings, which motivate philosophical 
positions, should not be hidden in philosophical discourse, but brought to light.  His discussion has 
important implications for doing philosophy, but is beyond the scope of my dissertation. 
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objects within the world, whether sensible or abstract.  Second, feelings of reality may 
only be dimly felt, but James’ theory, as we have seen in Chapter 3, is inclusive of 
feelings of lower intensity.  Finally, feelings of reality like emotions are bi-directional 
feelings.  They extend beyond the body and are directed toward the world.  In this way, 
feelings of reality, like objectless emotions, would seem to fall under the larger category 
of emotion.  
     At no point within Varieties is James explicit about whether or not feelings of reality 
are emotions.  However, two passages do seem to point in the direction that they are 
indeed emotions.  The first is his assessment in re-reading the first part of Varieties, 
which I have already alluded to, in which he says, “I am almost appalled at the amount of 
emotionality which I find in it”  ([1902], 435).  If James did not consider feelings of 
reality emotions, he would likely have not used the term emotionality here.  After all, if 
feelings of reality were not emotions, the amount of emotionality in Varieties would be 
significantly reduced.  Moreover, at one point he describes what appears to be feelings of 
reality as a “lower emotion” ([1902], 199).  The “lower” seems to refer to the fact that 
feelings of reality are in the background rather than the foreground of consciousness.  
These two passages tip the balance in favour of reading feelings of reality as emotions.  If 
this is the case, it comes with a rather surprising implication, namely that we are 
continually in a state of emotion.  This may seem like an absurd consequence of the view, 
but we need to remember that James conceives the category of emotion broadly.59  If an 
emotion is a bidirectional feeling, then feelings of reality are emotions.  As I proceed, 
however, I will continue to use the term feelings of reality in order to distinguish these 
feelings from the more standard occurrent emotions.    
     What James calls feelings of reality has not received much attention within 
philosophy, but a few theorists have discussed something similar.  Heidegger’s treatment 
of mood in Being and Time draws attention to the more primary orientation to the world 
                                                
59 This is not a unique feature of James’ view.  For Alexander Bain, the category of emotion is even 
broader, including pleasures and pains. “Emotion is the name here used to comprehend all that is 
understood by feelings, states of feeling, pleasures, pains, passions, sentiments, affections” (Bain [1859], 
3). 
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that we “always-already” find ourselves in.  According to Heidegger, “The mood has 
already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the world as a whole, and makes it possible 
first of all to direct oneself toward something” (Heidegger [1962], 176).  Through the use 
of the term mood, Heidegger highlights the pre-reflective world that we most often take 
for granted, one that we are always attuned to in a particular way.  Meanwhile for James, 
feelings of reality are conceived of as background feelings within a state of 
consciousness.  Nevertheless, both seem to be getting at the same affective phenomena; 
namely those feelings that bridge the self-world relation.   
     More recently, Damasio has posited a class of feeling called ‘background feelings’, 
which he distinguishes from emotions and moods.   
I am postulating another variety of feeling, which I suspect preceded the others in 
evolution.  I call it background feelings because it originates in “background” 
body states rather than in emotional states.  It is not the Verdi of grand emotion, 
nor the Stravinsky of intellectualized emotion but rather a minimalist in tone and 
beat, the feeling of life itself, the sense of being (Damasio [1994], 150). 
Like James’ account, Damasio gives emphasis both to the faintness and long-lasting 
nature of these feelings.  However, background feelings for Damasio are exclusively 
perceptions of bodily states, and are therefore not directed outward as they are for James.  
Damasio claims that these feelings provide the basis for our feeling that we are enduring 
selves (Damasio [1994], 151). 
     Finally, Matthew Ratcliffe has distinguished an affective category that he calls 
‘existential feelings’, which is very similar to James’ feelings of reality (Ratcliffe [2008], 
[2009]).  For Ratcliffe, existential feelings “constitute a sense of relatedness between self 
and world, which shapes all experience” (Ratcliffe [2009], 180).  He regards James’ work 
on emotion, particularly the feelings of reality as discussed in Varieties, as an important 
influence in this respect.  Ratcliffe writes, “By ‘feelings of reality’, I think James means 
something very similar to what I have described using the term ‘existential feeling’” 
(Ratcliffe [2008], 244).  Ultimately, both philosophers are concerned with highlighting 
the primordial feelings that underlie an individual’s particular activities and beliefs.  
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Ratcliffe, like Heidegger, approaches this relationship by emphasizing the pre-reflective 
world that we always-already find ourselves in.  James, on the other hand, highlights the 
background role these feelings have within a state of consciousness.  These are two 
different ways of approaching the same self-world relation.  Ratcliffe gets there via the 
world, whereas James comes by way of the self.   
     By existential feelings, Ratcliffe has in mind the following kinds of feelings: 
People talk of feeling conspicuous, alive, distant, dislodged, overwhelmed, cut 
off, lost, disconnected, out of sorts, out of touch with things, out of it, not quite 
with it, separate, detached, at one with the world, in harmony with things, and part 
of things. There are feelings of being, unreality, heightened reality, surreality, 
familiarity, unfamiliarity, strangeness, isolation, emptiness, belonging, being at 
home in the world, being at one with things, significance, and insignificance, and 
the list goes on (Ratcliffe [2009], 181). 
Ratcliffe admits that this list is incomplete, but it is certainly more extensive than the 
feelings of reality that James’ discusses.  This is because Ratcliffe does not limit his 
account to religious orientations to the world, but considers all feelings that are associated 
with this self-world relation.  There is clearly a considerable overlap, however.60  
Feelings of aliveness, detachment, disconnectedness, being in harmony, etc., can all be 
found in James’ account.  
     Although James and Ratcliffe are referring to the same affective category, there are 
some notable differences between their views.  One significant difference concerns the 
relationship between these self-world feelings and occurrent emotions.  Ratcliffe 
distinguishes existential feelings from emotions on the basis that they concern a sense of 
belongingness to the world.  In this way, he regards existential feelings as 
                                                
60
 This is in part due to James’ broad definition of religion.  He defines religion as "the feelings, acts, and 
experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to 
whatever they may consider the divine" ([1902], 36).  In fact, for James everyone has a religion insofar as 
everyone has a ‘total reaction to life’.  
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phenomenologically prior to emotions.  For example, in order to experience anger at an 
injustice within the world, one must already have a particular sense of belonging.  If one 
feels completely disconnected from the world, one would not be roused into anger in the 
first place.  Ratcliffe nevertheless concedes that some emotions are also existential 
feelings; that the two affective categories are not absolutely distinct.  He provides the 
example of intense grief, which is not only directed toward a particular thing, but also 
takes the “form of an all-enveloping alteration of relatedness to things” (Ratcliffe [2009], 
182).  Most emotions for Ratcliffe, however, are not existential feelings.  They do not 
have this sense of belonging to a world, but rather presuppose it.  Since we are always in 
an existential feeling of some kind or another, he seems committed to the view that 
during most emotional experiences, an individual feels both the emotion directed toward 
a particular object and the background existential feeling; that they are two separate 
feelings within consciousness.  
     Since James regards feelings of reality as a kind of emotion, he would reject 
Ratcliffe’s distinguishing existential feelings from most emotions on the basis of a sense 
of belonging to a world.  All coarse emotions for James have this feature, but we are less 
likely to recognize it because they most often last for brief periods of time.  When in a 
state of fear, for example, the fear is not only directed toward an object, but our entire 
orientation to the world is framed by a dangerous reality.  Take the fear of a predatory 
animal.  In such a circumstance, we are simply unable to think of anything happy or 
serene because our entire sense of reality is imbued with a sense of danger.  The same is 
true of happiness.  As James says:  
[H]appiness, like every other emotional state, has blindness and insensibility to 
opposing facts given it as its instinctive weapon for self-protection against 
disturbance.  When happiness is actually in possession, the thought of evil can no 
more acquire the feeling of reality than thought of good can gain reality when 
melancholy rules ([1902], 86). 
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All coarse emotions for James reorient one’s relation to the world.61  
     Of particular relevance to this reorientation to the world that an occurrent emotion 
temporarily brings is James’ previous essay The Physical Basis of Emotion.  He is clear 
that it is not a particular object that indirectly causes an emotional reaction, but the entire 
situation of which the object is a part.   
‘Objects’ are certainly the primitive arousers of instinctive reflex movements.  
But they take their place, as experience goes on, as elements in total ‘situations,’ 
the other suggestions of which may prompt to movements of an entirely different 
sort.  As soon as an object has become thus familiar and suggestive, its emotional 
consequences, on any theory of emotion, must start rather from the total situation 
which it suggests than from its own naked presence ([1894], 206). 
There is an important difference between seeing a bear caged up in a zoo and seeing a 
bear in the wild.  It is a difference between a reality that is safe versus one that is 
dangerous.  A particular object may indirectly cause our emotional reactions, but that 
object is itself part of a contextual setting.  It is this ‘total situation’ that ultimately sets 
off the emotional response.  An emotion then is ultimately a response to one’s “total 
situation”.  It concerns one’s entire sense of reality. 
     This lends further support to the thesis that feelings of reality are emotions for James 
since all emotions confer a sense of reality.  It follows that on James’ view, when we are 
in the midst of an occurrent emotion, we do not experience both the occurrent emotion 
and the feeling of reality.  Instead, the occurrent emotion replaces the background feeling 
of reality for this brief period of time.  In this way, James’ view differs from Ratcliffe’s, 
but is similar to Damasio’s.  According to Damasio: 
                                                
61
 As for subtle emotions, it seems to be different.  Here James’ acceptance of mental combination in some 
circumstances would seem to be involved.  The subtle emotion would be one feeling and the baseline 
feeling of reality another. 
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A background feeling corresponds instead to the body state prevailing between 
emotions.  When we feel happiness, anger, or another emotion, the background 
feeling has been superseded by an emotional feeling (Damasio [1994], 150). 
It is not that both feelings are felt in consciousness during an occurrent emotional 
episode, but rather the occurrent emotion supersedes the feeling of reality.  I will return to 
this question of the relationship between feelings of reality and occurrent emotions later 
in this chapter, after having presented James’ view of transformational emotions.     
     Another difference between James and Ratcliffe concerns the role of the body in these 
self-world feelings.  In Varieties, James is not concerned with the physiological 
component of emotion, and consequently does not inquire into the bodily role of feelings 
of reality.  Speaking of feelings of reality, he says: 
For the psychologists the tracing of the organic seat of such a feeling would form 
a pretty problem – nothing could be more natural than to connect it with the 
muscular sense, with the feeling that our muscles were innervating themselves for 
action… But with such vague conjectures we have no concern at present, for our 
interest lies with the faculty rather than with its organic seat ([1902], 63-4). 
While the physiological aspect is not James’ concern, it is a safe assumption that he 
would regard the bodily sounding board to be continually at work with respect to feelings 
of reality.  In The Gospel of Relaxation, published only a couple years prior to Varieties, 
he does discuss more background feelings and this is the view that he takes ([1899]).   
     Ratcliffe, meanwhile, draws explicit attention to the bodily component of existential 
feelings, and argues that they are bodily feelings.  Most often we regard bodily feelings 
as states that have the body as an object – for example, a pain in one’s foot is a bodily 
feeling insofar as it is about a part of the body.  According to Ratcliffe, there is a second 
kind of bodily feeling, which does not have the body as an object, but rather works 
through the body and projects a feeling outward onto the world.  As he says, it “is a 
feeling done by the body that has something other than the body as its object” (Ratcliffe 
[2008], 88).  In this way, Ratcliffe distinguishes his view from Damasio, who regards 
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background feelings as more traditional bodily feelings.  Moreover, he distinguishes his 
account from Michael Stocker and Peter Goldie who regard emotional feelings as 
consisting of bodily and non-bodily feelings (Ratcliffe [2008], 35).  Ratcliffe notes that 
this duality between bodily and non-bodily feelings is not felt within emotional 
experience itself; and that Goldie and Stocker are therefore “mistaken in claiming that 
there are two different kinds of feelings involved” (Ratcliffe [2008], 34).  There is a 
tension here in Ratcliffe’s account.  When discussing the phenomenology of emotional 
experience, he notes that there is a single undivided feeling.  However, given the way he 
distinguishes existential feelings from most emotions, he seems committed to the view 
that both feelings are experienced within consciousness. 
     James would certainly agree with Ratcliffe’s assessment regarding the 
phenomenology of emotional experience – that the feeling is unified.  Nevertheless, as I 
have argued in Chapter 2, emotions for James are bi-directional feelings, which consist of 
bodily feelings and an outward-directed sense of reality.  However, the emotional feeling 
as it is immediately experienced is single and undivided.  The subsequent division into a 
bodily and non-bodily feeling is an abstraction about experience that can be helpful in 
understanding the nature of these feelings, but this division is not intrinsic to them.   
While James would agree with Ratcliffe’s phenomenological account, he would not want 
to call these feelings bodily feelings.  The feelings certainly have a physiological basis, 
but it is rather odd to speak of a “feeling done by the body” that does not have the body 
as an object.  Ultimately, the difference between Ratcliffe and James appears to be rather 
minor as they are simply calling the same phenomenon by a different name – bodily 
feeling as opposed to feeling.  
     It goes without saying that for Ratcliffe we are continually in an existential feeling of 
some kind as we can never step outside of the self-world relation.  James, however, is not 
clear on this matter.  At one point he says that “in some degree every one possesses” 
feelings of reality ([1902], 39).  However, he later says that “One may indeed be entirely 
without them; probably more than one of you here present is without them in any marked 
degree” ([1902], 72).  James is referring specifically to those individuals that he calls 
rationalists, who insist “that all our beliefs ought ultimately to find for themselves 
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articulate grounds” and that “vague impressions of something indefinable have no place” 
([1902], 72-73).  An individual with such an outlook, many of whom James was certainly 
speaking to in his lectures, would certainly argue that their beliefs about the world are not 
rooted in any such feelings but are rather “definitely statable abstract principles” ([1902], 
72-3).  It is not clear how to read James’ inconsistency on this point.  It seems most likely 
that he is placating to certain members of his audience, who would surely reject that they 
experience anything like feelings of reality.  Of course, the denial that certain feelings 
exist does not prove their non-existence.   
     Ratcliffe’s treatment of existential feelings in and of themselves is certainly more 
developed than James’ discussion of feelings of reality.  This is no doubt a result of their 
respective inquiries.  James engages with these feelings only insofar as it contributes to 
his discussion of religious experience.  Meanwhile, Ratcliffe’s explicit focus is on 
feelings of being in general.  However, because of their different purposes, James pays 
considerable attention to aspects that Ratcliffe neglects.  First, he considers the 
underlying condition of what he calls the divided self, which can include cases in which 
an individual’s feelings of reality are no longer in accord with their activities and pursuits 
within the world.  Second, he focuses on conversion experiences, which brings to the fore 
the interconnection between feelings of reality and another distinct kind of emotion – 
transformational emotions.  
 
6.3 The Divided Self and Conversion 
Before looking at the nature of transformational emotions, it is important to first consider 
the psychic conditions that need to be in place in order for the kind of conversions that 
James is interested in to occur; namely, those conversions in which a previously divided 
self becomes unified.  In this respect, his chapter on “The Divided Self” serves as a 
bridge between his previous chapter on “The Sick Soul” and his two subsequent chapters 
on “Conversion”.  The process of religious transformation, from non-belief to belief (or 
vice versa), involves an intermediary stage of conflict in which the self is divided.  James 
is not explicit about what the psychological nature of a divided self consists in.  James 
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discusses a number of examples, and given his analysis, it seems there are in fact two 
ways in which this division can occur.  The first kind of divided self involves a conflict 
between two different habitual centres of personal energy.  The second is a conflict 
within a single habitual centre of personal energy.  I will discuss these in turn, as the 
distinction is important for distinguishing between different kinds of conversions. 
     The most notorious kind of divided self involves cases in which there is a battle of two 
opposing wills within an individual.  Augustine, who James discusses at length, nicely 
represents this kind of division.  Augustine’s well-known struggle, recounted in his 
Confessions, involved choosing between a life of bodily pleasures versus a life of purity 
and devotion to God.  These two modes of being, as Augustine conceived of them, could 
not be reconciled.  Even though he knew that his devotion to God and a pure, chaste life 
was what he ultimately wanted, he struggled from a weakness of will to act accordingly.  
Augustine describes this weakness as:    
…a disease of the mind, which does not wholly rise to the heights where it is 
lifted by the truth, because it is weighed down by habit.  So there are two wills in 
us, because neither by itself is the whole will, and each possesses what the other 
lacks (Augustine [1961], 172). 
Augustine’s struggle was one between two conflicting habitual centres of personal 
energy, each corresponding to one of his wills.  Of course, these opposing wills are built 
upon conflicting feelings of reality.  Sometimes Augustine would relate to the world in a 
healthy-minded way, characteristic of his largely pagan upbringing, and other times in a 
more austere saintliness way.  Only gradually did Augustine’s will for a pure, austere life 
devoted to God drive out the more ingrained habitual mode of being.  It was largely 
through conscious effort that Augustine was able to gradually replace this dominant 
habitual centre with the one of his explicit choosing.  He knew the kind of person that he 
wanted to be, but it took time for the more dominant habitual centre to be driven out by 
his will to believe.   
     The second kind of divided self that James discusses does not involve the traditional 
battle of wills that we see in Augustine, but a division within a single habitual centre of 
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personal energy.  We saw previously that a habitual centre of personal energy consists of 
a system of ideas that motivates a habitual pattern of aims and activities within the world.  
At the foundation of this system are feelings of reality, which function much like the 
foundation of a building.  A self can become divided when the feelings of reality no 
longer align with the habitual aims and activities of the individual.  In such 
circumstances, the aims and activities that previously animated an individual begin to 
lose their motivational force, and “for a time keep upright by dead habit” ([1902], 184). 
     This is the situation that Tolstoy found himself in, who James discusses at 
considerable length.  At the height of Tolstoy’s fame, living a life that outwardly seemed 
ideal, he came to view the world and his existence within it as pointless.  His previous 
aims and activities as a writer, husband and father, no longer motivated him.  As Tolstoy 
says:  
I felt that what I had been standing on had collapsed and that I had nothing left 
under my feet. What I had lived on no longer existed, and there was nothing left 
(Tolstoy [1998]: 11).   
According to James’ framework, Tolstoy’s feelings of reality that had supported and 
underpinned his previous aims and activities had been uprooted.  He no longer saw 
himself as part of an intellectual and artistic community that was doing a great service for 
humanity.  Rather, he came to regard these activities as immoral.  What was previously a 
self-world relation characterized by feelings of connection and vigor was now one of 
disconnection and foreboding.  As James says of Tolstoy: “Life had been enchanting, it 
was now flat sober, more than sober, dead.  Things were meaningless whose meaning had 
always been self-evident” ([1902], 142).  In short, Tolstoy’s self-world relation had 
fundamentally transformed.  In order to overcome the divided state that he now found 
himself in, another transformation would be necessary.  Yet, for a period of time, Tolstoy 
went through the motions of his previous aims and activities.  James characterizes 
Tolstoy’s situation nicely when he says: “A mental system may be undermined or 
weakened by this interstitial alteration just as a building is, and yet for a time keep 
upright by dead habit” ([1902], 184).  This “interstitial alteration” refers to the shift in 
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feelings of reality.  With this shift in the foundation of the mental system, the conditions 
are ripe for the unsupported edifice of ideas and activities to crumble by way of a 
transformative experience. 
     There is an important difference to note between these two kinds of divided selves.  
The self divided by two opposing wills most often has the intellectual knowledge about 
what he or she ought to do.  The trouble is acting in accordance with this knowledge, 
which Augustine’s struggle nicely illustrates.  Tolstoy, meanwhile, lacked knowledge of 
what he ought to do.  He felt lost, and went on a search to try and find answers to his 
predicament.  It is the kind of divided self that we see in Tolstoy that most interests James 
in Varieties.  While Tolstoy’s own conversion process was more gradual, the nature of 
his kind of divided self can often give rise to instantaneous conversions, in which a new 
orientation to the world is put in place by a transformative affective experience.    
     Much of Varieties is dedicated to understanding the process of conversion – how it is 
that an individual’s religious beliefs can radically transform, and in the process overcome 
a divided nature.  This conversion process involves a complete reorientation to the world.  
This can occur in either a gradual or in a sudden way, which James distinguishes as the 
‘volitional’ and ‘self-surrender’ type of conversion ([1902], 192).  Transformations that 
are gradual tend to be more volitional, while transformations that are sudden tend to be 
involuntary.  James admits that this is a very rough distinction, as most conversions 
involve both voluntary and involuntary aspects.  Nevertheless, he is clearly more 
interested in sudden conversions.  As he says, conversions brought about by volition are 
“as a rule less interesting than those of the self-surrender type” ([1902], 193).  Whereas 
willful conversions come from within the individual, those who have experienced 
involuntary transformations describe them as coming from an outside power.  James was 
particularly interested in self-surrender transformations in part because he saw them as 
supporting a view of the brain that transmits consciousness rather than produces it.62 In 
                                                
62 This is discussed in James’ Human Immortality (1898), in which he argues that physiological psychology 
is consistent with the possibility of human immortality.  Alva Noë has recently argued against the 
productive theory of the brain, although he does not draw any metaphysical conclusions from this (Noë 
[2009]). 
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fact, it is these sudden conversion experiences, in conjunction with mystical experiences, 
that provides the basis for James’ ‘over-belief’ in Varieties.63 
     Instantaneous conversions of the self-surrender kind were certainly not a priority for 
James in The Principles.  Nevertheless, at the end of his chapter on “The Perception of 
Reality” he does mention them.  
Nature sometimes, and indeed not very infrequently, produces instantaneous 
conversions for us.  She suddenly puts us in an active connection with objects of 
which she had till then left us cold.  "I realize for the first time," we then say, 
"what that means!"  This happens often with moral propositions.  We have often 
heard them; but now they shoot into our lives; they move us; we feel their living 
force.  Such instantaneous beliefs are truly enough not to be achieved by will 
([1890], 2: 322). 
While James recognizes in The Principles that such involuntary conversions do occur, his 
account of them is vague to say the least, content to say that it is something “nature” 
does.  He certainly had the theoretical tools at the time of The Principles to offer a more 
detailed framework of these phenomena, but as I noted in the previous chapter, he is not 
as willing at this time to invoke the subconscious realm in his explanations.  This changes 
in Varieties, which enables him to provide a much richer analysis.  However, James still 
admits that such sudden conversions are difficult to grasp theoretically.   
Now if you ask of psychology just how the excitement shifts in a man’s mental 
system, and why aims that were peripheral become at a certain moment central, 
psychology has to reply that although she can give a general description of what 
happens, she is unable in a given case to account accurately for all the single 
forces at work.  Neither an outside observer nor the Subject who undergoes the 
                                                
63 James says, “The whole drift of my education goes to persuade me that the world of our present 
consciousness is only one out of many worlds of consciousness that exist, and that those other worlds must 
contain experiences which have a meaning for our life also; and that although in the main their experiences 
and those of this world keep discrete, yet the two become continuous at certain points, and higher energies 
filter in” ([1902], 463). 
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process can explain fully how particular experiences are able to change one’s 
centre of energy so decisively ([1902], 183-4). 
There is a complexity to transformational experiences that the “hackneyed symbolism of 
a mechanical equilibrium” cannot fully account for ([1902], 183-184).  Nevertheless, it is 
a model of mechanical equilibrium that James utilizes, one that makes considerable use 
of the subconscious realm.  In the next section, I consider James’ theoretical account of 
conversion experiences, to which transformational emotions and feelings of reality figure 
prominently. 
 
6.4 Transformational Emotions 
For the most part, James’ pervasive discussion of emotion within Varieties can be 
distilled down to two kinds of emotions.  I have already looked at feelings of reality, 
which provide the background orientation through which an individual engages with the 
world.  In this section, I consider transformational emotions.  This is not James’ term, but 
it will help to articulate his account of conversion experiences.  Keith Oatley and Maja 
Djikic have called attention to the important role that emotions play in transformative 
experiences for James (Oatley & Djikic [2002]).  However, their analysis fails to capture 
the depth of James’ theoretical framework.  They are content to say that, “Conversion, 
then, is an invariably emotional process, a shift from one emotional centre to another” 
(Oatley & Djikic [2002]).  They do not provide any detail as to what this emotional 
process consists of.  For example, there is not any discussion of feelings of reality, nor is 
there any sustained discussion as to the features of transformational emotions themselves. 
     Unlike most emotions, transformational emotions are not structured by habitual 
reactions to the world, be it to a particular object or circumstance.  As we saw in Chapter 
4, most of an adult’s emotional reactions for James are structured by habits.  These 
reactions are not blind instinctual responses but have been learned over time, and as such 
there is an awareness of the ends to which the emotion leads.  Transformational emotions 
bear a resemblance to blind emotions insofar as the ends of the emotion are not known.  
The primary feelings within which these emotions are embedded are thereby extremely 
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passive states.  However, they can be distinguished from blind emotions in that they serve 
to break and overturn previous habitual patterns of being, and lay the groundwork for a 
new self-world orientation, upon which new habits – including emotional habits – can be 
built. 
     James is interested in the process by which an individual in a religiously divided state 
becomes psychically unified, particularly those involving a discord between an 
individual’s feelings of reality and his or her habitual aims and activities within the 
world.  Transformational emotions are central to this unification process, but they are not 
limited to these occasions.  They can equally bring an individual from a state of 
unification into a divided state.  Ultimately, transformational emotions reorient an 
individual’s perspective, and this can fracture a previously unified way of being as much 
as it can unify a previously fractured way of being.  In addition, transformational 
emotions are not limited to the religious domain.  James discusses how similar processes 
are at work when individuals fall in and out of love ([1902], 141).64  He also provides an 
example of a miser who instantaneously changed his miserly ways ([1902], 166-7).  What 
is perhaps most important to the transformational emotions that James discusses in 
Varieties is their relation to the subconscious regions of the personality.65  
     The role of the subconscious in transformative experiences is most clearly evident in 
what James calls the self-surrender kind of conversion, which tends to be sudden and 
instantaneous.  In cases of self-surrender, the divided individual has grown so weary of 
life that he or she essentially gives up.  The habitual aims and activities, which are no 
                                                
64
 Philippe Pinel provides a detailed example in this respect: “A young man was unable to obtain the hand 
of someone with whom he had fallen hopelessly in love.  His offers were disdainfully rejected by her 
parents.  He became taciturn, unresponsive to all pleasures and entertained only suspicious and sinister 
forebodings.  He lost his temper over the most trivial things and fell alternately into a state of 
discouragement and utter perplexity.  The company of his friends became more and more of a burden and 
he ended up in a state of a true melancholic delirium” (Pinel [1809], 15). 
65
 This is not to say that all transformational emotions have deep connections to the subconscious.  
Dramatic and shocking external events experienced by an individual can also induce a transformational 
emotion.   
128 
 
longer supported by the feelings of reality, are finally renounced.  According to James, 
such individuals get: 
…so exhausted with the struggle that we have to stop, - so we drop down, give 
up, and don’t care any longer.  Our emotional brain-centres strike work, and we 
lapse into temporary apathy.  Now there is documentary proof that this state of 
temporary exhaustion not infrequently forms part of the conversion crisis ([1902], 
197). 
It is under these conditions of exhaustion, with the will surrendered, that the boundary 
between the subconscious and consciousness relaxes.  Given the right kind of external 
stimulus, this levee can break, and a wave of emotional feeling then floods into 
consciousness.  In this respect, James agrees with Starbuck, who also attributes an 
important role to the subconscious in conversion experiences.66   
He (Starbuck) seems right in conceiving all such sudden changes as results of 
special cerebral functions unconsciously developing until they are ready to play a 
controlling part, when they make irruption into the conscious life.  When we 
speak of sudden ‘conversion’ I shall make as much use as I can of this hypothesis 
of subconscious incubation ([1902], 168). 
Most conversions that James discusses involve elements that are both involuntary and 
voluntary, and the distinction between sudden and gradual conversions is most often 
blurred in practice.  As he says, most conversions are “due to explicitly conscious 
processes of thought and will, but as due largely also to the subconscious incubation and 
maturing of motives deposited by the experiences of life” ([1902], 213).  These voluntary 
and involuntary aspects are interwoven, as willful effort once ceased can subsequently be 
taken up further in the subconscious domain ([1902], 191).   
                                                
66 Edwin Starbuck was a student of James’ at Harvard.  His work in the psychology of religion was a 
valuable resource to James in Varieties. 
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     We see this close connection between willful effort and the subconscious in Tolstoy.  
As a result of his crisis, in which he came to regard the world as intrinsically evil and 
wicked, the only rational conclusion he saw fit was to commit suicide.  Yet, he was 
motivated by a non-rational force that directed him away from this course of action. 
Reason worked, but something else was also working which I can only call a 
consciousness of life. A force was working which compelled me to turn my 
attention to this and not to that; and it was this force which extricated me from my 
desperate situation and turned my mind in quite another direction (Tolstoy [1998], 
31). 
Tolstoy’s gradual conversion process clearly involved both involuntary and voluntary 
components, inextricably woven together.  Even in cases of gradual conversion then, in 
which conscious effort is more pronounced, there are still often instances of sudden 
insights within the protracted process.67   
     The actual conversion experience occurs when the subconscious regions of the 
personality break into consciousness in the form of a transformational emotion.  The 
examples that James discusses are most often set off by seemingly uneventful external 
events.  For example, in a footnote James cites the transformational experience of John 
Stuart Mill, which although more moral than religious in nature, nicely reveals this 
transformative kind of emotion.  At the age of twenty, Mill suffered from a deep 
depression, and like Tolstoy he came to seriously question the meaning of his existence.  
He continued in this divided state for a period of time, until one day he read a particular 
passage from a book.  Mill here recounts his transformative experience: 
I frequently asked myself, if I could, or if I was bound to go on living, when life 
must be passed in this manner. I generally answered to myself that I did not think 
                                                
67
 We see such instances within Augustine’s more gradual, willful conversion.  For example when he 
describes the impact of reading Cicero’s Hortensius had on him: “It altered my outlook on life.  It changed 
my prayers to you, O Lord, and provided me with new hopes and aspirations.  All my empty dreams 
suddenly lost their charm and my heart began to throb with a bewildering passion for the wisdom of eternal 
truth” (Augustine [1961], 58-59). 
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I could possibly bear it beyond a year.  When, however, not more than half that 
duration of time had elapsed, a small ray of light broke in upon my gloom. I was 
reading, accidentally, Marmontel’s Mémoires, and came to the passage which 
relates his father’s death, the distressed position of the family, and the sudden 
inspiration by which he, then a mere boy, felt and made them feel that he would 
be everything to them—would supply the place of all that they had lost. A vivid 
conception of the scene and its feelings came over me, and I was moved to tears. 
From this moment my burden grew lighter. The oppression of the thought that all 
feeling was dead within me was gone (Mill [2004], 81). 
Although Mill’s transformational process was gradual in nature, it had instances of 
sudden insight along the way, as can be seen by the transformational emotion described 
in the passage above.  This experience reoriented Mill’s perspective on the world, and 
directly resulted in a number of changes to his philosophical beliefs.  For example, from 
this experience, he came to reject the doctrine of psychological egoism in favour of a 
view in which altruism could motivate action (Mill [2004, 83].  It is also from this 
experience that his view on free will shifted from a hard determinist position to that of 
soft determinism (Mill [2004, 98]).  In addition, Mill came to see that happiness as an end 
is best pursued indirectly rather than directly, which would later inform his utilitarian 
theory (Mill [2004], 82).   
     James, of course, is more interested in explicitly religious conversions.  One of the 
examples he cites is that of David Brainerd, who suddenly went from a “mournful 
melancholy state” to one of “unspeakable glory” ([1902], 198).   
…as I was walking in a thick grove, unspeakable glory seemed to open to the 
apprehension of my soul.  I do not mean any external brightness, nor any 
imagination of a body of light, but it was a new inward apprehension or view that 
I had of God… I continued in this state of inward joy, peace, and astonishment, 
till near dark without any sensible abatement; and then began to think and 
examine what I had seen; and felt sweetly composed in my mind all the evening 
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following.  I felt myself in a new world, and everything about me appeared with a 
different aspect from what it was wont to do ([1902], 198-199). 
Similarly to Mill’s experience, Brainerd’s transformational emotional experience is not 
caused by a dramatic external event.  Rather it is a process that is working through him, 
which for James involves “subconscious incubation”.  Moreover, there is a clear 
articulation by Brainerd of an entirely new perspective of the world, which is brought 
about by the transformational emotion.68 
     Having presented a number of cases of sudden conversion experiences, such as the 
Brainerd example above, James then provides a theoretical framework in an attempt to 
explain these phenomena.   
In a large proportion, perhaps the majority, of reports, the writers speak as if the 
exhaustion of the lower and the entrance of the higher emotion were 
simultaneous, yet often again they speak as if the higher actively drove the lower 
out.  This is undoubtedly true in a great many instances… But often there seems 
little doubt that both conditions – subconscious ripening of the one affection and 
exhaustion of the other must simultaneously have conspired, in order to produce 
the result ([1902], 199). 
The “higher emotion”, with its “subconscious ripening” is what I am referring to as the 
transformational emotion.  While it is directed toward a particular thing or event in the 
world (such as Marmontel’s Mémoirs for Mill) its intensity derives from the 
“subconscious ripening”.  By “the lower emotion” James seems to be referring to the 
feelings of reality, which were previously felt before “the higher emotion” came into 
consciousness.  However, it is not that the two feelings – the previous feelings of reality 
and the transformational emotion – are felt at the same time during the conversion 
                                                
68 Following James, a number of more recent kinds of transformational experiences have been collected, 
documented and analyzed by psychologists William Miller and Janet C’de Baca in Quantum Change 
(Miller & C’de Baca [2001]). 
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experience.  Rather, it is a single process in which the ‘transformational emotion’ drives 
out the old feelings of reality.  As James says in a footnote to the above passage:  
Describing the whole phenomenon as a change of equilibrium, we might say that 
the movement of new psychic energies towards the personal centre and the 
recession of old ones towards the margin were only two ways of describing an 
indivisible event ([1902], 199fn). 
The “higher emotion” is transformational precisely because the old feelings of reality are 
permanently removed from consciousness.  Once the intensity of the ‘transformational 
emotion’ has subsided, the individual’s perspective on the world has been restructured in 
some respect, which is reflected by new feelings of reality.  This is what accounts for the 
“change of equilibrium”.   
     The transformational emotion is thereby a kind of bridge between two different 
orientations to the world.  As James says of these kinds of “emotions characteristic of 
conversion”: 
Emotional occasions, especially violent ones, are extremely potent in precipitating 
mental rearrangements.  The sudden and explosive ways in which love, jealousy, 
guilt, fear, remorse, or anger can seize upon one are known to everybody.  Hope, 
happiness, security, resolve, emotions characteristic of conversion, can be equally 
explosive.  And emotions that come in this explosive way seldom leave things as 
they found them ([1902], 184-5). 
Out of this shake up of the mental system, caused by the transformational emotion, an 
individual’s baseline feelings of reality change.  As James says, there is “a transfiguration 
of the face of nature in his eyes.  A new heaven seems to shine upon a new earth” 
([1902], 142).  The process of conversion thereby involves three successive emotions: the 
old feeling of reality, the transformational emotion, and the new feeling of reality. 
     James’ emphasis on transformational emotions has deep connections to the 
subconscious, but they can also be brought about by dramatic external events.  Ratcliffe’s 
example of intense grief, often caused by the death of a loved one, provides a good 
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example.  Ratcliffe conceives of the intense grief as an instance in which the categories of 
emotion and existential feeling overlap.  However, it seems that we can better 
characterize this intense grief as a transformational emotion that subsequently puts in 
place new feelings of reality.  We have here two feelings, not one.  Ratcliffe’s view that 
existential feelings are phenomenologically prior to emotions is thereby called into 
question by transformational emotions.  After all, an emotional experience can entirely 
change our sense of belonging to the world.    
    There has been little attention paid to transformational emotions within the history of 
philosophy.69  Sartre describes emotions as ‘transformations of the world’ (une 
transformation du monde), but these transformations are short-terms states (Sartre 
[1939]).  Once the emotional state ceases, the individual’s experience of the world is not 
transformed in any way.  With respect to more contemporary philosophers, 
transformational emotions have been neglected.70   This seems to be because 
transformational emotions challenge the presuppositions of the standard philosophical 
theories.  Contemporary theorists tend to agree that emotions are about objects in the 
world.  Where they disagree is with respect to the nature of the intentional content that 
emotions have.  According to cognitive theorists, emotions are essentially beliefs or 
judgments.  Transformational emotions, however, are not judgments.  These emotions, at 
least those that James describes, emanate directly from the subconscious region of the 
individual.  Once made conscious, these feelings do not express knowledge about reality 
but rather acquaintance with reality.  Moreover, the feeling element of an emotion on a 
cognitive theory is subordinate to the judgment.  In this way, our emotional reactions, 
which emanate from our emotional dispositions, can only ever express what we already 
know to be the case.  For example, if I get angry when somebody steals my car, this 
                                                
69 There has been more emphasis on these kinds of emotions within the history of psychiatry.  For example, 
the French psychiatrist Jean-Étienne Esquirol, in his treatment of melancholy, notes: “A sudden, strong, 
and unexpected emotion, a surprise, fear and terror, have sometimes been successful” (Esquirol [1845], 
229).  In this way, transformational emotions have been induced by clinicians in order to reorient the 
baseline feelings of reality of their patients. 
70Jon Elster discusses transformational emotions in a different sense.  He focuses on how we often 
transform or ‘transmute’ our real motivations into ones that are more acceptable to us.  For example, 
instead of acting out of envy or jealousy, we tell ourselves that we are acting out of justice (Elster [1999]). 
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anger, according to a cognitivist, is essentially my knowledge that I have incurred an 
injustice.  But this knowledge is based on a complex history in which I have come to 
associate theft with anger.  With a transformational emotion on the other hand, there is no 
prior knowledge to support the purported judgment.  The previous feelings of reality have 
been wiped away.  There is only an intense feeling, one that most often does not align 
with what the individual previously knew about the world.   
     Transformational emotions also pose a challenge to perceptual theories, which regard 
emotion as generally analogous to visual perception.  These theories take a middle 
ground between non-cognitive feeling theories, which face problems accounting for the 
intentionality of emotion, and cognitive theories, which tend to over-intellectualize the 
emotions.  Like visual perceptions, emotions are at once directed toward objects in the 
world and are thus intentional and yet they are not propositional beliefs about the world.  
However, there is nothing in the domain of visual perception that is analogous to 
transformational emotions.  We do not experience visual perceptions that bring lasting 
changes to the way we perceive the world.  There are of course different ways of seeing, 
which ambiguous images such as the rabbit-duck illusion bring to light.  However, these 
illusions involve reverting back and forth between the different images.  The perceptions 
do not bring about a new and permanent way of seeing.   
     In short, both perceptual and cognitive theories – as well as the various theorists that 
regard emotions as having intentional content somewhere in between perceptions and 
beliefs – agree that emotions have a mind-to-world direction of fit.  In this way, emotions 
are intentional states that can be assessed for their rationality.  However, these theoretical 
accounts are insufficient to explain how transformational emotions can bring instant and 
lasting change to the way the world is perceived.  Indeed, these emotions are not only 
responses to objects in the world, but they also transform the world.  In so doing, 
transformational emotions provide a fertile ground for new beliefs about the world to 
grow.  Rather than the traditional Aristotelian model of moral psychology in which our 
emotions are gradually brought in line with our beliefs, in these cases it is our emotions 
that are the epistemic driver, and it is our beliefs that follow. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented two unique kinds of emotions that are central to James’ 
discussion within Varieties – feelings of reality and transformational emotions.  While 
James is concerned with these emotions in the religious domain, they clearly relate to all 
aspects of experience.  These emotions have important implications to James’ wider 
philosophy, which I have been unable to consider in this chapter.  For example, the 
interconnection between feelings of reality and transformational emotions is central to 
our notions of the self and personal identity.  James’ work on feelings of reality, most 
developed in Varieties, also seem important to his pragmatic theory of truth.  These 
questions, however, are beyond the scope of my project.   
     In the next chapter, I consider James’ famous essay The Will to Believe, paying 
particular attention to his notion of our passional nature. 
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7 The Passional Nature and The Will to Believe 
In Varieties, James is particularly interested with religious conversions that are 
involuntary and instantaneous.  When conversions occur in this way, there may be 
insufficient objective evidence to support the religious belief, but the transformative 
experience provides its own justification.  The individual’s feelings of reality have been 
reoriented, and he or she simply believes (or does not believe) as a matter of course.71  In 
The Will to Believe, published a few years prior to Varieties, James is also concerned 
with religious conversions, but those of a more voluntary kind.72  In these more willful 
cases of conversion problems seem to immediately arise.  First, there is the problem of 
possibility.  We may want certain propositions to be true, but this does not mean that we 
can will them to be true.  It seems that a power is being attributed to the will that it does 
not have.  Second, there is the problem of permissibility.  Supposing that it is possible in 
some sense to will to believe, it seems epistemically unlawful given that there is 
insufficient evidence to support the belief.   
     Supporters of James often reject the problem of possibility by noting that he does not 
invoke a voluntaristic conception of the will.  Rather, it is the question of permissibility 
that he is concerned with.  In other words, James is not so much concerned with the will 
to believe as he is with the right to believe (Franks [2004]; Gale [2009], Jackman [1999], 
Slater [2009]).  According to these advocates, James is ultimately arguing that religious 
belief is epistemically permissible given that it is a genuine option – that is, a hypothesis 
that is live, forced and momentous – where sufficient evidence is lacking.73  Even James 
would later remark, given the voluntaristic misinterpretations, that he should have called 
                                                
71
 The individual may subsequently reconsider how much epistemic weight to attribute to this single 
transformative experience.  In such a case, the self has returned to a divided state, and the religious question 
remains an open one.   
72
 At the same time, James is attempting to provide a justification of faith for those who already believe. 
73
 I will be discussing these three features of a genuine option throughout this chapter.  Briefly, a question 
is live if there is a preexistent feeling that inclines toward the belief.  A question is forced if it is an 
exclusive disjunction, meaning there is no possibility for an individual to remain indifferent to the 
hypothesis.  Finally, a question is momentous if it makes a significant difference in the life of an individual 
in believing versus not believing.  In other words, the question is not trivial. 
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his essay The Right to Believe ([1904], 600).74  This would certainly have obviated the 
problem of possibility and focused more attention on his epistemic argument.  Of course, 
criticism has also been levied against James on this front.  Critics argue that he is giving 
individuals a license for wishful thinking (Miller [1898]; Hick [1957]).  Just because 
there is insufficient evidence with respect to the existence of God, our believing that God 
exists does not make it the case.  Simply put, we do not have a right to make believe.  
     This emphasis on what we have a right to believe, while an important argument within 
the essay, continues to overlook James’ primary thesis.  He is not only arguing that it is 
permissible in certain circumstances to believe in God, but that individuals who find 
themselves in these circumstances ought to summon up their courage and believe.  This 
ought is not to be understood as a moral ought.  It is not that an individual is morally 
blameworthy if they do not believe under permissible circumstances.  Nor is it a 
prudential ought, whereby it is better for us if we believe, although this crude pragmatist 
reading is common.  Rather, the ought is what I am calling an existential ought, which 
maps onto what some existential writers call ‘authenticity’.75  For James, having the will 
to believe is about having the courage to act in the world according to one’s own 
convictions, which means having the courage to believe on the basis of one’s feelings.  
This believing and acting is not about being good or moral; it is about having the courage 
to be oneself.  Importantly, this does not involve transcending or abandoning reason.  
Unlike Kierkegaard’s leap of faith, James’ will to believe is presented to be eminently 
rational. 
     James’ primary thesis then is not an epistemic argument, but an existential argument, 
which I argue is captured by the will to believe.  In making this case, I will inquire into 
                                                
74
 James says: “I once wrote an essay on our right to believe, which I unluckily called The Will to Believe.  
All the critics, neglecting the essay, pounced upon the title. Psychologically it was impossible, morally it 
was iniquitous. The 'will to deceive,' the 'will to make-believe,' were wittily proposed as substitutes for it” 
([1904], 600). 
75 For Heidegger, authenticity is closely connected to Dasein coming out of the fog of the they-self; for 
Kierkegaard, it is connected to recognizing one’s particularity and individuality; for Sartre, authenticity is 
closely connected to not giving in to external, public pressures. 
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what James means by the passional nature, a concept that has received little serious 
investigation (Jackman [1999], 7).  By drawing upon James’ more extensive work in The 
Principles and Varieties, I hope to show that the passional nature with respect to belief 
extends further than commentators – critics and advocates alike – have recognized.76  It 
consists of three components: 1) a preexistent feeling for the belief (i.e. feelings of 
reality); 2) volitional effort that seizes upon this feeling and works toward the belief; and 
3) the emotional constitution of belief, in which the belief is consented to.77 These three 
components comprise James’ psychological thesis.  Only by understanding the full scope 
of the passional nature can we appreciate the various philosophical arguments that are 
interwoven throughout The Will to Believe.   
 
7.1 The Passional Nature 
It is no secret that the passional nature plays a pivotal role in the development of James’ 
argument.  It is referred to throughout the essay, including in critical passages.   
Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between 
propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided 
on intellectual grounds.  For to say, under such circumstances, “Do not decide, 
but leave the question open,” is itself a passional decision, - just like deciding yes 
or no, - and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth ([1897], 11). 
How James’ essay is interpreted depends largely on how the passional nature is 
interpreted.  Those who read him as a voluntarist conceive of the passional nature 
                                                
76
 It might be objected that this approach draws upon work at different stages in James’ career, which does 
not necessarily remain consistent.  However, I use these other works only to further develop what James 
already says in The Will to Believe.  The essay is short and complex, and in order to present it in its proper 
light a larger context is required. 
77 As we have seen, James uses the term belief in various ways.  It can refer to our conviction with respect 
to a sense of reality (i.e., our acquaintance with the world) or our conviction with respect to a proposition 
(i.e., our ‘knowledge about’ the world).  It is important to note that belief in The Will to Believe refers to 
our knowledge about the world.   
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exclusively in terms of volition and desire (Miller [1898]; Barrett [1978]).  On this 
reading, adopted by William Barrett, James is encouraging his reader “to produce out of 
oneself something that is not there to begin with” (Barrett [1978], 309).  In other words, 
James is attributing to the will a power that does not exist within it; namely the power to 
convince without any prior conviction for the belief.  This voluntaristic reading, if 
correct, would seem to undermine James’ entire argument.  Since we are unable to will to 
believe in this voluntaristic sense, the question of whether or not it is epistemically 
permissible to will to believe is a moot point.   
     This voluntarist reading might at first glance appear justifiable given that James is 
using the terms passional nature and willing nature synonymously throughout the 
essay.78  But James is very clear what he means by this latter term: 
When I say ‘willing nature,’ I do not mean only such deliberate volitions as may 
have set up habits of belief that we cannot now escape from, - I mean all such 
factors of belief as fear and hope, prejudice and passion, imitation and 
partisanship, the circumpressure of our caste and set.  As a matter of fact, we find 
ourselves believing, we hardly know how or why ([1897], 9). 
Our willing nature/passional nature is not reducible to our deliberate, voluntary decisions, 
but also includes all of those involuntary decisions based on our habits, emotions and 
feelings in which we simply “find ourselves believing”.   
     James then, as has been well documented, does not have a voluntaristic conception of 
the will (Brown [1997]; Franks [2004]; Jackman [1999]; Yeager [1989]).  He is not 
                                                
78
 While James does use these terms synonymously in the essay insofar as he is concerned with action, our 
passional nature is certainly more extensive than our willing nature.  We need only consider those instances 
in which we react emotionally but have no inclination to act, such as when watching an artistic 
performance.  In fact, in The Principles of Psychology, James distinguishes emotion from instinct on the 
basis that we need not act out of emotion.  In this way, an emotion can be experienced but there is no 
action.  Thus our passional nature is activated but not our willing nature.   
 
140 
 
arguing that we can simply believe whatever we want to believe by pure volition.  This is 
made evident throughout The Will to Believe. 
Can we, by any effort of our will, or by any strength of wish that it were true, 
believe ourselves well and about when we are roaring with rheumatism in bed, or 
feel certain that the sum of the two one-dollar bills in our pocket must be a 
hundred dollars? We can say any of these things, but we are absolutely impotent 
to believe them ([1897], 5). 
The reason we cannot believe these propositions is that we are already convinced 
otherwise by the facts.  When I see a red apple, I cannot will it to be blue.  The facts 
simply constrain my belief, and there is nothing that my will can do to change this.  As 
James says, “in our dealings with objective nature we obviously are recorders, not 
makers, of the truth” ([1897], 20).  We cannot help but believe in these instances.  With 
respect to other questions, however, we are not merely recorders of the truth, but active 
participants.   
When we look at certain facts, it seems as if our passional and volitional nature 
lay at the root of all our convictions.  When we look at others, it seems as if they 
could do nothing when the intellect had once said its say ([1897], 4). 
When empirical evidence for a particular question is lacking, the passional nature lies at 
the very foundation of belief.  If this passional nature is not reducible to volition and 
desire, the question remains what exactly does it consist of?   
     According to Yeager, the passional nature for James is the will, but it is not to be 
understood in a voluntaristic sense.  She says that the will for James is “a constellation of 
prerational passions and predispositions that constitute the indelible affective core of the 
individual personality” (Yeager [1989], 471).  Yeager accepts that this view is not 
consistent with James’ chapter on “The Will” in The Principles, where, for example, he 
says, “Effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of will” ([1890], 2: 562).  
However, she looks to other chapters within the treatise for support.  While Yeager 
purports to provide an analysis of the will she is in fact more concerned with what James 
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calls the willing nature.  These terms are not co-extensive for James.  Henry Jackman, 
meanwhile, has suggested that the passional nature, in addition to volition and desire, also 
includes feelings and emotions (Jackman [1999], 7).  This is certainly true, and while this 
helps to refute the voluntarist reading, it does little to shed light on other aspects of 
James’ paper.  Indeed, Jackman does not consider any of these components of the 
passional nature in detail.  
     For the remainder of this section, I will examine what the ‘passional nature’ with 
respect to belief consists in for James.  There are three components to the ‘passional 
nature’.  The first is a feeling foundation for the belief.  This comes to light when we 
consider James’ notion of liveness, which is the first of three conditions of a genuine 
option.  As Hunter Brown has illustrated, a hypothesis only becomes live for an 
individual when there is a preexistent feeling to believe it (Brown [1997], 98).  Simply 
wanting something to be the case is not enough for a hypothesis to become live.  As 
James says: 
If I ask you to believe in the Mahdi, the notion makes no electric connection with 
your nature, - it refuses to scintillate with any credibility at all.  As an hypothesis 
it is completely dead ([1897], 2).   
Where there is no electric connection to one’s nature, there is no feeling foundation for 
the belief.  For a hypothesis to be live, a preexisting feeling for the belief is required.  
Only then can our volitional effort be roused into action. 
     James makes reference to this foundational feeling that is necessary but not sufficient 
for belief when considering Pascal’s wager.  “It is evident that unless there be some pre-
existing tendency to believe in masses and holy water, the option offered to the will by 
Pascal is not a living option” ([1897], 6).  According to James, Pascal’s argument will 
necessarily fail for the individual who has no “pre-existing tendency to believe”; that is, 
no foundational feeling upon which the will can work on.  If, however, a preexisting 
feeling is in place, the result can be quite different.  As James says:  “Pascal’s argument, 
instead of being powerless, then seems a regular clincher, and is the last stroke needed to 
make our faith in masses and holy water complete” ([1897], 11).  Pascal’s argument can 
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be effective, according to James, depending on the feeling constitution of the particular 
individual.  If there is a feeling foundation already present that the argument resonates 
with, the belief can then be “clinched”.  The difference between the individual who 
accepts Pascal’s argument versus the individual who rejects it, often comes down to the 
foundational feelings of reality.  These feelings “have prepared the premises” for the 
belief ([1902], 73). 
     This “pre-existing tendency to believe” that James discusses in The Will to Believe is 
ultimately what he describes as feelings of reality in Varieties.  These feelings provide an 
individual with a foundational orientation to the world.  If the question of God’s 
existence is a live hypothesis for an individual, then there must already exist feelings of 
reality that can underpin this belief.  This does not mean that the individual fully believes, 
as there can also exist feelings of reality that incline the individual toward the opposite 
belief.  It is these conflicting feelings that ultimately produce a state of doubt ([1890], 2: 
393).  However, the possibility exists in these situations of conflict for the individual to 
attend to particular feelings of reality, and through conscious effort and volition, work 
toward fully believing.   
     Here we come to the second aspect of the passional nature – the volitional component.  
The volitional aspect of the passional nature highlights the effort put in by the individual 
to nurture and develop the preexisting feelings for the belief.  With respect to religious 
belief, this effort could come in the form of an individual engaging in the rituals and 
practices of a particular religion.  Although he or she does not yet fully believe, such 
actions can gradually bring about the belief.  As James says in The Principles: 
But gradually our will can lead us to the same results by a very simple method: 
we need only in cold blood ACT as if the thing in question were real, and keep 
acting as if it were real, and it infallibly end (sic) by growing into such a 
connection with our life that it will become real.  It will become so knit with habit 
and emotion that our interests in it will be those which characterize belief ([1890], 
2: 321). 
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Although actions that come from our conscious effort appear cold and calculating, they 
are nevertheless supported by underlying feelings.  Without this feeling foundation 
already in place, the individual would never be inclined to act in the first place.  The 
hypothesis would remain dead.  We saw this aspect emphasized in Chapter 6 with 
Augustine’s struggle.  Through conscious effort, Augustine was able to seize upon his 
feelings of reality that supported his Christian belief, and over time, as he overcame his 
divided state of being, he fully believed.  Without these preexistent feelings his willful 
conversion would never have occurred, as the possibility of a Christian God would have 
remained a dead hypothesis.   
     The feeling foundation of belief, and the volitional effort that seizes upon these 
feelings are not enough to bring about belief.  There is a third component to the passional 
nature in which the belief is consented to.  I call this the emotional constitution of belief.  
In The Principles, James notes that “In its inner nature, belief, or the sense of reality, is a 
sort of feeling more allied to the emotions than to anything else” ([1890], 2: 283).  
Specifically, belief is constituted by a feeling of consent, in which the reality of a state of 
affairs or the truth of a proposition is assented to ([1890], 2: 287).  This feeling brings us 
from a state of unrest and doubt to one of rest and belief.  A similar idea is presented in 
his earlier essay The Sentiment of Rationality.  Here James describes this transition from 
doubt to belief as a feeling of sufficiency, in which no more inquiry is needed to “explain 
it, account for it, or justify it” ([1879], 317).  In The Will to Believe, James refers to this 
emotional aspect of belief when he says that “there is something that gives a click inside 
of us” ([1897], 13).  This “click” is the feeling of sufficiency as described in The 
Sentiment of Rationality, and as a result of this feeling a previous state of doubt gives 
way to belief.  The two epistemic laws that James highlights in The Will to Believe – 
“Believe truth” and “Shun error” – further reveals this emotional constitution of belief 
([1897], 18).79  According to James, the drive to avoid error is motivated by fear, while 
the believing of truth is motivated by hope ([1897], 18-19).  These opposing laws often 
                                                
79
 Jackman regards these epistemic laws as referring to the emotional foundation of belief (Jackman 
[1999]).  This is not the case.  The tension between these epistemic laws rather reflects the emotional 
constitution of belief; that belief itself in cases of forced options is irreducibly emotional. 
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come into conflict, and depending on how this emotional tension is navigated, different 
individuals will have different believing constitutions.  Whether an individual is a 
gambling believer or a risk-averse believer is thereby part of their passional nature.   
     The latter two aspects of our passional nature can help to shed light on how James 
would respond to Bertrand Russell’s critique that James confuses belief with hypothesis-
adoption (Russell [1972]).  According to Russell, in cases where evidence is lacking we 
ought to proceed on the basis of a hypothesis not a belief.  To a certain extent, James 
would agree.  The individual who engages in the cold and willful action described above 
does not yet fully believe.  This kind of action, for example inquiring into or participating 
in a particular creed, practice, ritual, etc., can be construed as a kind of hypothesis 
adoption – that is, acting on the basis of a hunch in order to acquire more facts.  While an 
epistemic approach of hypothesis adoption can start off the volitional process, it is not 
sufficient for James.  This is because James construes belief in terms of action, and those 
individuals who remain in a hypothesis adoption state will not be inclined to act in the 
world as if the belief were true.  
     In this section, I have attempted to flesh out James’ conception of the passional nature 
with respect to belief.  It consists of three elements: 1) a preexistent feeling for the belief, 
2) volitional effort that seizes upon this preexistent feeling, and 3) the emotional 
constitution of belief that finally consents.  Taken altogether, these three components of 
the passional nature comprise James’ psychological thesis.  Each of these aspects of the 
passional nature provides support to the three philosophical arguments in The Will to 
Believe.  In the next section, I consider James’ argument against Clifford’s evidentialism, 
which relies on the third feature of the passional nature - the emotional constitution of 
belief.   
 
7.2 The Argument Against Evidentialism 
James wrote The Will to Believe in part as a response to William Clifford’s essay The 
Ethics of Belief.  According to Clifford, “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, 
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to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (Clifford [1876], 295).  This 
epistemological ethic, in which sufficient evidence is required for belief, is known as 
‘evidentialism’.  With respect to non-genuine options, James agrees with Clifford that 
this is the most prudent way to proceed.  This is because for many questions, as with 
scientific questions for James, we are mostly recorders of the truth.  As a result, a policy 
of remaining patient until sufficient evidence has been acquired is the optimal way to 
proceed in these matters.   
     It is important to note that the philosophical skeptic parts ways from Clifford and 
James with respect to these non-genuine options. The philosophical skeptic is the 
archetype of the conservative believer.  On the spectrum of consent ranging between 
hope and fear, the skeptic’s disposition to believe is motivated predominately by fear.  By 
not consenting to the belief that truth exists or at least a truth that we can know, the 
skeptic can be quite assured that epistemological errors will not creep into his or her 
belief system.  The skeptic will not be duped to use James’ term.  However, this risk-
averse approach comes at a significant epistemic cost.  For if we are in fact able to know 
the truth, regardless of what it may be, the skeptic will necessarily go without it.  By 
contrast, the individual who believes too easily without sufficient rigour lies on the 
opposite side of the spectrum.  The odds that these individuals will capture the truth is 
high, but this comes at the cost of letting many falsehoods into their belief system.  Their 
undisciplined approach, motivated predominately by hope, is unable to adequately 
distinguish truth from error.   
     As James rightly notes, the difference between a skeptic and the individual who 
believes in truth is not a matter of philosophical analysis or logic.  There is no way to 
logically disprove the skeptic.  All the rest of us can do is proceed with our hope that 
there is a truth of some kind.  As James says: 
Our belief in truth itself, for instance, that there is a truth, and that our minds and 
it are made for each other, - what is it but a passionate affirmation of desire, in 
which our social system backs us up? ([1897], 9). 
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The question of whether or not there is a truth – be it a particular truth or truth in general 
– is a forced choice, which is James’ second condition of a genuine option.  Even if one 
prefers to remain indifferent to the question that is proposed, this is akin to going without 
the truth.  The skeptic who remains agnostic with respect to the possibility of truth is for 
James essentially consenting to go without it – a consenting that is motivated by the fear 
of being a dupe.  
     Just as the skeptic parts ways from Clifford and James with respect to non-genuine 
options, so too does James part ways from Clifford with respect to genuine options.  This 
is ultimately because James is more of an epistemological risk-taker than Clifford, 
motivated more by the hope of truth rather than the fear of error.  This difference of 
perspective is not a matter of reason or logic, but of feeling and emotion.  
I myself find it impossible to go with Clifford.  We must remember that these 
feelings of our duty about either truth or error are in any case only expressions of 
our passional life ([1897], 18).   
James is not critical of Clifford for not believing in God since this belief is an expression 
of his passional nature.  Rather, James is critical of Clifford’s evidentialism, which issues 
an a priori prohibition on religious belief.  It is the rules prescribed by evidentialism that 
James regards as irrational ([1897], 28). 
     The third component of James’ passional nature figures importantly here – the 
emotional constitution of belief.  After all, Clifford could accept that a feeling foundation 
is necessary for a belief, and also that volitional effort is required.  With respect to the 
latter, Clifford says that it is wrong “to nourish belief by suppressing doubts and avoiding 
investigation” (Clifford [1876], 292).  Clearly volitional effort is required in some cases 
in order to acquire facts.  However, Clifford would maintain that we ought not to consent 
to the belief until there is sufficient evidence for it.  For genuine options, this strategy 
means that Clifford will necessarily not believe.  According to James, Clifford has every 
right not to believe on the basis of insufficient evidence with respect to genuine options, 
but he is not justified in proclaiming that it is unlawful to believe the other way.  Indeed, 
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Clifford does not recognize that his evidentialist ethic is an expression of his own 
passional nature – one that is motivated by the fear of being in error.  
     It is from this irreducibly subjective element of belief, which is a manifestation of our 
emotional constitution, that we are continually waging bets on the truth.  Some of us are 
more aggressive epistemic betters; others are more conservative.  These are simply 
psychological facts for James.  One of the purposes of his essay is to provide a 
philosophical argument for the optimal balance of this emotional constitution of belief, 
whereby we can maximize truth and minimize error.  The discipline of philosophy is in 
many ways concerned with navigating these two competing epistemological laws, and to 
find that optimal point.  Philosophers most often agree that this optimal point is one in 
which belief is withheld until sufficient evidence is acquired.  What counts as evidence 
and what counts as sufficient is of course a matter of dispute, but generally this strategy 
seems best equipped at avoiding error on the one hand and gaining truth on the other.  
However, James rejects that we should apply the same standard to all beliefs.  He is 
arguing that we ought to relax the impossible evidentialist requirements for genuine 
options by employing a more liberal epistemic policy in these cases.  James regards his 
heterogeneous policy with respect to belief, which requires sufficient evidence for some 
questions but not for others, as the optimal point for managing these conflicting 
epistemological laws. 
 
7.3 The Right to Believe Argument 
There are numerous arguments running through The Will to Believe, and it can be 
challenging to keep them distinct.  The voluntarist reading of James conflates his 
argument against evidentialism with his argument for the will to believe.  Since according 
to the evidentialist critique we need not have sufficient evidence in order to believe, we 
can legitimately will to believe God’s existence.  This is obviously a misreading.  It is 
important to separate James’ argument against evidentialism from his argument in 
support of the will to believe and the right to believe.  These arguments differ in their 
scope.  The argument against evidentialism is directed toward all readers.  The dictum 
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that it is always wrong to believe without sufficient evidence is, according to James, an 
irrational rule, one motivated predominately by fear ([1897], 28).  The right to believe 
argument on the other hand, which builds upon the argument against evidentialism, is 
directed toward a much smaller audience.  This is made clear by James as he transitions 
from his argument against evidentialism to his argument for the right to believe:  
If for any of you religion be a hypothesis that cannot, by any living possibility be 
true, then you need go no farther. I speak to the ‘saving remnant alone” ([1897], 
26).  
One could agree with James’ argument against evidentialism, but still not be part of this 
saving remnant, since the religious question remains dead.  Indeed, James is now only 
speaking to those individuals to whom the religious question is live.  
     While liveness is a necessary condition in order to have the right to believe it is not 
sufficient.  This subtle point has not been appreciated by many of James’ advocates, who 
argue that anybody in a state of doubt – that is, to whom the question is live – thereby has 
a right to believe (Gale [1999]; Jackman [1999]; Slater [2009]).  James is not saying that 
anyone who has preexisting feelings to believe thereby has a right to believe.  He is 
appealing specifically to those individuals whose feeling foundation is more strongly 
inclined to believe in the God hypothesis, which he makes clear in the opening 
paragraphs of the essay: 
I have long defended to my own students the lawfulness of voluntarily adopted 
faith; but as soon as they have got well imbued with the logical spirit, they have 
as a rule refused to admit my contention to be lawful philosophically, even though 
in point of fact they were personally all the time chock-full of some faith or other 
themselves ([1897], 2). 
The students that James is concerned with are not only in a state of doubt, but in a 
particular state of doubt.  It is a conflict between their preexisting feeling for some faith 
that is “chock-full” and their “logical spirit”.  The essay is thus primarily directed toward 
those individuals whose strong preexisting feeling to believe in some faith has been 
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stifled by their “merely logical intellect” ([1897], 1-2).  Of the two live propositions that 
are in conflict then, James is targeting those individuals who are more inclined toward 
belief in God.80  Being in a psychological state of doubt is thereby necessary but not 
sufficient to have the right to believe.  As James says, “we have the right to believe at our 
own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will” ([1897], 29).  Belief 
requires more than liveness.  The hypothesis has to be “live enough to tempt our will”.  
Presumably, James thinks that we can only accomplish so much by our volitional effort; 
that only those individuals who are already more inclined to believe have the possibility 
to believe.  Right implies can. 
     Meanwhile, an individual for whom the question is live, but the feeling for the belief 
is faint, does not have the possibility to believe.  Their will simply will not be tempted, 
and as a result it is pointless to say that these individuals have a right to believe.  For the 
individual to whom the religious question is live but nevertheless faint, it would follow 
that they have the right not to believe in God.  Since their will is more tempted by the 
non-believing hypothesis, these individuals have the right to overcome their uncertainty 
and firmly believe in the non-existence of God.  While James is a theistic sympathizer 
advocating belief to an academic audience, his argument equally applies to an atheistic 
sympathizer advocating disbelief to a religious audience.  For example, it would apply to 
those individuals who are going through the ritualistic motions of religious faith but who 
have deep lingering doubts.81  These individuals have a right to believe in atheism since 
their will is most tempted in that direction. 
                                                
80
 This reading is further supported by a letter James wrote to Mark Baldwin, which is discussed by Hunter 
Brown.  Brown says: “On the whole, then, with respect to the first major characteristic of liveness, I am 
proposing that James’s main concern in The Will to Believe is with situations in which one has a certain 
existing belief or propensity to believe which, as he described it to Mark Baldwin, is “threatened” by an 
alternate proposition towards which one also finds a propensity to believe” (Brown [2000], 40).    
81
 Of relevance here is Daniel Dennett and Linda LaScola’s Preachers Who Are Not Believers (2010).  
These authors present a number of cases of Christian preachers who have either lost or are in the process of 
losing their faith, but nevertheless continue to preach.  This paper is part of a bigger project called The 
Clergy Project. 
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     For the individuals that James is focusing upon, however, their options are either to 
remain in a state of doubt or to believe in some kind of religious faith that makes a 
connection with their existent feelings.  Not only must the passional nature decide this 
question, but it may lawfully choose either option.  It is important to note that with 
respect to this right to believe thesis that James remains entirely neutral as to what the 
individual should do.  He is not advocating that such individuals should believe.  He is 
simply saying that it is permissible for them to believe, just as it is permissible for them 
to remain in a state of doubt.  This cold, neutral argument for the permissibility of belief 
is not James’ ultimate argument, however.  I consider his primary argument – the will to 
believe thesis – in the next section.    
 
7.4 The Will to Believe Argument 
Amongst advocates of James’ essay, it is standard practice to distinguish the right to 
believe from the will to believe.  Most often the will to believe is read as a psychological 
thesis, which supports his philosophical right to believe thesis (Franks [2004]; Slater 
[2009]; Yeager [1989]).  While I agree that James’ psychological thesis (namely the 
passional nature) informs his epistemic thesis, I disagree that the will to believe is a 
psychological thesis.  Instead of interpreting the will to believe as informing a more 
primary epistemic argument, I argue that it is the primary argument of the paper.82 
                                                
82
 Gail Kennedy also argues that the will to believe is James’ more primary argument: “James asserts two 
different propositions, not kept as distinct as they might have been either by him in that essay nor by his 
critics.  The first is concerned with what should be called the “right to believe: it is, that under certain 
conditions one is entitled to believe in the existence of a fact in advance of having complete evidence… 
The second is concerned with what properly should be called the “will to believe”: it is, that there are 
certain cases where the belief in the future existence of a fact may itself help to produce that fact (Kennedy 
[1958], 579-80).”  This argument, however, confuses James’ argument against evidentialism with his ‘will 
to believe’ argument.  By believing in God, James does not think that we “produce” the fact.  His argument 
that faith can produce facts, such as when we believe we can jump over a precipice, is intended to 
undermine evidentialism.   
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     We have seen that for James only particular individuals, based on the particular 
makeup of their passional nature, have a right to believe in God.  He remains completely 
neutral with respect to what these individuals should choose.  It is permissible that 
individuals believe in these circumstances just as it is permissible that they remain in a 
state of doubt.  But this permissibility misses the central thrust of James’ argument.  
Indeed, the will to believe thesis goes further than mere permissibility.  According to 
James, those individuals who have a right to believe ought to believe.  This ought is not 
to be understood in terms of a moral duty to believe.83  Nor is it to be understood as a 
prudential ought; that we ought to believe because it is better for us.  In this respect, 
Hunter Brown has brought to light the importance of the strenuous mood to James’ moral 
and religious philosophy (Brown [2000]).  James does not think that believing in God 
will bring ease and comfort to the individual.  Rather, belief in God often requires living 
strenuously, whereby an individual is required to confront and act against evil in the 
world, which can entail sacrifice and pain.  As a result, a crude pragmatist reading of The 
Will to Believe fails to capture the essence of the essay.  James is not arguing that we 
should believe in God because it is expedient to do so.  
     The ought is rather an urging that individuals take responsibility for themselves by 
acting according with their deepest convictions.  In cases of genuine options, where an 
individual has a right to believe, James is advocating that individuals have the courage to 
trust their own feelings and believe.  
When I look at the religious question as it really puts itself to concrete men, and 
when I think of all the possibilities which both practically and theoretically it 
involves, then this command that we shall put a stopper on our heart, instincts, 
and courage, and wait…seems to me the queerest idol ever manufactured in the 
philosophic cave ([1897], 29-30). 
                                                
83 Interestingly, in 1875, in a review for The Nation, James took such a view. Peter Kauber and Peter H. 
Hare in The Right and Duty to Believe (1974) go into further detail on this duty to believe.  In fact, they 
ultimately argue that James did not retract this thesis; that James is ultimately arguing for the duty to 
believe.  In making this argument they look at James’ philosophy as a whole, particularly his essay, The 
Moral Philosopher and Moral Life.  However, there is little if any textual evidence to support this view in 
The Will to Believe.  
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James is going much further than simply arguing for the lawfulness and permissibility of 
religious belief.  He is advocating that we ought to remove this “stopper on our heart, 
instincts and courage”.  In a letter to Peirce, in which James explains his position in The 
Will to Believe, he claims he was trying “to legitimate the individual in ‘trusting his 
lights’ at his own risk” (Dooley [1972], 142; quoting an unpublished letter of James).  
Here again we see that James is ultimately concerned with instilling in his reader the 
conviction to trust his or her own feelings, rather than the norms of the culture, and have 
the courage to believe.  
     Of central importance to this reading of the will to believe is James’ third requirement 
of a genuine option; namely that it be ‘momentous’. 
So proceeding, we see, first, that religion offers itself as a momentous option.  We 
are supposed to gain, even now, by our belief, and to lose by our non-belief, a 
certain vital good ([1897], 26). 
The “vital good” that we gain with religious belief is a universe that we are deeply 
connected with.  As James says of the religious convert, “The universe is no longer a 
mere It to us, but a Thou, if we are religious” ([1897], 27).  This is the feeling of intimacy 
that we saw in the previous chapter.  Of course, this feeling of connectedness to the world 
comes with the potential loss of being duped.  A question is thereby momentous when the 
stakes in either believing or not believing are high.  As a result, whether we believe or do 
not believe, we are taking a gamble.  This gamble, which is so momentous to the life of 
the individual, is essentially a bet between one’s own deeper feelings and a cultural norm.  
It is far better, according to James, to win or lose by trusting your own lights than to win 
or lose by following some external standard.  With these momentous choices, the choice 
is ultimately between choosing on behalf of one’s self versus abdicating one’s self in 
favour of an external rule.  By following the societal norm, we end up acting in a kind of 
Jamesian bad faith, whereby we turn away from our deeper convictions.  
     According to James, those individuals who have a right to believe in God, ought to 
summon up their courage to believe.  This summoning up of courage requires effort of 
will – hence the will to believe.  Indeed, it is no accident that James concludes his essay 
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by quoting a passage from Fitz James Stephen. “In all important transactions of life we 
have to take a leap in the dark… If we decide to leave the riddles unanswered, that is a 
choice…What must we do? ‘Be strong and of a good courage’” ([1897], 31). 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to shed light on what the passional nature with respect to 
belief consists of for James.  The various misinterpretations of his essay, be it from critics 
or supporters of James, stem from a failure to appreciate the scope and structure of the 
passional nature.  Each of the three components of the passional nature provides support 
for one of James’ three arguments in The Will to Believe.  The emotional constitution of 
belief supports James’ argument against evidentialism; the feeling foundation of belief 
supports his right to believe argument; and the volitional aspect of belief supports his will 
to believe argument.   
     The emphasis that has been placed on James’ right to believe thesis fails to capture the 
passion, emotion and feeling that runs through The Will to Believe.  James is ultimately 
arguing that those who have a right to believe ought to trust their feelings, be courageous, 
and will to believe. 
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8 Conclusion 
As a philosopher, James makes daring intellectual leaps, but in the process he can be 
inattentive to detail, leaving behind a trail of confusion.  This is certainly the case with 
his work on emotion, where more than a century of misunderstanding has distorted his 
view.  Over the last seven chapters, I have attempted to clarify James’ work in this 
domain by inquiring into his conception of consciousness, the nature and extent of 
emotional feelings, and the relationship between emotion and other mental and bodily 
phenomena.  This clarification of James’ view is only possible to the extent that there is 
consistency in the use of his terms.  I have argued that James has a broad understanding 
of the concept emotion.  It refers not only to coarse emotions, but also objectless 
emotions, subtle emotions, self-feelings, blind emotions, habitual emotions, feelings of 
reality and transformational emotions.  All of these affective states are emotions insofar 
as they are bidirectional feelings – that is, they are at once bodily feelings and feelings 
directed toward the world.  With the terms mood and passion on the other hand, no clear 
definition emerges in James’ work.  On some occasions these terms are used 
synonymously with emotion, while at other times they seem to take on a different 
meaning.  For example, James’ discussion of the strenuous mood seems to include not 
only feelings of reality but also a constellation of associated ideas.  Likewise, the 
passional nature extends further than the category of emotion, as it also includes the 
volitional aspects of the self.  This is a reminder that the emotional domain for James is 
ultimately difficult to clearly demarcate as it is intimately tied up with instinct, habit, 
attention and will.    
     As opposed to the standard view of James, whereby he is thought to reduce an 
emotion to bodily feelings, I have argued that emotions imbue our experience of the 
world with meaning and value.  Moreover, our philosophical and religious beliefs about 
the world are built upon an underlying emotional foundation.  There is little doubt that 
emotion is a core element within James’ overall philosophy, but I have yet to mention his 
way of philosophizing.  In this respect, the content of his view is in perfect harmony with 
his style.  James injects passion and feeling into his writing, breathing new life and 
urgency into age-old philosophical questions.  When one reads James, it is eminently 
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clear that he has felt the force of the philosophical questions that he engages with.  This 
passionate style, combined with what seems to be an effortless talent for writing, 
resonates with readers.  Owen Flanagan has said that William James is his favourite 
philosopher and yet he disagrees with almost everything he says (Flanagan [1997]).  This 
is surely a testament to James’ style.  He does not treat philosophical questions as abstract 
curiosities, to be thought about from a safe intellectual distance.  He rejects this 
traditional approach to philosophy in which we simply observe and think about the world.  
We are not “absolutely passive clay upon which ‘experience’ rains down”, but are active 
beings, who shape the world as much as the world shapes us ([1890], 1: 403).  Try as 
many philosophers may, James does not keep his feelings out of the philosophical 
domain. 
     While I hope my work has clarified aspects of James’ understanding of emotion, there 
are certainly further questions that remain.  Emotion figures prominently in both 
Pragmatism and Essays on Radical Empiricism, two of James’ later works that I have not 
considered here.  With respect to the latter, James’ metaphysical theory of pure 
experience is informed, in part, by his understanding of emotion.  This aspect of James’ 
work, particularly as it is developed in The Place of Affectional Facts In Pure Experience 
has received little scholarly attention.  As for James’ pragmatic theory of truth, there 
continue to be ongoing debates about its commitments.  For example, the most prominent 
argument against his theory is that it reduces truth to subjective contentment (Russell 
[1910/2009], Moore [1907]), Rescher [2000]).  Hilary Putnam, however, has argued that 
there is a “Peircian strain” to James’ theory, wherein truth is ultimately regarded as a 
collective matter (Putnam [1997], 166).  A fully fleshed out Jamesian conception of 
emotion, including the relationship between emotion and belief, could help to resolve this 
and other questions.  
     Furthermore, I have not inquired into the relevance of James’ views to contemporary 
philosophy of emotion.  However, it certainly seems to have important implications to 
current debates.  James challenges numerous assumptions, such as the building-block 
model of consciousness, the feeling-thought distinction, and the scope of the category 
emotion.  Moreover, he focuses in detail on affective states that have not received much 
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attention in contemporary emotion theory, including feelings of reality and 
transformational emotions.  His discussion of the relationship between emotion and 
belief, a theme that runs through much of his writing, is another area where James is of 
relevance within the current climate of philosophy.  
     To conclude, it might seem that James’ views on emotion, particularly his later views, 
leaves the practice of philosophy in a precarious position.  If our philosophical beliefs 
necessarily take root from an underlying feeling foundation, then this seems to degrade 
the rational undertaking of philosophical inquiry and debate.  This conclusion is too 
hasty.  First, it might be the case that some feeling orientations to the world are more 
rational than others.  This appears to be the view that James takes in Pragmatism, where 
he tries to find a more balanced perspective than the “men of radical idiosyncrasy” who 
have largely dominated western philosophy ([1905], 489).  Second, bringing more 
attention to this affective foundation, both in ourselves and in others, might in fact serve 
to benefit the nature of philosophical inquiry.  It could very well inspire more humility in 
our beliefs, further developing the intellectual virtues of curiosity and open-mindedness, 
which could help to bring about a more inclusive and vibrant philosophical environment.    
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